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ABSTRACT 
Amidst studies attempting to fix the U.S., China, and their relationship into preconceived 
frameworks of international relations, presupposed definitions, and models of reality, this 
dissertation adopts an identity centric approach to understanding the nature of U.S.-China 
relations and, more generally, international politics.  This approach involves utilizing an 
interpretive method to understanding, analyzing the narratives of self and other expressed 
by political actors and how their identities—expressed through narratives—interact with 
one another and thus how they influence or reflect social behavior.  Striving for greater 
understanding and a more intellectually honest approach to the study of international 
politics, this study seeks not theory building or generalizability in a traditional 
“scientific” sense.  Rather, informed by thinkers from Karl Popper through those more 
recent, this dissertation develops and outlines an in-depth, contextual approach to 
understanding, applying this approach to analyzing the nature of U.S.-China relations. 
Ultimately, this study argues that U.S. and Chinese identities and how their 
identities interact influence the nature of U.S.-China relations, whether the relationship 
tends towards cooperation or conflict, and that in order to glimpse this nature researchers 
must delve into the details of their subjects of study.  Attempting to do so, this study 
analyzes U.S.-China relations surrounding the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, 
relations regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan as it 
pertains to U.S. relations with China, and relations regarding encounters between the U.S. 
and China in cyber space (paying special note to attempts to define this “space” itself). 
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PREFACE 
Much of the work focusing on relations between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China remains speculative, attempting to ascertain what type of power China 
is and thusly the impact its rise will have on international politics.  Attempts to pin down 
the nature of the People’s Republic of China or the nature of the U.S.-China relationship, 
however, too often result in misleading monotypes and what Harry Harding refers to as 
mutually exclusive scenarios.1  Too often analysts and observers blind themselves to the 
complexity and nuance of U.S.-China relations in attempting to define (to box in and 
enclose) the current and future nature of this very relationship.  U.S.-China relations are 
not solely cooperative, competitive, or conflictual, nor will they be so easily defined 
moving into the future.  An obvious but oft forgotten insight bears great relevance with 
regard to examining this relationship and others in international politics: the complexity 
of social behavior and of social subjects.  However unfortunate, researchers seldom deal 
with absolutes in the realm of social behavior and thus social scientists must turn to more 
open modes of inquiry if they truly wish to draw nearer to understanding their subjects. 
In a region where historical animosities and unresolved territorial disputes remain 
important, many East and Southeast Asian states look askance at China and its rise, 
concerned over their security, independence, and economic prosperity.  Uncertainty fuels 
this anxiety more than anything, uncertainty over whether China will become belligerent 
and challenge the existing regional or global status quo as restraints on its behavior 
                                                
1 Harry Harding, “American Visions of the Future of U.S.-China Relations: Competition, 
Cooperation, and Conflict,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, ed. David 
Shambaugh (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), 389. 
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decline, concomitant with its increasing power and influence.  The United States views 
China much in the same way: speculation spurred by uncertainty over whether future 
relations between Beijing and Washington will be characterized more by cooperation, 
competition, or even conflict.  This is more than a simple issue of academic intrigue, as 
the United States has many vested interests and important relationships in the Asia-
Pacific and possesses the power projection capabilities that very much make it an 
important actor within the region. 
For its part, the Chinese government reassures the world of the peaceful nature of 
China’s rise and of the harmonious nature of its society.  At the same time, Beijing 
behaves in ways that lead many to question whether the Chinese government uses such 
professions to mask its true intentions, biding time while attaining greater economic clout 
and military strength to later reshape world politics in its favor.  Do China’s relationships 
with North Korea or Iran, its opposition to the United Nations’ sanctions against Syria, its 
territorial dispute with Japan over islands in the East China Sea, or its disputes with 
Southeast Asian states over maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea coincide 
with a peaceful rise?  What of China’s increased military spending and military 
modernization?  Such concerns do not necessarily indicate China’s current or potential 
belligerence or portend the ultimately conflictual nature of its rise.  Understanding these 
issues depends, in part, upon careful examination of whether such points of tension are 
emblematic of or are an exception to overall Chinese behavior.  It also depends on the 
matter of perspective.  Is China the driving force behind such points of tension or are 
other actors?  Do any one state’s interests hold objective legitimacy over those of 
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another?  In analyzing U.S.-China relations, this study argues that, most importantly, the 
nature of relations between the U.S. and China depend on how both countries view 
themselves, view each other, and view the international system; relations depend upon 
their identities.  Through a process of discursive representation, U.S. and Chinese 
identities are expressed and shaped. 
Demonstrating the relevance of what traditional international relations theories 
exclude in their analyses, this study adopts an identity centric approach to the study of 
international politics, seeking a stronger foundation for and more intellectually honest 
approach to understanding the nature of relations between international actors.  While 
problematizing the role of identity in international politics is not new, this study differs 
from others in adopting a more interpretive approach to examining the role of identity, in 
elucidating the foundations upon which this approach rests, and in demonstrating the 
political nature of identity. 
As argued throughout this study, identities underlie the nature of and provide the 
foundation for relations between actors, they underlie the nature of the international 
political system, and they underlie the various approaches to explaining international 
politics.  For whatever it lacks in comparison to traditional approaches—desires for 
parsimony or (illusory) explanatory power—this approach makes up for in potential to 
offer detailed, context based understanding of important issues while providing a more 
intellectually honest approach to the study of international politics, an approach always 
wary of the danger of reifying social constructions and always cognizant of the effects 
produced by the theories and the worldviews held by actors and their observers.
  1 
Prologue 
 
AMERICA’S ASIA-PACIFIC CENTURY 
 
 
America and China have arrived at a critical juncture, a time when the 
choices we make—both big and small—will shape the trajectory of this 
relationship.† 
 
–Hillary Rodham Clinton 
 
 
On 16 November 2011, President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard announced a joint strategic decision reflective of the United States’ pivot toward 
the Asia-Pacific region.  Holding a news conference in Canberra, Australia, the two 
leaders revealed their agreement to rotate deployments of U.S. Marines through 
Robertson Barracks near Darwin, located in Australia’s Northern Territory, and to allow 
the U.S. Air Force to access Royal Australian Air Force facilities in the area.2  This 
decision came during a time of seeming decline in the United States’ preoccupation with 
the Middle East and nearby countries,3 refocusing its foreign policy and interests toward 
the “far east.”  Though many expected the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to occupy 
much of the United States’ foreign policy interest at the start of the twenty first century, 
al-Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 attacks on the twin World Trade Center towers in New 
                                                
† U.S. Department of State, “Inaugural Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture on a Broad Vision 
of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century,” Remarks: Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, January 14, 2011. 
 
2 White House, “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard 
of Australia in Canberra, Australia,” Administration of Barack Obama, 2011, November 
16, 2011. 
 
3 As colloquial references to the “Middle East” often include states actually part of other 
nearby geographic regions. 
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York and on the Pentagon using hijacked U.S. commercial planes, a fourth plane brought 
down by its passengers in rural Pennsylvania before reaching its target, prompted a 
fundamental shift in the focus of U.S. foreign policy, security interests, and warfare 
strategy. 
Shortly after these attacks, which stirred sympathy in support of the United States 
well beyond its borders, Washington struck at al-Qaeda’s sanctuary, invading 
Afghanistan with widespread international approval.  The Bush administration’s original 
goal was to track down Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda’s leader, eliminate the terrorist 
organization’s training camps and ability to plan and conduct future attacks, and remove 
the Afghan Taliban from power, securing the country from serving as a refuge for future 
terrorist activity.  Initially responding with a limited footprint, relying primarily upon 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces personnel working 
with the Afghan Northern Alliance and supported by U.S. air power, the United States 
was unable to secure Afghanistan’s borders and prevent al-Qaeda’s retreat into the 
relatively ungoverned territory in northwest Pakistan.  Despite having yet to achieve its 
goals, the United States soon shifted its focus away from Afghanistan as it undertook a 
preemptive invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 on the grounds (possibly the pretense) of 
the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.4 
During its tenure, the Obama administration effected the withdrawal of U.S. 
troops from Iraq set out in the Status of Forces Agreement signed towards the end of the 
                                                
4 Though the George W. Bush administration classified its invasion of Iraq as 
preemptive, many argue that it is actually an example of preventive war, as the U.S. did 
not face any imminent threat. 
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Bush administration and reemphasized focus on Afghanistan.  Now, shortly over a 
decade since the September 11 attacks, the future degree and length of U.S. force 
commitments to Afghanistan remain uncertain while general U.S. interest in the war 
grows increasingly tenuous.  Even so, U.S. troop levels are declining, the surge forces 
deployed to Afghanistan withdrawn at the end of September 2012, and the U.S. 
increasingly eyes withdrawal from the country. 
With declining U.S. commitments and interests in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
Obama administration is carefully reorienting the United States’ focus towards the Asia-
Pacific region.  The joint agreement between the United States and Australia to rotate 
U.S. Marines through Australia’s base near Darwin serves as one of the strongest 
examples of this shift in U.S. foreign policy over recent years.  It signals both the United 
States’ commitment to the region and the importance of the region’s dynamics to the 
future interests of the United States.  Though many U.S. allies and partners throughout 
the region welcome greater U.S. involvement, this development does raise concern for 
some, particularly China.  While the Obama administration is careful to assert that its 
actions are not directed towards China, questions persist over whether the administration 
indeed aims to contain China’s rise.  Both countries hold varied interests in the Asia-
Pacific, many of them overlapping.  Both countries also suffer from a fundamental lack 
of mutual trust, driving uncertainty and speculation on both sides and often increasing the 
degree of tension in U.S.-China relations.  While the ultimate effects of the United States’ 
renewed interest in the Asia-Pacific remain concealed in the future, this renewed interest 
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nevertheless offers a unique opportunity to begin building a deeper understanding of 
U.S.-China relations. 
To understand Washington’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific and broader U.S.-China 
relations, this study adopts an identity centric approach to examining international 
politics, arguing that doing so offers the greatest potential for understanding relations 
between the U.S. and China and the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy and strategic 
focus to the region.  This approach focuses not on fixed, pre-given, monolithic identities 
and interests.  Instead, it seeks to uncover the important identities at play in U.S.-China 
relations and how those identities interact with one another, utilizing an interpretive 
method of understanding.  “Identity,” a cognitive concept explored later in greater detail, 
generally refers to individually or collectively held relational conceptualizations that 
distinguish the self from other (whether individuals or groups).  Actors invariably hold 
many different identities.  In order to understand the important identities in U.S.-China 
relations, researchers must turn to the narratives found on each side that speak to 
conceptions of the self and the other.  Further, researchers must move to explore what 
these narratives do and how they, these conceptualizations or representations, influence 
the conceptualizations held by the other—how identities influence other identities.  
Essentially, researchers must explore the identities of the actors they study and how those 
identities interact.  This requires examining how narratives and salient identities relate to 
one another and to actual international behavior in order to develop more comprehensive 
understanding of U.S-China relations.  Analyzing the identities involved in U.S.-China 
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relations allows for the development of a more nuanced understanding of the nature of 
this relationship and the interests held by each side. 
Traditional Explanations 
Before exploring U.S. and Chinese identities relating to the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific 
region, considering traditional explanations from the field of international relations is 
worthwhile, as these explanations themselves act and are adopted as identities of sorts.  
Though a single event in the ever-dynamic realm of international politics, the joint U.S.-
Australian agreement of November 2011 serves as a microcosm for beginning to explore 
salient issues in and modes of understanding U.S-China relations.  How might observers 
understand, explain, or interpret this agreement and overall renewed U.S. interest in the 
Asia-Pacific?  For some time, reminiscent of the field of international relations itself, 
academics and analysts have debated how best to explain relations in the region, 
especially between the United States and China. 
In 2006, John Mearsheimer, for example, contended that China’s rise will 
increasingly create a situation of security competition between Washington and Beijing, 
each side fearing the capabilities and intentions of the other, spurring both to strive for or 
maintain hegemony.  Mearsheimer drew a parallel to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, arguing that China will attempt to drive the United States from East 
Asia while predicting that the United States will “…go to great lengths to contain China 
and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in 
Asia.  In essence, America is likely to behave toward China much the way it behaved 
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toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.”5  This pessimistic view represents a 
“classic” power politics, realist narrative of international politics, interpreting states as 
predominantly interested in their own survival and security due to mistrust and desire for 
power fueled by the anarchic order in which they exist.6  Treating this view as a narrative 
rather than an explanation, as with other international relations theories, helps underscore 
the ability these theories possess to do much more than explain international politics.  
These theories possess the ability to influence international politics, as social theories do 
not truly represent reality but construct realities and influence the worldviews through 
which international actors interpret the world. 
 Other theoretical explanations of China and U.S.-China relations might emphasize 
the importance of cooperation when and where it occurs, holding potential to reduce 
conflict and promote cooperation between increasingly interdependent and interacting 
states.  They might find important work being done in and some degree of influence 
extenuating from the Asia-Pacific region’s various multilateral institutions.7  Studies of 
such institutions offer mixed verdicts about their effectiveness in promoting cooperation, 
in producing meaningful decisions, and in implementing enforcement mechanisms.  This 
betrays little surprise: much the same often holds for the institutions of international 
                                                
5 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 
2006): 162. 
 
6 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
 
7 Institutions including: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); 
the East Asia Summit (EAS); and even to some extent the six-party talks focused on 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 
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politics in general.  Some might also herald the post-Cold War spread of democracy and 
law-like observation that democracies rarely enter into armed conflict with one another.8  
This factor is worth remembering even if China itself is not a democracy.  On one hand, 
foreign policy makers and analysts from various countries might ponder whether 
democratic transition will take place within China (if so, hopefully with little turmoil or 
unrest, unfortunately not often the case with transitions to democracy) and in turn have 
some insight into what relations will be like with the United States if it ever does.  On the 
other hand, China’s economy has increasingly liberalized over recent decades, with 
greater market reforms and freedoms.  These insights ultimately lead to questions over 
how the existence of various ideologies, deep history, and problematic (often 
undemocratic) governments in the Asia-Pacific influence relations between the region’s 
actors, offering insight into why neoliberal expectations might or might not hold.9 
 Accompanying these approaches, which are often accepted as the predominant 
frameworks in the field of international relations, social constructivist explanations of 
                                                
8 Law in the scientific sense.  Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” The 
American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986).  Also see Bruce Russett, 
Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
9 The broader region offers evidence of governments in states such as North Korea 
wanting much in the way of basic rights and liberties and lacking functioning democratic 
systems of governance, attracting views and proclamations that these governments are 
fundamentally at odds with Western values.  Strong claims, as these are, should never be 
taken for granted, instead begging inspection into how, why, and to what degree such 
fundamental differences in identities and interests occur.  Reports, such as those produced 
by Freedom House, offer a way to visualize at least some of these differences, evaluating 
and ranking governments based on level of freedom throughout the world.  See, for 
instance, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012.  This provides more of an aid in 
beginning to visualize differences in the region and, as with data of any form and any 
source, analysts must always question how such results are derived. 
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China’s rise incorporate factors such as history, culture, and ideology that should 
accompany any attempt at understanding.  By their very nature, these factors constitute, 
characterize, and otherwise influence the context of relational behavior, whether this 
means the nature of structures like the international system or the norms and expectations 
that exist between actors of various types.  Many adopting this sort of approach to 
studying China or U.S.-China relations have aimed to determine whether Western 
theories of international relations, specifically realism, are applicable to China or the 
broader Asia-Pacific region.  Ian Alastair Johnston and Feng Huiyun’s respective studies 
of Chinese strategic culture do just this.10  Despite differences in their findings, both 
studies implicitly hold that strategic cultures—worldviews—are neither uniform nor 
monolithic, derived from states’ unique histories and ideas.  In other words, differences in 
such views exist between states as well as within them.  David Kang’s argument in China 
Rising follows similarly, positing that China’s foreign relations are best understood in 
terms of its historic role as the Middle Kingdom and its tributary relations with 
neighboring countries, offering a peaceful ordering of the region.11  Kang’s and similar 
arguments reflect the notion of Chinese exceptionalism, the view that China’s history and 
historic conduct are characterized more by peaceful relations than principles of power 
politics.  Often this view is then projected onto present and future China to define the 
                                                
10 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Feng Huiyun, Chinese 
Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership, and 
War (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
 
11 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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nature of its rise.  Paradoxically, such explanations often take homogeneity for granted, 
ignoring any possible variance in worldviews—essentially identities—within states, not 
to mention interaction effects impacting identities both within and between states, 
undervaluing the potential for change (even if the idea of change receives nominal 
attention) and undermining attempts to understand it. 
 The most promise for understanding China’s rise and its implications for U.S. 
interests results from those studies more indebted to social psychology (whether 
acknowledged) and tenets of social constructivism, focusing on the dynamism of 
identities, picking up where shallow constructivist explanations either circumscribe or 
abandon their own explanatory journeys.  These more promising studies adopt deeper, 
thicker constructivist approaches.  Assessing Chinese nationalism and relations with the 
United States in their respective studies, Peter Hays Gries and William A. Callahan place 
particular emphasis on the role of ideas and history in U.S.-China relations.12  Consider 
the humiliation narrative, recounting the historic abuses China suffered at the hands of 
Western powers and Japan for approximately a century from the early-mid nineteenth 
century forward, as well as China’s more recent optimism stemming from its impressive 
rise.  How might such ideas and beliefs influence leaders and governed alike?  What 
might be the effect of such factors on interactions between governments?  When 
activated, typically summoned in response to circumstance, identities—the historic 
victim, the rising power, and others—possesses the ability to affect relations between 
                                                
12 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press,  2004) and William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist 
Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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actors and influence behavior.  This is not simply the case for relations between states but 
for relations between all international actors, across and within state borders.  Ultimately, 
Gries and Callahan similarly conclude that whether China and the United States treat one 
another as friends or enemies, partners or competitors, will greatly influence the nature of 
U.S.-China relations. 
 While offering much greater insight into U.S.-China relations than some 
approaches, these studies, essentially focusing on the role of identity in international 
politics, leave many fundamental issues and questions unexplored.  As stated previously, 
the recent agreement between Washington and Canberra offers an opportunity to begin 
exploring identity in U.S.-China relations.  The uneasy, indeterminate relations between 
Washington and Beijing suggest an interplay of corresponding and competing identities 
and interests.  Beyond simple nationalism holding greatest sway over bilateral relations 
between these two countries, the existence of multiple identities and their differences 
require exploration.  This exploration requires delving into the processes through which 
identities are constituted and expressed, implicitly or explicitly, consciously or not.  It 
requires examining the narratives in which glimpses of identity may be gleaned.  The 
Obama administration’s pivot toward the Asia-Pacific and China’s reactions offer an 
ideal point from which to embark upon this examination as well as explore any effects 
theory inspired worldviews might have on U.S.-China relations. 
U.S. Perspective of the “Pivot” 
With the announcement of plans to rotate U.S. Marines through Australia’s Robertson 
Barracks, starting with 250 personnel in mid-2012 up to 2,500 over subsequent years, 
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President Obama emphasized that the decision, coming on the 60th anniversary of the 
alliance between the two countries, was intended to increase both U.S. cooperation with 
Australia and U.S. commitment to the region.13  According to the President’s statements, 
this commitment includes maintaining a regional leadership role, maintaining the 
region’s security architecture, and protecting lines of commerce and trade.  When 
questioned about China, the President replied that the United States bears no fear of the 
country and welcomes a rising, peaceful China.  At the same time, the President 
emphasized that China needs to play by the rules that have permitted its amazing 
economic progress over the past few decades.14 
The next day, speaking before the Australian Parliament in Canberra and later in 
front of U.S. and Australian military personnel at the Royal Australian Air Force Base in 
Darwin, President Obama praised Australian troops and the importance of the U.S.-
Australian Alliance.  After alluding to their shared history—U.S. and Australian forces 
fighting together since World War II after Australia’s own “Pearl Harbor” in Darwin—he 
stated, “our alliance is rooted in the bonds between our people and the democratic values 
that we share and our commitment to stand with each other through thick and through 
thin, no matter what.”15  These shared values include a respect for universal human rights 
                                                
13 Ladwig states that this joint-decision and the “pivot” will only bring U.S. Army and 
Marine personnel back up to their pre-Iraq war levels.  See Walter C. Ladwig III, “The 
Best Defense is Dialogue,” The New York Times, September 27, 2012. 
 
14 White House, “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard 
of Australia in Canberra, Australia.” 
 
15 White House, “Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra, Australia,” Administration of 
Barack Obama, 2011, November 17, 2011.  White House, “Remarks to United States and 
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and the efforts of both the United States and Australia to promote and defend such 
freedoms when and where they are threatened.  He also asserted the “fundamental truth” 
that the United States is and always has been a Pacific nation.  Addressing regional 
concerns over cuts in the U.S. defense budget, President Obama reassured his audience, 
and in essence the world, that any cuts would not come at the expense of U.S. capabilities 
in and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. 
 The Obama administration’s strategic decision to reorient U.S. focus to the Asia-
Pacific presents what appears a unified effort by top administration officials that began 
not long after the President’s election, well before his trip to Australia after the 
November 2011 APEC forum.  In July of 2009, for example, Washington hosted the first 
meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) between the United States and 
China, initiated by President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao.  The S&ED 
(successor to the previous administration’s participation in the joint creation of the 
Strategic Economic Dialogue [SED] with China, focusing on economic and financial 
relations) offers a bilateral forum for high-level officials from Beijing and Washington to 
discuss and pursue mutual security interests and economic cooperation on issues around 
the world.16  At the 2010 S&ED meeting in Beijing, both parties began discussing the 
promotion of educational and cultural exchanges between American and Chinese 
                                                                                                                                            
Australian Military Personnel at Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin, Australia,”  
Administration of Barack Obama, 2011, November 17, 2011. 
 
16 White House, “Remarks by the President at the U.S./China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue,” Office of the Press Secretary, July 27, 2009. 
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citizens.17  Though much of the discussions at these meetings have focused on economic 
cooperation and international financial recovery after the 2008 global economic crisis, 
both countries have also reportedly participated in candid discussions about security 
issues, including, but not limited to, North Korea and Iran as well as U.S. support of 
universal human rights and what Washington sees as Chinese human rights abuses.18  
Indeed, President Obama and his top officials continually stress that they candidly make 
the U.S. position on human rights abuses known to Beijing in both public and private.  
Nevertheless, Washington typically follows such public remarks with assurances that 
criticism over human rights need not obstruct cooperation with China in other areas. 
 Further demonstrating the Obama administration’s reorientation toward the Asia-
Pacific, the Department of State, particularly Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, echoes 
the remarks from the White House.  In November 2010, Secretary Clinton and then 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates co-authored an op-ed in The Sydney Morning Herald 
on the importance of Asia to the United States’ future, especially in terms of economic 
growth security.  Meeting in Melbourne to sign the “Space Situational Awareness 
Partnership Statement of Principles,” aimed at increasing cooperation in the areas of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, both secretaries took the opportunity to 
assert the United States’ identity as a Pacific nation ready to strengthen its regional 
alliances and face current and future security threats in pursuit of what the U.S. has 
                                                
17 White House, “Statement of President Barack Obama to the U.S.-China Strategic & 
Economic Dialogue,” Office of the Press Secretary, May 24, 2010. 
 
18 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Closing Remarks for the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue,” Remarks, May 10, 2011. 
 
  14 
termed forward-deployed diplomacy.19  Discussing the overall state of the region during 
an interview conducted at that time, Secretary Clinton recalled, “…when China first told 
us at a meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that they viewed the South China 
Sea as a core interest, I immediately responded and said we don’t agree with that.  So 
they were on notice,” this response directed specifically to Chinese State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo.20 
 Mirroring these sentiments, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell has reiterated the centrality of the Asia-Pacific to the 
United States’ interests in the twenty first century.  During his March 2011 testimony 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 
Campbell stated, “Essential to our long-term national interests is to make sure that the 
United States remains true to its identity as a Pacific Power.”21  Perhaps not deliberately, 
Campbell intrinsically linked the concepts of both U.S. national interests and identity.  
During his own testimony before the U.S.-China Economic & Security Review 
                                                
19 U.S. Department of State, “Australia and the U.S. Face Past, Present and Future 
Together,” Op-Ed, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates, The Sydney Morning Herald, November 8, 2010. 
 
20 U.S. Department of State, “Interview with Greg Sheridan of the Australian,” Interview, 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Melbourne Australia, November 8, 2010. 
Among Dai Bingguo’s previous positions include serving as Vice Minister of China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on two different occasions as well as holding other positions 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee of China’s Communist 
Party. 
 
21 U.S. Department of State, “Asia Overview: Protecting American Interests in China and 
Asia,” Testimony, Kurt M. Campbell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, March 31, 2011. 
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Commission the following month, Daniel Kritenbrink, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary 
to Kurt Campbell, emphasized many of the common themes found in narratives regarding 
the United States’ views of the Asia-Pacific region and of China.  These themes include 
the view that the U.S. and China should pursue win-win cooperation—zero-sum theories 
making little sense in this new century, as Secretary Clinton often states—and the 
assessment that China’s foreign policy is driven by desires to maintain economic growth 
and domestic stability.22  Other common themes spanning top levels of the executive 
branch, topics often broached in forums with China, include the desire to prevent 
misunderstanding and miscalculation between both governments and the desire to build 
mutual trust.  The United States’ also declares its abidance by the three joint 
communiqués, statements that facilitated the normalization of relations between the U.S. 
and China, and affirmation of the one China policy, recognizing the People’s Republic of 
China as the one and only China, Taiwan being a part of China.  At the same time, the 
U.S. maintains its commitment to and the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), 
necessitating that the United States maintain relations with Taiwan, provide weaponry 
through the sale of military equipment, and extend Taiwan a (dubious to some) security 
guarantee.23 
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 Unsurprisingly, given the editorial by Secretaries Clinton and Gates, the 
Department of Defense too emphasized these recurring themes.  However, the U.S. 
Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011, clearly expresses concern over China’s 
military modernization, especially in terms of ballistic missile development, anti-access 
and area-denial capabilities, and asymmetric capabilities designed specifically to counter 
U.S. power.24  On the region’s maritime territorial disputes, Secretary Gates, speaking at 
a media roundtable in Beijing during January of 2011, reiterated the lack of a U.S. 
position on the ownership of the disputed islands in the South China Sea or the dispute 
between Japan and China over islands in the East China Sea.  This is characteristic of the 
U.S. stance on these disputes in general.  However, Secretary Gates also noted that as 
long as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are administered by Japan, they are covered by the 
U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty.  Interestingly, responding to a question over whether he 
feels there is a gap between Chinese civilian and military leadership, Secretary Gates 
replied, “I’ve had concerns about that.  And, frankly, it’s one of the reasons why I attach 
importance to a dialogue between the two sides that includes both civilians and 
militaries.”25  This comment tellingly illustrates the importance of internal state dynamics 
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when considering relations between Beijing and Washington’s and inter-state relations in 
general. 
Though often presenting an appearance of unity and often reified as unitary actors 
by academics and policymakers, states are not monolithic.  They are composed of various 
actors, groups, and institutions with unique identities and interests.  Different actors 
might not hold the same views and may not necessarily enforce or enact congruent policy 
decisions and actions.  The interests and identities among various groups and actors 
within any state can and often do differ.  Secretary Gates’ response to the military-
civilian leadership gap question broaches the possibility of this within China.  In the 
United States, though the Obama Administration and top-level officials present an overall 
unified approach to U.S. priorities in the Asia-Pacific and with regard to China, others 
within the United States hold differing views.   
Many candidates in the 2012 U.S. election, as well as representatives from both 
parties serving Congress, argued that the United States, if not the Obama administration 
in particular, needed to adopt a tougher stance in its relations with China.  Presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney echoed this in the second Presidential Debate, declaring he would, 
if elected, label China a currency manipulator during his first day in office.26  Issues of 
concern ranged widely from the current state of trade relations with China to U.S. 
military superiority and national security. 
It is reasonable to consider whether the more impassioned sentiments directed at 
China reflect a form of scapegoating in a time of economic hardship, similar to U.S. 
                                                
26 Though exactly what doing so would mean and what the effects would be remain 
unclear. 
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economic fears of Japan’s rise during the 1980s and early 1990s, or simply reflect the 
self-interested tools of political maneuver often attending the desire for individual and 
party influence in electoral politics.  In light of economic tension between the U.S. and 
China, elected officials in Washington might have been grasping for a source upon which 
to partially affix blame for or deflect attention from the United States’ sluggish economic 
recovery since the 2008 global economic crisis, diffusing personal responsibility and 
offering an issue upon which to mobilize voters in their campaigns for election or 
reelection.  Interestingly, a Pew Research poll indicated that a majority of American 
voters supported building a stronger relationship with China over adopting a tougher 
stance.  Only individuals associated with what has come to be known as the Tea Party by 
majority supported adopting a tougher approach towards China, largely in hopes of 
achieving greater parity in trade relations and promoting U.S. economic and job growth.27  
Though some might be tempted to disregard these political beliefs and behaviors as an 
emblematic misfortune of petty partisanship, observers would be remiss to do so absent 
considering the possible effects they might have on bilateral relations.  Understanding 
how certain issues are interpreted, how they become politically salient, their political use, 
and how they are marketed to others offer clues to states’ interests and identities and 
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victory?” Foreign Policy October 14, 2011.  That adopting a tougher approach to the 
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allows for deeper understanding of political behavior for both domestic and international 
politics, for both individuals and groups. 
 By no means uniform in coverage or views expressed, especially in democracies 
like the United States, news sources also offer insight into general attitudes and 
components of identity, the nature of interactions between states, and accounts of foreign 
policy decisions.  In November 2010, The Washington Post relayed that the Obama 
administration’s announcement of its decision to sell $6 billion worth of military 
equipment to Taiwan incurred a “furious response” from China and subsequent 
cancellation of planned military exchanges with the United States.28  The very same 
month Defense Secretary Gates divulged his views on whether there is a gap between 
China’s civilian and military leadership, another Washington Post article noted the 
opaqueness of the Chinese government, where “…some of China’s most powerful voices 
are heard only in secret.”29  The same article claimed that ideology no longer unites 
China.  Instead, nationalism based on pride provides the foundation for unity, acting as 
the glue that holds China’s populace together. 
 Looking specifically to the joint U.S.-Australian decision to rotate Marines 
through Australia’s military base near Darwin, Michael Swaine told the media that 
though this development does diversify the United States’ strategic presence in the Asia-
Pacific, the agreement itself is mostly symbolic, especially for the time being, sending a 
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message to other regional actors indicative of U.S. commitment to the region.30  Also 
capturing the dynamics of this decision, as well as the dynamics of the APEC forum held 
days earlier, Keith Richburg wrote that “China is feeling at once isolated, criticized, 
encircled, and increasingly like a target of U.S. moves.”31  Speaking to this, he noted that 
in advance of the East Asia Summit, China’s deputy foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, 
declared that including the South China sea dispute on the agenda for discussion would 
be inappropriate, only to be followed by President Obama specifically stating during his 
speech to Australia’s parliament that cooperation over the South China Sea dispute would 
be one of the issues discussed at the session.  In response to President Obama’s call at 
APEC for China to follow the established rules of international trade, a senior Chinese 
Foreign Ministry official was caught by the media, stating, “if the rules are decided by 
one or several countries, China does not have to observe them.”32  Despite U.S. calls for 
cooperation and multilateralism, Michael Green told The New York Times that 
multilateral endeavors are “…becoming an arena for subtle but, for the region, quite 
unnerving power plays and influence games between the U.S. and China.”33 
Leading up to the November 2011 APEC forum in Hawaii and his trip to 
Australia, President Obama continued to press China on allowing greater flexibility with 
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the valuation of its currency, the yuan renminbi (RMB), improve domestic Chinese 
working conditions and human rights, increase imports of U.S. manufactured goods, and 
make headway towards greater governmental transparency.34  As previously indicated, 
these pressures created at least a small degree of tension with representatives from the 
People’s Republic of China.  The joint U.S.-Australian announcement on November 16 
and following tension stemming from President Obama’s discussion of the South China 
Sea dispute further increased tension between both sides. 
Washington’s rhetoric regarding its agreement with Australia and, more generally, 
the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region form a mostly uniform narrative reflective of 
both U.S. identity and interests.  Foremost, the U.S. (re)affirms its commitment to and 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region and its allies therein.  Here, the U.S. draws upon its 
longstanding identity as a “Pacific” nation, supporting the legitimacy of its interests and 
actions within the region.  Signaling its commitment to the region and friends and allies 
therein, the U.S. also asserts its identity as one of, if not the, key actors within the region 
(by extension of its worldwide influence and power).  This narrative also works to affirm 
the U.S. identity as the guarantor of stability and status quo in the Asia-Pacific.  The U.S. 
has indeed held important interests and maintained strong relationships within the Asia-
Pacific.  However, in refocusing its foreign policy, why has Washington decided to re-
affirm and re-emphasize its commitment to the Asia-Pacific, as characterized by actions 
such as the joint U.S.-Australian agreement of late 2011? 
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Though the U.S. is careful in mentioning specific reasons for the its foreign policy 
reorientation, many indicators point to concerns over China and its rise.  As indicated 
above, concerns include examples such as the region’s various disputes, uncertainty over 
China’s willingness to play by established regional and global rules, China’s military 
modernization, civilian control over the People’s Liberation Army, and even human 
rights issues.  In light of these concerns, the U.S. is strengthening its presence within the 
region and its ties with countries of shared values, such as Australia.  When the United 
States asserts its interest in maintaining stability within the region, China is implicitly 
identified as the other, as a potential threat to regional stability (despite the great care 
typically taken by the U.S. to avoid identifying China as a competitor or even enemy).  
Despite aspects of the U.S. narrative regarding the “pivot” emphasizing cooperation with 
China and win-win diplomacy, tacit uncertainty influences U.S. views of China, situating 
China opposite the U.S. and identifying it as a potential source of instability.  Thus, the 
U.S., however discreetly, situates itself and its identity—as provider of stability and 
upholder of human rights—opposite China.  However, U.S. restraint in specifically 
identifying China as part of its focus or the reason behind its foreign policy reorientation 
does aid in preserving greater room for a working relationship between both countries. 
Although U.S. narratives may indicate the country’s identities as a leading 
power in the Asia-Pacific region and guarantor of stability, often implicitly opposite 
China, consideration of the other deserves exploration as well.  How does China view the 
U.S. “pivot” to Asia and what salient aspects of Chinese identity arise with its views? 
 
  23 
Chinese Perspective of the U.S. “Pivot” 
In the People’s Republic of China, media outlets provide important insight into views of 
the government.  Typically, they either serve as a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist 
Party—relaying official narratives and positions—or operate under tight regulation.35  
Nonetheless, even official state media outlets offer deeper insights into Chinese views 
than provided by official government remarks alone, often voicing higher and more 
heated degrees of criticism.  Frequently, these views originate from ministry spokesmen, 
rather than high-level officials, in response to events in international politics.  In response 
to the joint U.S.-Australian agreement, The People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), quoted 
Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng stating “Military alliances are a product of 
history.  We believe any strengthening and expansion of military alliances is an 
expression of a Cold War mentality.”36  A China.org.cn article criticized the agreement, 
arguing that it undermines Australian neutrality and could put Australia in an 
“embarrassing situation” if conflict were to occur, going on to argue that the U.S.-
Australia alliance “will deal a blow to Sino-Australian relations” and that the stationing 
of American troops near Darwin will pose a strategic challenge for China.37  The article’s 
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author, Jiao Haiyang, serves as deputy director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies in 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, one of China’s top think tanks.38 
 The Chinese media also directs much criticism towards U.S. military strategy.  
Commenting on the new U.S. National Defense Strategy in China’s Jiefangjun Bao 
Online, Lin Zhiyuan contends that the Obama administration has turned back to the 
threat-based national defense strategy the U.S. followed during the Cold War and away 
from its capabilities-based strategy directed towards countering terrorism under Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld.  Lin uses this argument to demonstrate that the United States is 
acting in accordance with what many, particularly those in China, term the “China threat 
theory.”  As Lin states, “One could say that the United States is a country which cannot 
do without war.  On the one hand, it is ‘withdrawing troops,’ while on the other it is 
‘drilling soldiers and feeding warhorses’ (making preparations for war), strengthening its 
military alliance relationships, and completing preparations to fight the next war.”39 
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Some do offer a more positive view.  Diplomat Wu Jianmin contends that “Peace, 
development, and cooperation have become an irresistible trend of the era” and that there 
will only be a Cold War between China and the United States if both sides choose to 
fight.40  On this point, Wu expresses that China holds no aspirations for world hegemony 
and will never wage a new Cold War against the U.S.  Ultimately, Wu states that “current 
Sino-US relations are fundamentally different from former Soviet-U.S. relations.  Pursuit 
of hegemony in Soviet-American relations was dominant at that time, while seeking 
cooperation in Sino-US relations is dominant today,” closing with the recommendation 
that “We should absolutely not fall into the trap created by new Cold War inciters.  This 
trap is a road that will lead the world to disaster, goes against the historical trend, and is 
doomed to failure.”41 
 Beijing’s rhetoric regarding the U.S. “pivot” presents an interesting narrative and 
depiction of China’s own identity.  To start, the rhetoric represents the “pivot” as part of a 
U.S. strategy to contain China, akin to strategies and thinking prominent during the Cold 
War.  Officials in Beijing note that this sort of behavior and military alliances, such as 
between the U.S. and Australia, are unnecessary, as China does not seek hegemony or 
conflict.  These officials assert the benign identity of China and their country’s rise while 
depicting the U.S. as a self-interested hegemon.  At the same time, Beijing delivered 
close to what may be interpreted as a direct warning to Australia that its relationship with 
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the U.S. may have consequences.  Such statements and forms of indirect pressure can and 
do influence social interactions and behavior.  Regardless, China asserts its benign 
identity and does so opposite an other encumbered by a Cold War framework of viewing 
international politics, the United States. 
 On the other hand, as represented by Wu’s remarks, some officials in China do 
hold a more optimistic view of U.S.-China relations, focused on factors like cooperation.  
Such views better fit China’s own assertion of its identity as a benign rising power.  This, 
however, creates complexity in determining China’s identity.  Here, caution must be 
exercised, as China’s does not necessarily present a uniform identity or view of 
international politics.  There appears to be relative agreement amongst Chinese officials’ 
assertions of the benign nature of their country and its rise.  However, consideration of 
these assertions must be done in light of China’s actions within the region and elsewhere.  
Also, differences arise in Chinese views and depictions of the United States, its 
involvement in the region, and its relations with regional allies.  The depictions, by some, 
of the U.S. as a power constricted by Cold War thinking with a desire to contain China 
identifies the U.S. as an other opposite Chinese interests, an other opposite China’s self-
professed benign interests and rise.  As neither side’s identities and actions exist in 
isolation, analyzing their interaction allows for a more complete representation of U.S.-
China relations 
The Intersection of Competing Identities 
Interactions among identities offer mixed insights when attempting to understand 
contemporary U.S.-China relations, especially in light of the U.S.-Australian agreement 
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itself and China’s reaction.  Rhetoric present in the narratives of each country indicates, 
on one hand, security driven, even traditional realist, concerns while, on the other, 
underscoring the importance of cooperation and peaceful interstate relations.  Within 
these narratives, as discussed previously, it is possible to glean aspects of each side’s 
identities, attempts to fix and stabilize these identities, and the influence various 
frameworks and worldviews have on them.  However, when considered together, these 
threads of identity interact and weave an altogether unique tapestry defiant of off the 
shelf, one size fits all theories and scholarship.  Moreover, within the details and 
differences of each side’s narratives, deeper understanding emerges.  Problematizing 
international theories as worldviews adopted by and in part constituting the identities of 
important international actors enlightens this approach to understanding.  These 
worldviews and others serve as the lenses through which international actors view and 
attempt to understand one another similar to an academic’s application of theory to 
international politics, acting as a lens through which to explain worldly phenomena.  
Understanding how international actors view one another and international politics offers 
greater possibility of understanding their behavior.  It also brings to light the relational 
nature of international relations, the fact that actors’ identities (including their 
worldviews and the outlooks or theories they hold) are dynamic, developing and 
changing based on interaction with one another—the actions they take, the rhetoric they 
speak, the intentions they signal—and the interpretations that result. 
On the surface, at a superficial level, the behavior of China and the United States 
in some ways hearkens to realist notions of power politics found during the Cold War.  
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As Mearsheimer portended in 2006, Beijing and Washington, driven by distrust and 
preoccupied with security, seemingly seek to acquire power in order to protect 
themselves and their interests.  Their internal composition, ideologies, and any broader 
preferences or interests matter little.  According to this view, the United States, despite 
claims otherwise, is simply redistributing its focus and forces to protect against its 
greatest growing perceived threat, the People’s Republic of China.  With waning interests 
in the Middle East and surrounding countries, the U.S. seeks to affirm a new identity as 
an authority in the Asia-Pacific, drawing upon its history of involvement in the region to 
support this identity while cautiously eyeing China’s rise.  For its part, steadily accruing 
the resources necessary to acquire and maintain great power status, Beijing, uncertain of 
U.S power and inclined to shift the regional or even global status quo in its own favor, is 
modernizing its military forces and should increasingly oppose U.S. interests and 
increased regional presence, eventually seeking to push the United States from the region 
and even possibly supplant it as the global hegemon.  Along the way, China will surely 
enforce its territorial claims in the surrounding seas and take punitive measures against 
weaker regional actors that align themselves with the United States in a coming great 
power contest.  Though the situation need not necessarily devolve to the point of armed 
conflict, it very easily might.  Each side’s nuclear insurance helps—to the extent the logic 
of mutually assured destruction (MAD) holds—stand guard against this possibility.  
Economic interdependence might act similarly, though history reminds observers that 
conflict may occur regardless of high levels of interdependence: 
Associating interdependence, peace, democracy, and prosperity is nothing new.  
In his much translated and widely read book, The Great Illusion (1933), Norman 
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Angell summed up the texts of generations of classical and neoclassical 
economists and drew from them the dramatic conclusion that wars would no 
longer be fought because they would not pay.  World War I instead produced the 
great disillusion, which reduced political optimism to a level that remained low 
almost until the end of the Cold War.  I say "almost" because beginning in the 
1970s a new optimism, strikingly similar in content to the old, began to resurface.  
Interdependence was again associated with peace and peace increasingly with 
democracy, which began to spread wonderfully to Latin America, to Asia, and 
with the Soviet Union's collapse, to Eastern Europe.42 
 
 Even so, realism offers little account of high levels of economic interdependence 
between the U.S. and China and the cooperation necessary to sustain their respective 
economies, despite an essentially fragile relationship.  What of realism’s mutual distrust 
and a proclivity for self-reliance?  Should not either of these concerns caution a rising 
power and global hegemon against sacrificing any degree of security resulting from 
dependence upon one another, especially a potential peer competitor?  Trade is not the 
only concern; so is the vast amount of excess savings that China invests in the United 
States through purchase of U.S. treasury securities.  A decrease or halt in this much-
needed investment very much threatens the United States and the value of the U.S. dollar 
(USD).  However, if China stops or even decreases investing substantially in the USD, let 
alone considers “dumping” its holdings of U.S. debt, the USD will decrease dramatically 
and China, due to its investments and inability to liquidate them all instantaneously, will 
suffer heavily as well, compelling the country to maintain, even buttress these 
investments. 
Perhaps cooperation between the U.S. and China is a holdover from times when 
the world knew a weaker China, posing less of a possible future threat to the United 
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States.  Then again, perhaps tension has always permeated the relationship—the outcome 
of the Chinese revolution, the Korean War, Vietnam, Tiananmen Square, crises in the 
Taiwan Strait, the 1999 accidental bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy, the 2001 EP-
3E spy plane incident, Chinese relations with North Korea, relations with Iran, relations 
with Pakistan, human rights abuses, accusations by the U.S. of a lack of fairness in trade 
relations and currency manipulation, and China’s opposition to UN sanctions on Syria’s 
Assad regime all providing almost a century of examples of tension in U.S.-China 
relations.  At a more basic level, it may make more sense to ask why these two countries 
fear one another more than others?  China does not pose the greatest existential threat to 
the United States in terms of capabilities or intentions (at least this does not presently 
appear to be the case).  China, for instance, could certainly pursue military modernization 
and weapons acquisition at a quicker pace with respect to the U.S. or Japan.  What 
accounts for these realizations?  
Holding contentious ideologies and views on fundamental issues such as human 
rights, observers might very well expect China and the United States to often find 
themselves at odds, a “clash of civilizations,” or at least governments, coming to head.43  
On the other hand, perhaps increasing regional and global interaction and institutional 
engagement has effected a more cooperative or benign nature regarding U.S.-China 
relations.  If the case, however, observers might expect lower degrees of insecurity and 
tension within the region, including greater progress towards resolutions to the region’s 
various territorial and other disputes.  Theoretical approaches emphasizing cooperation 
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unfortunately do not delve into the foundations of the interests and identities of the U.S., 
China, or other regional actors, including how their identities, and in turn interests, are 
constituted.  Often, approaches that supposedly pay heed to such factors, constructivist 
approaches of some report, in the end only offer superficial examinations that do not fully 
explore the social interactions of these concepts and the processes involved in their 
relation: social construction.  Even if, as Alexander Wendt states, anarchy is what states 
make of it, by what process does this occur? 
Adopting an identity centric approach to understanding the interaction of U.S. and 
Chinese identities regarding the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific proves more illuminating 
than simple theoretical analyses.  In justifying the pivot, the United States asserts its 
unbroken membership in the club of Pacific powers.  The President and his top officials 
uphold official impartiality on most issues in the region in their official statements, 
typically referring only to an interest in maintaining regional stability, but simultaneously 
endeavor to strengthen alliances and relations with states party to some of the region’s 
disputes.  Within the region, and in relation to China in particular, the U.S. also places 
great importance upon human rights issues.  Though the United States trumpets respect 
for basic, universal human rights, it is worth considering to what extent doing so might 
possibly serve a political purpose, toward gaining moral superiority opposite China both 
on regional and international stages.  Generally perceived as highly sensitive to human 
rights abuses, what does the United States’ own mistreatment of prisoners at the Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq or even the comparatively minor mistreatment of domestic 
protestors composing the Occupy Wall Street movement do, if anything, to U.S. criticism 
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of human rights abuses by others?  It is also worth considering to what extent either actor, 
if at all, trades on fear, even if only the prospect fear, to serve their own ends, consciously 
or unconsciously.  To what extent do certain interpretations and characterizations—these 
narratives—serve particular interests and define them within or between the United States 
and China? 
 Responding remarks expressed in U.S. narratives, China frequently asserts that 
external forces should not interfere in other countries’ issues of national sovereignty or of 
domestic nature, including the East and South China Sea disputes.  China also responds 
to U.S. human rights criticism by exclaiming its own support of human rights while 
criticizing the U.S. for the human rights abuses it commits, supposedly ignores, and does 
not take responsibility for.  These abuses include high rates of domestic violent crime and 
gun ownership, decreasing privacy with relaxing legal restraints on law enforcement and 
other agencies, prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and so forth.44  Yet, 
if U.S. criticism of China might in some ways serve as a ploy for moral superiority in 
international politics (or serve other purposes, which may very well include legitimate 
concern), China’s criticism of U.S. human rights certainly appears to do so, coming as a 
retort to U.S. criticism, a retort that in numerous instances appropriates sources of 
                                                
44 “Full Text of Human Rights Record of the United States in 2010,” Xinhua, April 10, 
2011.  While the Chinese government remarks that the United States needs to face up to 
its own human rights abuses, of which it reportedly seldom does, the report on the United 
States goes on to cite numerous U.S. sources and organizations to back its statistics and 
claims, fully ignoring the role these institutions play and the role of freedom in speech in 
bringing these criticisms to light.  In a roundabout way, the Chinese government often 
finds sources of criticism from within the U.S. only to report this criticism back to the 
U.S. 
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criticism of U.S. human rights abuses originating from within the U.S. while at the very 
same time arguing the U.S. ignores the issues cited! 
 Of more concern in regards to the U.S. “pivot,” China at times accuses the United 
States of attempting to encircle it in the Asia-Pacific, of attempting to contain China, and 
for engaging in balance of power, Cold War style politics.  Strengthening its position in 
the Asia-Pacific region through its joint agreement with Australia, this narrative of U.S. 
behavior is at the very least plausible.  As for China, the CCP asserts that they follow the 
path of a peaceful, harmonious rise and do not seek to become a world hegemon or 
disrupt international stability.  On the other hand, maintaining relations with North Korea 
and Iran, opposing UN sanctions on Syria, and modernizing its military forces might also 
point to Cold War style politics, China opposing and balancing against the interests of the 
U.S. and other western powers throughout the world.  This implies that China seeks to 
check and restrain U.S. power and influence more than directly confront it, reminiscent of 
the Cold War.  This is but one interpretation of pertinent narratives and identities, but 
whether the foreign policy behaviors of either side represent Cold War style politics is 
nonetheless worth considering. 
Though both sides frankly admit the need to develop greater levels of mutual trust, 
in doing so they tacitly admit the dearth of trust existing between them.  While spotting 
evidence of this distrust takes little effort, both sides work diligently to maintain bilateral 
exchanges and cooperation whenever possible.  One of the greatest shared interests 
between both the United States and China is economic growth.  However, while both 
sides share an interest in maintaining the stability necessary to support this growth, their 
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interests in economic growth itself differs.  Both sides clearly need the other in order to 
prosper but they remain foremost interested in their own economic superiority and 
prosperity.  U.S. pressure on China to quickly enact financial and trade reforms and 
China’s reluctance to do so exhibit economic nationalism in practice, protectionism 
antithetical to a global free market but nonetheless endorsed, at least rhetorically, both for 
domestic and international purposes.  Here, as in other cases, two powerful countries 
draw words rather than weapons in hope of influencing perceptions in international 
politics. 
 When working together in international politics or seeking the approval of others, 
image matters.  States and their policymakers often wage these rhetorical battles to 
express and influence narratives regarding identities of themselves and others, in some 
cases with little regard for what may be legitimate or accurate, betraying their 
international jockeying and hinting at deeper motives.  The same occurs within states.  
Recently, China faced a large-scale leadership transition beginning with the meeting of 
the National People’s Congress held on November 8, 2012, while the United States held 
its presidential and other elections on November 6.  In the U.S., both presidential 
candidates promised to adopt or maintain a tough stance on China, especially concerning 
trade and economic relations.  Such domestic statements serve certain interests and 
influence perceptions, whether and to what degree the interests are legitimate, self-
serving, or otherwise.  Concerns may be legitimate, but they may also offer an issue with 
which to incite or exacerbate fear and simultaneously offer a solution in the voting booth 
or from which to motivate already concerned voters.  With the 2012 U.S. presidential 
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race, remarks were intended for a domestic audience but, nonetheless, have an effect on 
both domestic perceptions and on those between the U.S. and China.  Both countries 
routinely monitor the domestic policies and statements of the other.  Though both sides 
certainly understand the nature of hyperbolic political rhetoric, uncertainty nevertheless 
remains and the rhetoric itself always holds the potential to create commitment traps and 
reshape identities and perceptions. 
 It remains early to fully understand the recent actions and rhetoric stemming from 
both sides of the Pacific regarding the U.S. “pivot” and agreement with Australia.  Of 
what might be understood at this point, while the United States does not define China as 
an enemy, it certainly does not define it as a close friend or ally.  In many ways the U.S. 
views China as a competitor, as a potential source of instability, as an underhanded 
trading partner, as weak on human rights, and far from a liberal democracy.  Opposite 
these views of China, the U.S. differentiates and defines itself.  The U.S. is or sees itself 
as the world’s leading economic and military force, if not moral authority and stabilizing 
force, promoting systems of liberal trade and governance throughout the world while 
serving as an example for others to follow, valuing fundamental human rights and 
liberties and democracy.  Beijing views itself as victim of undue criticism from Western 
powers and their allies, unfairly the focus of U.S. economic and security concerns with 
Washington’s pivot to Asia, as provider of an alternative to the Washington consensus, 
and as a returning great power, once the Middle-Kingdom, the center of the world, 
politically and otherwise, with ever increasing influence.  The narratives and identities of 
each side interact to create a situation of heightened tension and mistrust despite desires 
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for improved relations.  Both sides exhibit their own confidence and insecurity; both 
might be described in Callahan’s terms as “Pessoptimist Nations,” if in different ways 
and for different reasons. 
 Whatever else might be, the United States and China need one another.  
Understanding the intricacies of how and why lays the pathway to a more informed 
understanding of U.S.-China relations and the productive power of influence they bear 
upon one another.  An attempt to understand U.S.-China relations and the inherent 
distrust therein requires an examination of the ways in which both countries constitute 
their identities and an exploration of the interactions between these identities both 
internally and externally.  Developing the details of this approach and applying it to U.S.-
China relations offers not only a way to understand this case, it also offers a specific 
approach generalizable to understanding international politics capable of illuminating 
details intrinsic to how international actors view and interact with one another. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION: IDENTITY IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
We do not see things as they are. We see them as we are. 
 
–The Talmud 
Some of the most interesting and pressing issues in international relations currently 
revolve around the relationship between the United States and China, this relationship 
itself poised to remain critically important in international politics moving forward 
through the twenty first century.  Both China and the U.S. view the other through a prism 
producing a spectrum concerns that affect their relations with one another, whether in 
terms of national security or other national interests.  While the nature and importance of 
relations between these two countries have varied throughout history, China’s continued 
rise and growing levels of economic interdependence between the U.S. and China have 
brought the relationship increasing attention for some time.  This increasing attention is 
especially apparent considering the multiple points of tension permeating U.S.-China 
relations. 
Taiwan, China’s maritime territorial disputes, North Korea, modernization of the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), trade practices, environmental concerns, human 
rights issues, and even allegations of cyber espionage and attacks all serve as examples 
that, in different ways and to different extents, have caused friction in bilateral relations 
between Beijing and Washington over recent years.45  While these and other issues are 
interesting and important for their own sake, a more fundamental concern exists: what is 
                                                
45 Not to discount friction in other bilateral and multilateral relations within the Asia-
Pacific region and elsewhere. 
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at stake as China rises closer to the power and influence possessed by the United States, 
especially where diverging interests come into contact?46  Will a new “Cold War” emerge 
or, perhaps, a hegemonic transition marked by conflict, as some have predicted?47  
Understanding such questions (as only the future provides such answers) requires 
analysis of the identities at play on both sides of the Pacific.  Identities characterize and 
contextualize social interactions, interests, and material factors.  Essentially, identities 
characterize the very nature of relations between various actors, in this case the nature of 
relations between the U.S. and China.48  Examining the role and influence of identities on 
the nature of U.S.-China relations, this study seeks to improve and enhance 
understanding of this relationship, demonstrate the importance of considering the role of 
identity in international relations, and assist policymakers on both sides better understand 
and navigate their relations with the other.  
Numerous analyses of China and U.S.-China relations have surfaced over the past 
few decades, often attempting to explain—to fix in time, at least for a time—the true 
nature of China as it rises ever closer to becoming a peer competitor to the United States.  
These studies toil on fertile ground, as the relationship involves differing ideologies, 
                                                
46 This question bears obvious ethnocentricity, a question implicitly cast in terms of U.S. 
interests.  The following analysis does, however, strive for impartiality, doing so to 
develop greater understanding not only of U.S.-China relations but also the perspectives 
of each side free from as much bias as possible.  In combination with this goal, this study 
also hopes to offer relevance beyond academia. 
 
47 Notably, John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 
690 (April 2006) and Yan Xuetong, “How China Can Defeat America,” The New York 
Times, November 20, 2011. 
 
48 As outlined later, this study adopts the position that interests are neither homogenous 
nor exogenously given. 
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systems of governance, and seemingly endemic tension over important interests and 
issues.  Despite the intent of these analyses, little consensus as to the nature of China’s 
rise has emerged and attempts to define China, largely the purpose of these analyses, 
remain little more than speculative.  As in the field of international relations itself, 
interpretations, theories, and worldviews abound.  This implicitly calls into question 
traditional modes of understanding and explanation in the field of international relations 
and the practice of fitting real world cases into preconceived frameworks and theories 
rather than attempting to understand the nuances of real world cases on their own terms 
and the influence of theories and frameworks on the real world.  How, then, does this 
study propose to understand the nature of past, present, and future U.S.-China relations 
and, more generally, relationships between other international actors? 
Paying heed to fundamental theoretical assumptions about how and under what 
conditions states and other actors interact, scholars in the field of international relations 
typically seek to explain and hope to predict international behavior.  Following this 
endeavor, they ask many important and worthwhile questions.  Why do international 
political actors behave in the ways that they do?  What are the causes of conflict or 
cooperation in international politics?  Are states constrained by existential fear to little 
more than rational, zero-sum calculations and power balancing behavior in a world where 
no more than self-help can be trusted?  Is meaningful cooperation possible?  Does the 
spread of political or economic liberalism mediate conflict?  Do culture, soft power, or 
ideology matter?  Is the international system (often taken as a system of presupposed 
anarchy of a specific nature) simply what states make of it?  These all serve as examples 
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of predominant theoretical questions pondered within the field of international relations.  
With a seemingly trivial semantic shift from speaking of theories to worldviews—the 
actual views and outlooks held by social actors—drastically different and more complex 
questions emerge.  Instead of asking about the state of the international system and actors 
within, focus turns to questions about how states and other actors view and interpret the 
international system and other actors—including themselves—in order to understand 
their interactions with one another.  Theories become lenses not only through which to 
explain or predict international behavior but are themselves interpretations and 
perspectives—theories, worldviews, outlooks—that influence behavior, a notion denying 
researchers the ability (the choice) to ignore the realization that international relations is 
social in nature. 
 Regardless of the terminology adopted—theories, frameworks, approaches, 
worldviews, perspectives, strategic cultures, or otherwise—looking at the effects of 
identities and perceptions on international behavior treats theories more closely to what 
they actually are: social constructions product and productive of international politics.49  
Beliefs about the international system and the interactions that occur within do not result 
from timeless, objective, systemic truths independent of the relations that constitute 
international relations, as some theories hold.50  International politics is the result of 
                                                
49 Productive of international politics in the sense that social theories aid in producing—
in constructing—reality. 
 
50 Many scholars, taking it upon themselves to define the discipline of international 
relations and its scope—often based upon their own theories and not vice versa—
minimize the importance of the object in the phrase “international relations” in favor of 
the adjective.  In other words, some scholars minimize or ignore the relations in 
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interaction, learning, and interpretation among international actors and thus utterly 
dependent upon these actors’ unique, ever-changing natures—their identities.  This 
dynamic process—interactions between international actors, the relations of international 
relations—influences the views international actors hold and thus influences their views 
of one another and the international system.  The process flows to and fro; identities, how 
actors view others and themselves, are interdependent and inextricably linked, acting as 
both cause and effect.  What, then, is identity and how does it influence international 
politics? 
The concept of identity is inherently complex and refuses simple definition (not to 
mention operationalization).51  Identity is largely a conceptual notion; it is intangible and 
exists in the flow of social interaction and social relationships.  Generally, identity refers 
to the conceptions actors hold of (or project onto) themselves and others.  However, 
identity is much more complex than this simple definition allows.  Glimpses of this 
elusive concept appear in the very process of social interaction as actors invoke the 
notion of identities, implicitly or explicitly.  Identities result from actors’ unique 
histories, their beliefs, and their interests, factors all of which are interdependent and 
interact with other identities.  That identity can be taken simultaneously as both cause and 
effect serves as a strength in emphasizing the role of this concept when analyzing 
international politics.  It allows researchers to direct attention towards the formation of 
                                                                                                                                            
international relations, often turning to their own theories to justify doing so and to justify 
their attempts to define the discipline. 
 
51 Not that operationalization is necessarily a worthwhile endeavor or that it will here be 
attempted.  A footnote within the next chapter notes both Popper and Einstein’s thoughts 
on operational definitions. 
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identity and its constitution as well as its influence on behavior.  As both are interrelated, 
identities are in a constant a state of social flux.  Choosing to treat them as such may not 
prove a neat or tidy endeavor but does avoid the explanatory limitations of theories 
restricted to one or the other.  It allows researchers to consider the performative nature by 
which identities are constituted and expressed and their ability to both influence and be 
influenced when examining the narratives through which identities emerge. 
This study contributes to a basis for and demonstrates the value of examining 
identity as a fundamental concept in international politics by both exploring its theoretical 
foundations and applying an identity centric approach towards analyzing and developing 
a richer understanding of the nature of U.S.-China relations.  The decision to assess the 
United States and China is not arbitrary, the global importance of both countries, the 
unpredictable and often tense relations between them, and the evident importance of 
history, culture, and other factors—all important components of identity—support this 
choice.  Since the 1980s, scholars have speculated about the rise of an Asian century.52  
China’s rise and the current importance of the Asia-Pacific region, the fear often 
accompanying speculation concerning China’s rise, and Washington’s supposed pivot to 
Asia with the beginning of America’s self-proclaimed Asia-Pacific century all indicate 
the current importance of the relationship between Beijing and Washington.  Further, the 
representational instability created by China’s rise, as this phenomenon alters the ever-
dynamic fabric of the international system, also influences this choice in case selection; it 
                                                
52 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and 
International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995). 
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opens space for examining the role of identity at play in U.S.-China relations where 
identities and interests come into contact in a dance of power and politics.53 
Focusing on the identities at play in U.S.-China relations, this study primarily 
analyzes the “national” identities that influence or are endorsed by both countries in their 
interactions with one another and in their foreign policies, only devoting attention to 
more varied “sub-national” (or, better, sub-state) identities when they obviously influence 
bilateral relations.  This decision is not made on the basis that more internal identities are 
any less important or interesting than national identities.  They are, perhaps, more 
important and more interesting than the identities this study examines.54  For example, 
despite being viewed by many “China watchers” and others as a monocultural entity 
defined by a predominant Han identity and nationalism, many different ethnicities, 
nationalities, and identities comprise the Chinese state, including Han and Muslims, 
China’s various Muslim nationalities,55 urban and rural, rich and poor, and men and 
women.  Of course, these more internal identities can influence international politics: 
consider the possible effects China’s treatment of its Muslim minorities might have on 
relations between predominantly Muslim countries and Beijing (many of which are 
                                                
53 A degree of arbitrariness does exist in terms of why select the U.S. and China over 
other important relationships in international politics, as well as why many view this 
relationship itself as important (and the potential effect or productive power of such 
views).  These concerns are inescapable in any study. 
 
54 And examining these more domestic identities, understudied as they are in terms of 
broader international politics, offers a fruitful path for future research and analysis. 
 
55 For an excellent examination of different Muslim groups within the Chinese state and 
in what ways their identities are expressed (nationality versus religion versus ethnicity), 
see Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern 
Subjects (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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significant trading partners with or investors in China).  Nonetheless, this study limits its 
focus primarily to foreign policy concerns, analyzing the identities that influence the 
interstate relations between the U.S. and China due to the seemingly growing importance 
of and tension exhibited by this relationship. 
The stakes, as noted earlier, in relations between Beijing and Washington are 
high, all the more unnerving realizing the tensions that permeate an otherwise peaceful 
relationship.  The possibility, for instance, of a military conflict between China and 
Taiwan that draws in the United States lingers with unrealized potential.  In her book, 
China: Fragile Superpower, Susan Shirk (2007) opens by recalling her continual worry 
over the realization of this very possibility—even by accident—during her time serving 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs 
during the Clinton administration.  The intricacies of whether and to what extent conflict 
might occur between the U.S. and China due to Taiwan are complex, from interpretations 
over what the language of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) actually requires of the U.S. 
in defense of Taiwan to how quickly the island might be overrun in the event of a cross-
strait conflict.  Regardless, the issue remains a potential flashpoint.  What then of the high 
levels of economic interdependence (and wide social and cultural exchanges) shared 
between the U.S. and China, these two nuclear powers?  What then of the security of 
other important trade relations and, especially, trade routes within the Asia-Pacific 
region? 
China’s quarrel with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands presents another 
volatile situation, one analyzed later within this study.  Both China and Japan levy 
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competing sovereign claims to these islands, especially since the discovery of valuable 
natural resources within their proximity (particularly oil and gas deposits, rich fisheries, 
and trade route control).  The United States officially maintains a neutral stance on the 
status of the islands but, as Japan’s ally, asserts that it is bound by treaty to come to 
Japan’s defense with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands or otherwise.  As with 
Taiwan, direct conflict between China and Japan need not be intentional.  Accidents, 
uncertainty, and miscommunication may just as easily result in escalation and conflict.  
China’s targeting of both a Japanese ship and aircraft near the islands with weapons radar 
in January 2013 demonstrates how easily the situation might unintentionally (if not 
intentionally) escalate to the point of actual armed conflict.  Similarities exist between 
this dispute and territorial disputes in the South China Sea over the Spratly Islands, 
Paracel Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal.  Though different issues involving different 
actors, natural resources and waterway control are likewise at stake and these spats too 
might result in broader conflict. 
Pertinent in considering any potential conflict between China and the U.S. or 
another country, China’s efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 
particularly the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), presents another issue of 
concern.  China is also focusing attention on developing asymmetric capabilities able to 
(assumedly) counter U.S. military strengths.  China’s Dong Feng-21D (DF-21D) anti-
ship ballistic missile (ASBM), dubbed the carrier killer, offers one compelling example.  
In its annual report to Congress on China’s military, the U.S. Department of Defense 
notes that the PLA intends the DF-21D to provide the ability to attack large ships, 
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particularly aircraft carriers, in the Pacific Ocean.56  If successful, the missile system will 
be able to target U.S. ships and possibly avoid the defensive systems employed by carrier 
strike groups, posing a relatively low cost method to counter one of the United States’ 
foremost and expensive military strengths.  Additionally, China recently commenced sea 
trials (August 2011) of its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, an ex-Soviet carrier formerly 
known as the Varyag—purchased from Ukraine in 1998.57  China is also working on two 
stealth fighters, the J-20 and J-31, in addition to maintaining and upgrading other 
weapons systems in the unending fashion adopted by modern military powers.  These 
activities certainly must be taken into consideration when contemplating the possibility of 
a regional conflict.  Cyber space—especially allegations of Chinese cyber espionage and 
attacks—presents yet another asymmetric capability that has increased tension in U.S.-
China relations and led the U.S. government to consider this space,58 existing inside the 
flow of electrons, as a new domain of warfare.  While these various Chinese weapon 
systems and capabilities might not ultimately meet expectations and might not directly 
match U.S. capabilities, uncertainty proves enough to warrant caution and consideration. 
                                                
56 The 2012 and 2011 reports mention little more than the development of the DF-21D 
and that it has a range exceeding 1,500km and a maneuverable warhead. See the 2011 
and 2012 reports under the following: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report 
to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China. 
 
57 For a concise history of China’s aircraft carrier desires and the history of China’s 
problematic acquisition of the Varyag, see Ian Storey and Ji You, “China’s Aircraft 
Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 1 
(Winter 2004). 
 
58 If cyber space may truly be called a “space” at all.  The extent to which it can be 
referred to as such, or even a domain of warfare, is discussed in chapter five. 
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With these various considerations in mind, how, then, does the nature of U.S.-
China relations create a situation, a reality, with stakes high for both sides and teeming 
with potential for conflict?  Adopting an interpretive approach to considering identity in 
international politics offers a method to develop a more detailed (though still subjective 
as most attempts at understanding and explanation), contextual understanding of the 
specific issues and phenomena salient in U.S.-China relations.  The findings produced by 
this approach might not be generalizable, as they are context specific and the approach 
itself does not engage in the practice of theory building, but the approach to 
understanding here adopted is generalizable.  Ultimately, this study argues that the 
identities and representational practices found on behalf of both the U.S. and China serve 
to construct, support, as well as influence the nature of relations between these two states, 
an argument applicable to relations between any actors in the broader international 
political system. 
Adopting an identity centric approach to the study of international politics does 
not necessarily privilege social facts to the exclusion of so called material factors.  
Though social facts are highly important and of primary emphasis, their importance does 
not deemphasize the importance of material factors.  Rather, examining identity allows 
researchers to place material factors in context in order to better understand their 
importance; they still play a major role in identify formation and affect both individual 
and group interests.  Emblematic of this relationship, material factors, including critical 
resources and the tools of military power, hold the potential to influence identity 
formation, perceptions of others, and in turn behavior.  Juxtaposing the nuclear 
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deterrence theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD) with international politics 
illustrates this point. 
Nuclear arsenals, though the creation of man, do have an objective, tangible, 
existence.59  On their own, however, they pose little threat, lacking any objective purpose 
or intent.60  Only when combined with identities and how the identities of others are 
perceived do they become instruments of fear and deterrence (offering insight behind 
desires to possess nuclear weapons).  This dependent relationship explains why the 
United States does not fear the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom, but did fear the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, as well as why the U.S. might now 
fear the nuclear arsenals of China or Pakistan.61  Of course, the United States also fears 
the potential for nuclear exchange between pairs of long time rivals, such as Pakistan and 
India.  Identity also aids in explaining why Japan, a nonnuclear state, does not currently 
fear the nuclear arsenal of the United States, even though it is the only state to suffer the 
horrors of nuclear attacks—at the hands of the United States—while Iran might very well 
fear the United States’ (or Israel’s) nuclear arsenal.  The point is simple, while identities 
are important, absent the objects of cooperation or conflict, both matter relatively little. 
                                                
59 “Objective” leaving aside philosophical debates over ontology and epistemology. 
 
60 But the potential for accidents still exists, as well as concerns over deterioration, both 
potentially leading to unintended radiation contamination. 
 
61 The latter particularly, primarily out of concern for the security of Pakistan’s nuclear 
arsenal and nuclear material in light of the identities and interests of those who might 
come to appropriate the country’s nuclear weapons or components in the event of 
government incompetence or dissolution. 
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 Contention may exist that adopting such an identity centric approach to 
examining the role of identity in international politics (an approach akin to social 
constructivism) does not, in fact, operate within the realm of international relations 
theory, instead offering more of an approach to understanding foreign policy, concerned 
with state or individual level issues instead of those of the systemic level.  While such a 
parochial view might favor parsimonious theorizing or reinforce the authority of more 
traditional approaches within the field of international relations, it does little service to 
the discipline or the policymakers and others who might pay heed to scholarly insights.  
Traditional approaches to international relations, often limited to analysis of systemic 
level issues and taking states as unitary actors, detach the political from political science 
and the relations from international relations.  They arbitrarily limit their own 
applicability and ability to explore a wider, more diverse range of phenomena and 
observations, including the real world influence of social theories.  They also often exert, 
as has at times been the case, a tyrannical agenda on the field of international relations, an 
agenda that limits and circumscribes scholarly goals of seeking greater knowledge and 
understanding by privileging certain methods of pursuing these goals over others.  There 
is little mistake that the insights and explanations offered by traditional theories often 
prove intriguing and, in many cases, make intuitive sense.  The fundamental problem lies 
in their limited applicability, the tendency for reification by their proponents, and the 
ability of social theories to influence social behavior.  International behavior cannot be 
legitimately examined without paying deference to this fact. 
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Examining the role of identity in international politics does increase the 
complexity of explanations and understanding and require intensive study, often 
incorporating many factors.  It also requires the cultivation of in-depth regional and 
country specific knowledge and a respect for and inclusion of history.  Worrisome for 
some might be the potential for subjectivity that exists in conducting analyses that 
examine identity.  However, potential for subjectivity exists with any research study and 
in the application of any theory.  Adopting a traditional approach under the mantle of 
“science” often only masks this fact.  Much depends on each particular researcher, their 
knowledge, biases, sources used, sources ignored, and even the sources of which they 
find themselves (or, rather, do not find themselves) ignorant.  Even quantitative studies, 
boasting supposed greater objectivity provided by mathematical formulae and statistical 
analyses suffer bias and subjectivity in the interpretation of results, the selection and 
exclusion of variables, how variables are coded, how data is collected, and in the 
incorporation of underlying theory.62  The only remedy is to adopt an approach that 
admits potential subjectivity or bias and attempts to problematize it.  Adopting an identity 
centric approach allows for tailoring to specific needs and allows for the examination of 
more specific questions to develop more specific, more in depth understanding of 
international politics. 
                                                
62 A privileging of qualitative methodology over quantitative does not follow from this 
argument.  Unfortunately, as Mearsheimer and Walt note, quantitative studies too often 
come at the expense of underlying theory within the field of international relations.  John 
J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind: Why Hypothesis Testing 
Has Become Bad for IR,” European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming). 
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Similar to studies of strategic culture and Chinese nationalism, this study argues 
that relations between international actors are best explained in terms of identity.  
Emphasizing the role of identity in international politics allows for an examination of not 
only behavior but the ways in which the identities actors hold influence the behavior and 
identities of one another.  Traditional theories of international relations become 
worldviews with productive power that influence the social relations of international 
politics.  That is, they are capable of influencing behavior, as actors adopt these views 
themselves while also assessing the worldviews others might hold.  If these statements 
are misguided, how else might scholars explain why there has been so much focus on 
determining what type of power China is? 
John Mearsheimer predicts that despite Beijing’s rhetoric to the contrary, China’s 
rise will ultimately not be peaceful.63  Instead, it will lead to regional and global 
rebalancing with the potential for conflict, a neorealist view.  It is possible to interpret 
recent Chinese behavior in this light.  Beijing often criticizes the U.S. and Japan, has 
embarked upon sea trials with its first aircraft carrier, has experienced heightened tension 
with Japan since the 2010 collision of a Chinese fishing trawler with two different 
Japanese coastguard vessels near the mutually disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, offers 
much needed aid to North Korea, and refrained from criticizing North Korea’s 
unprovoked sinking of the South Korean destroyer, the Cheonan, and shelling of 
Yeonpyeong, a South Korean island.  Not necessarily interpreting these behaviors to 
portend the character of China now or in the future, Thomas Christensen argues that the 
                                                
63 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” 
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CCP was more or less compelled to respond to these situations in these ways due to 
behavioral constraints.64  In other words, even if Beijing desired to act in ways more 
agreeable to the west, it did not have the option to do so.  If true, this explanation does 
not free China and its leaders from responsibility, especially as the behavioral constraints 
encountered are largely ideational, past rhetoric and behavior serving as influential 
factors either creating cognitive or bottom up commitment traps.  However, if, as 
Christensen seems to suggest, China had no other option than to lie in the bed it made for 
itself in some of these situations, the leadership in Beijing is still responsible for the 
making of its bed.  Of importance are the identities implicit in these explanations. 
This study undertakes an analysis of three different cases in seeking greater 
insight into the nature of U.S.-China relations, in how this relationship functions, and in 
hopes of developing a greater understanding of relations between these two countries and 
offering a more intellectually honest approach the study of international politics.  As 
such, this study focuses on what might be considered periods of transition or crisis.  
According to Roxanne Doty, “…rhetoric is intensified in times of crisis, when naturalized 
identities are at risk of coming undone, when authority is being questioned, and when the 
reproduction of identities takes place in different and permanently changing arenas.”65  
With this in mind, this study first assesses relations between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks.  Before the 
                                                
64 Thomas Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s 
Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011). 
 
65 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996), 29. 
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terrorist attacks on the American homeland, tension with China appeared on the rise, 
resulting from economic concerns as well as (to some degree) due to unfortunate 
accidents: the May 1999 U.S./NATO bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy and the 
April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3E reconnaissance aircraft with a Chinese fighter near 
the island of Hainan.  After al-Qaeda’s attacks, China condemned terrorism and offered 
its condolences to the United States.  Relations began to warm and China came to be 
seen, for a time, as a partner in the global “war” on terrorism, Beijing claiming to have 
suffered terrorist attacks in its Xinjiang region over the previous decade.66  Relations 
would soon cool with the U.S. invasion of Iraq and China’s continued rise and increasing 
military power—especially in terms of asymmetric, outer space, and cyber capabilities—
as well as China’s continued support of international actors at odds with U.S. interests, 
such as North Korea.  These shifts in relations are explained through analysis of the 
narratives of identities found in both the U.S. and China over this period, not only how 
they define themselves but also how they define one another and their interests. 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute between China and Japan serves as the 
second case study in this analysis.  Though primarily an issue between these two 
countries, as Japan’s ally and having much interest in maintaining stability in the region, 
this issue also matters greatly to the United States.  Thus, the dispute is examined through 
the interactions and posturing it has spurred between the U.S. and China rather than 
between China and Japan  The U.S. relationship with Japan undoubtedly influences U.S.-
China relations, as do animosities and opposing interests between Japan and China. 
                                                
66 A claim not uncontested, whether any of the activities in Xinjiang or elsewhere in 
China represent terrorism and to what extent is an important question. 
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Last, this study examines the increasing number and nature of confrontations 
between the U.S. and China in the digital world, in cyber space.  This includes the 
narratives and rhetoric adopted by each side in their representations of themselves and the 
other, as with the other cases analyzed in this study.  Over the last few years, China has 
come under increasing criticism for conducting cyber attacks against the U.S. 
government, military, and business sectors.  However, the nature of these attacks must be 
examined in light of the United States’ own cyber activities and interests.  Linked to these 
issues is the matter of how both sides define the identity of the realm of cyber space 
itself.  Complicating matters is the attribution problem, the difficulty of determining the 
origin of an attack in cyber space, which must also be considered, especially in how this 
affects the identity performances of both states and the narratives they adopt. 
For each case this study draws upon relevant historical context, especially with 
regard to the Chinese humiliation narrative, with origins in the late nineteenth and, more 
so, the early twentieth centuries.  Each case involves significant events and transitions 
that reflect important shifts in bilateral relations.  Rather than treating either side as a 
monolithic, unitary actor or monocultural entity, this study explores the different 
identities at play on both sides and how these identities affect the nature of the U.S.-
China relationship. 
In analyzing each of these three cases, this study examines the salient narratives 
and aspects of identity for each actor, drawing especially upon primary sources in so 
doing, attempting to ascertain how, in their narratives, the U.S. and China define 
themselves, one another, and their relationship.  The fluid concept that it is, identities will 
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shift, or at least the salience of certain aspects of identity will, due to the influence of 
actions and rhetoric from either side as well as internal, domestic factors. 
Before analyzing each of these three cases, this study’s identity centric approach 
will be further outlined, as one of this study’s goals is not only to adopt an interpretive, 
identity centric approach to analyzing U.S.-China relations but also to provide a 
foundation for applying this approach to international politics at large.  This discussion 
will necessarily include consideration of traditional international relations theory in 
relation to this approach as well as how the theories considered relate to the scientific 
endeavor in the social sciences and the supposed purpose of the study of international 
relations.
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II 
 
IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
But in my view, the appeal to the authority of experts should be neither 
excused nor defended.  It should, on the contrary, be recognized for what 
it is—an intellectual fashion—and it should be attacked by a frank 
acknowledgement of how little we know, and how much that little is due to 
people who have worked in many fields at the same time.  And it should 
also be attacked by the recognition that the orthodoxy produced by 
intellectual fashions, specialization, and the appeal to authorities is the 
death of knowledge, and that the growth of knowledge depends entirely 
upon disagreement.† 
 
–Karl R. Popper 
 
 
In studying international politics, Hans Morgenthau stated that when examining the 
behavior of the statesman, “We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches, we 
listen in on his conversations with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very 
thoughts,” doing so as if disinterested observers.67  Though often differing on which 
actors and factors of international politics are important, researchers and the theoretical 
dispositions they adopt often agree with this notion of the disinterested observer: the 
objective analyst external to the subjects and systems under scrutiny, separate from the 
findings they uncover and from the explanations they formulate.  But does not the 
statesman take note of the researcher’s shadow, peering over his shoulder?  Does not 
knowledge of the studies of the statesman ultimately ring back to him in some way or 
                                                
† Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In defence of science and rationality  
(London: Routledge, 1994), X. 
 
67 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
Seventh Edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 5. 
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form?  Does not the statesman perceive that his decisions—his actions—will bear 
scrutiny from peers and interested observers alike?68   These questions hint at important 
insights related to the study of international politics: the influence and productive power 
of not only social constructions but also of social theories (which are themselves social 
constructions) and the influence of self-reflective considerations about how behavior will 
be perceived by not only researchers but, more importantly, by other actors.69  Actors, 
whether the statesman or the researcher, whether consciously or not, find themselves 
engaged in the production of knowledge.  According to Linus Hagström, “if knowledge is 
socially constructed, the possibility of reconstruction and reinterpretation follows.”70  
This relates closely to the role of perception with regard to identity, itself a multifaceted 
concept.  For the purpose of this study, perception is defined as the ability of social actors 
to become aware of the identities and interests of other actors (however biased these 
perceptions may be).  Actors form their own perceptions, influence the perceptions of 
others, and contemplate the perceptions held by others.71  More than simply influencing 
behavior, perceptions and theories shape the identities that drive behavior. 
                                                
68 With regard to the study of systems rather than individual or groups of subjects, a 
similar but simpler rhetorical question might be asked about whether statesmen and 
others become aware of such studies. 
 
69 By productive power, the ability of theories and other modes of understanding to 
influence and produce, to have an affect on, behavior is meant. 
 
70 Linus Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010,” The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 5 no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 269. 
 
71 All of which is quite tacit in Morgenthau’s depiction of the statesman used above. 
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Focusing on the role of identity in international politics, this study offers an 
approach to understanding that prioritizes the cultivation of in depth knowledge of 
specific international issues and cases for use by scholars and policymakers alike.  This 
approach bears similarity to that of Hagström, where the overall goal is to assess the 
narratives and dominant modes of explanation salient for the cases or issues under 
examination, not necessarily to offer competing or challenging narratives.72  The 
approach also bears similarity to that often adopted by those conducting area studies, the 
best of which prioritize the empirical over the theoretical with an almost obsessive 
attention to detail and context in order to best inform understanding and debate.  It 
differs, however, in that it strives to understand international politics in terms of how the 
identities—the narratives of identities—influence and characterize the nature of relations 
between different international actors.  Here, identity refers to individually or collectively 
held relational conceptions of self and other that influence how actors view themselves, 
others, and their worlds and how actors interact with one another.  Identity is a purely 
conceptual notion, one researchers may partially glimpse through analysis of the 
narratives of self and other expressed by international actors.  In examining—in 
problematizing—the role of identity in international politics, taking identities as fixed or 
entirely knowable must be avoided; neither represents reality.  Not only does much 
important variation exist for the actors or within the groups—states, organizations, 
                                                
72 Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia?” 271.  This sort of constructivist approach also 
avoids, as Hagström explains, the problem of selection bias, since the goal is not to 
validate any single framework, theory, or narrative. 
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nationalities, and so on—of possible study, identities are malleable and infinitely subject 
to change over time. 
Analyzing identity, researchers are confronted with the intricate problem of 
gaining insight into the mind of their subjects—the other, the statesman or whomever 
else—a task at which they will never fully succeed.  Thus, researchers adopting this 
approach are limited to the prospect of gaining as much insight as possible, typically 
through the narratives of various actors, and presenting their findings as informed 
interpretations of reality (their own narratives of sorts), analyses almost certain to be 
incomplete or tainted by their own viewpoints and an inability to fully know their 
subjects no matter how disinterested they endeavor to remain, rather than reducing73 the 
results of their studies to generalities or passing off their findings as composite of 
timeless, objective truths.  Otherwise stated, in order to come as close as possible to 
understanding reality as it is, researchers must admit to and remind themselves that they 
will never truly “know” reality and not deceive themselves otherwise.74  Before detailing 
this study’s approach to examining the role of identity in international politics, what the 
approach does not entail as well as the fundamentals upon which it is based will first be 
discussed. 
The approach set forth and adopted in this study does not set out to apply, test, or 
assess any specific or preconceived theory.  However, nor are its aspirations and 
                                                
73 Reducing in terms of the amount and value of information offered, and perhaps degree 
of intellectual honesty. 
 
74 The concept of knowing is here used in an epistemological (even philosophical) sense. 
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applicability limited to this study’s case of choice: the dynamics of contemporary U.S.-
China relations.  Instead, it offers an approach to understanding applicable to, at least 
informative for, the wider field of international relations, to cases beyond contemporary 
relations between Beijing and Washington.  Within the field of political science and other 
social science disciplines, much is made of testing established theories75, simple or 
complex, on novel cases—building or whittling away support for theories and research 
programs, filling gaps, puzzle-solving.  However unexpressed, this sort of activity does 
not promote growth of knowledge, whatever that might mean, so much as promote 
individual scholarly objectives and interests. 
With this study’s approach to international politics and identity, the crux of the 
matter, its essence, is that identity matters but that its role is unique to particular 
situations and dependent upon contextual factors.  While some, like Ted Hopf, attempt to 
incorporate identity theory into what he considers the scientific approach to studying 
international relations, a problem in doing so exists derivative of constructivism as a 
whole, of which identity theory is part.76  The specific criticism often levied at 
constructivism is that it offers little more than a method or an approach to study rather 
than truly offering a theory of international relations.  Constructivism seems neither able 
                                                
75 Or, for the ambitious and creative, formulating their own novel theoretical insights to 
apply to problems and cases, old or new.  This is distinct from the frequent practice of 
adopting established theories from other disciplines to support pretentions of novelty and 
interdisciplinarity.  Novelty and interdisciplinarity are admirable, but not for their own 
sake. 
 
76 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, 
Moscow, 1955 & 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
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to offer the conditions under which it is falsifiable nor specific, generalizable hypotheses 
or predictions.  When inspecting the theoretical foundations of constructivism, the lack of 
a stronger, harder, more scientific theory is not for want but is instead the result of the 
constructivism’s theoretical tenets.  Constructivism’s foundations and the largely 
unconscious practice of social construction prevent any grand, timeless, generalizable 
theoretical claims about social behavior.  With its insights, researchers might at times 
posit explanations that hold under certain conditions, but constructivism’s strength lies in 
noting that those conditions are never fixed or stable.  Despite valuable insights from the 
realm of psychology and social experimentation—which do not necessarily attempt to 
offer this sort of “scientific” theory—the same holds for identity.  Whether 
constructivism or identity offer any sort of scientific theory or approach for the field of 
international relations depend upon understandings of the scientific endeavor. 
The Science of Social Science 
Political science quite clearly bears the mantle of science, situated within the realm of the 
social sciences.  Nevertheless, whether political science is, in fact, scientific and to what 
extent the social sciences should (if at all) emulate the natural sciences remains contested.  
When speaking of science, reference is made to a very particular, systematic approach to 
understanding.  The traditional explanation is that the scientific approach generally 
begins with an interesting observation or question that inspires exploration, the ensuing 
research adhering to specific standards of proof and falsifiability.  More generally, 
theories are formulated and tested.  This explanation, however, radically simplifies the 
scientific approach and thus leads to contestation over what is and is not scientific.  In 
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order to understand the possibilities of scientific understanding, where this process 
begins, if the commonly held ideal of the scientific method holds irrevocably true, and 
what sort of effects it produces require discussion. 
 Widely held as one of the most influential contributors to discussions of science 
and rationality in recent history, Karl Popper’s thoughts offer great insight into the 
possibilities of scientific understanding.  These thoughts, however, too frequently suffer 
misinterpretation and misrepresentation.  Taken by many as an iconic positivist and one 
of the foremost sponsors of the scientific method, Popper adamantly defined himself as 
an anti-positivist and explicitly rejected the common conceptualization of the scientific 
method adopted during his time.77  Specifically, Popper rejected the notion that science 
does or should begin with induction.  Instead, he supported a conceptualization of the 
scientific method based on what he called a critical approach to science.  Rejecting the 
idea that science starts with empirical observations, Popper argued that all observation is 
biased and theory impregnated.  According to Popper, science starts not with observation, 
but with a problem, a question, or a theory.  The scientist cannot merely begin with 
observation without some inkling of what she is looking for.  He further argued that the 
best theories—those of Newton, Einstein, and other great thinkers—originate outside of 
science itself, endorsing metaphysical and speculative thought.  This, according to 
                                                
77 Habermas apparently first applied the positivist label to Popper, originating this widely 
held misconception.  This is intriguing, as Popper himself, criticized as a part of the 
positivist Vienna circle by those in the Frankfurt School, situated himself as an anti-
positivist and criticized the Vienna circle from his anti-positivist, “realist” standpoint.  
Popper even described Hegel’s identity philosophy as an example moral and legal 
positivism. Popper, 67-8. 
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Popper, is big science, the revolutionary sort leading to growth of knowledge.  Popper 
feared the opposite, that the growth of normal science would incur stagnation, and 
possibly even prevent or lead to a regression in growth of knowledge.78  Though holding 
some notion of growth of knowledge, Popper simultaneously rejected the notion that 
science leads to the uncovering of any sort of absolute truth. 
 Whether or not surprising, Popper claimed that observers neither experience the 
world as it truly exists nor can they ever ascertain absolute truth.  In other words, 
researchers can never produce absolute, definitive scientific proof to support their 
theories or scientific explanations.  Indeed, this general idea should not be surprising at 
all, as even the natural sciences deal primarily in the realm of theory, a term explicitly 
honest that it (theory) does not definitively represent reality or fact.79  Popper did, 
however, believe in objectivity.  Objectivity, for Popper, stemmed from his view of the 
scientific method itself.  The scientific method—Popper’s scientific method, not that of 
inductivists—hinged on a critical approach to understanding: engaging in a process of 
debating and testing theories in relation to one another.  He rejected dogmatism and the 
prospect of any theory attaining dogmatic authority, of becoming an “intellectual 
fashion.”  What Popper termed objectivity, what others might take greater comfort in 
                                                
78 Popper, 72.  Thusly, Popper feared the increasing trend of Ph.D. students being trained 
in technical methods instead of initiated into the scientific tradition of critical 
questioning, focusing on small, soluble puzzles instead of following the uncertainty of 
large riddles.  Popper’s view correlates quite closely to Kuhn’s notion of puzzle solving. 
 
79 Leaving aside a more philosophical exploration of theories and scientific laws. 
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terming inter-subjectivity, results from “mutual rational criticism.”80  Rationality, for 
Popper, represented little more than the ability to engage in critical discussion.  Even 
though he contested the notion of ascertaining (absolute) truth itself, Popper viewed this 
method as a way to approach and achieve a better approximation of the truth, for this 
reason defining himself an epistemological optimist. 
In response to criticism from certain relativists, and some of the striking 
similarities between aspects of Popper’s thought and relativism should be noted, Popper 
argued that a mutual framework is not pre-requisite for critical discussion or mutual 
understanding.  Nonetheless, he did admit that fruitful discussion might not always result 
between those of differing modes of understanding, whether scientific theories, cultures, 
or even time periods.  Whatever the case, he strongly opposed foreclosing this possibility 
altogether, believing that attempts at critical discussion at the very least broaden 
researchers’ knowledge and their understanding of those with whom they differ.  Thus, 
Popper defined belief in the prerequisite necessity of a mutual framework for critical 
discussion as the myth of the framework.81 
                                                
80 Popper, 70.  In relation to other trends Popper opposed, he, in agreement with Einstein, 
opposed operationalism.  That is, he opposed operational definitions, viewing this task as 
an exercise in infinite regress doing little more than divert effort from the true problem 
under scrutiny.  Popper, 41. 
 
81 For a full discussion of this myth, see Popper, 33-64.  The similarities between 
Popper’s thoughts and those of, for instance, Kuhn are quite striking.  The greatest 
difference likely comes in terms of the nuances of Popper’s myth of the framework, 
whether engaging in fruitful critical discussion with those of different frameworks is 
possible.  Using Kuhn’s terminology, paradigms might be substituted for frameworks.  
Discussion across paradigms or frameworks relates to Kuhn’s consideration of whether 
the tenets of fallen paradigms or theories are mutually intelligible under a new paradigm 
after a “scientific revolution.”  According to Kuhn, old or marginalized paradigms and 
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 As far as he was concerned with the social sciences, Popper opposed the adoption 
of the methods of the natural sciences by social scientists.  He did so with, however, one 
very important caveat.  Popper voiced this opposition in terms of the traditional 
understanding of the scientific method found in the natural sciences.82  Popper’s 
opposition to adopting the scientific method in the social sciences mirrors his rejection of 
traditional understandings of the scientific method and the rationality on which it is based 
in the natural sciences.  On the other hand, Popper indeed endorsed his own view of 
science and the scientific method as equally applicable to both the natural and social 
sciences.  In all, Popper’s views and reconceptualization of the foundations of science 
rejected positivism and the inductivist notion that science begins with observation in 
favor of embracing unorthodox sources of theoretical inspiration and offering a scientific 
method cognizant of its shortcomings and deriving strength from rational—critical—
discussion.  An epistemological optimist, Popper believed that pursuing this approach 
offered the best chance to develop a closer approximation of truth and facilitate growth of 
knowledge. 
 What relevance does Popper’s thought hold in relation to the objectives of 
understanding and explaining international politics?  Whether political scientists claim to 
embrace or reject his approach, looking past the frequent misunderstandings of it, the 
                                                                                                                                            
theories must be explained—essentially reinterpreted—in the terms of the new paradigm 
and that everything from the old paradigm is not always able to be explained by the new 
one.  For a fuller treatment of this process, see Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Third Edition (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1996 [1962]). 
 
82 Popper, 155. 
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discipline of political science appears to at the very least follow something akin to it.  
Most academics within the field concede the inability of uncovering any absolute truth 
about the world or international politics.  Many even appear to side with Popper on the 
topic of induction.  Moreover, the discipline (as with the social and natural sciences in 
general) seems to embrace the notion of critical discussion and debate to determine the 
merit of the various theories routinely formulated, modified, or tested by scholars of 
political science.83  Other times, the field reflects the heights of positivism and 
dogmatism, even when simultaneously claiming otherwise (though the claims to 
positivism by those within the discipline are often dubious and intermixed with their 
misconstrued interpretations of Popper’s thought).  Theory and models tend towards 
reification, often without realization; numbers speak truth and defray attention from 
underlying theory; certain frameworks and approaches to understanding receive higher 
regard over others not based on merit or open, critical scientific thought and discussion 
but out of a vested interest in and desire to hold to or defend specific research programs 
and theories or out of a devotion to (misunderstood) principles of science that supposedly 
possess an ability to objectively differentiate between scientific and unscientific, between 
which theories are productive and which are degenerative. 
This process has the effect of marginalizing important criticism, marginalizing 
novel, revolutionary thought, and marginalizing the demand for scientific and intellectual 
accountability.  At stake are authoritative claims to science and reality.  At their worst, 
                                                
83 The field of international relations often reverberates with claims that any given theory 
is no more than a tool, scholars free to adopt and apply whichever might best fit the 
problem or question at hand, a sort of methodological and theoretical pluralism.  Popper 
opposed this practice, which he defined as intrumentalism. 
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dogmatic, “positivist” claims to science and to authority within the discipline of political 
science dictate which approaches are scientific and while declaring their own ability to 
objectively arbitrate reality.  By appropriating science, they appeal to and deploy the 
authority associated with the concept of science to construct the discipline.  At best, space 
is made for others adhering to less “traditional” scientific approaches, whether akin to 
Popper’s understanding of science or otherwise and whether they view their approaches 
as scientific or not.  Somewhere in the middle, “traditional” scholars admit the limits of 
their theories and of adopting the traditional scientific method in the social sciences—the 
same limits noted by Popper (and others)—only to then strategically forget these 
concerns and adopt this method anyhow. 
This all, of course, only reflects a general observation, one observers would be 
remiss to accept as authoritative, definitive, or representative of the discipline as a whole.  
Nonetheless, neoutilitarian84 theories of international relations, for example, continue to 
possess great influence and exhibit great persistence in the face of falsifying evidence and 
continue in attempts to define the “research programs” within the field of international 
relations.85  More importantly, they ignore the influence of theory itself in the social 
world.  Conventional threads of constructivism pay heed to the role of social 
                                                
84 John G. Ruggie’s term for the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism, due to their 
shared foundations.  This term will be explored in more detail below. 
 
85 Perhaps “better” substitutes for these theories have not emerged.  Or, perhaps, 
substantial vested interest in these theories and their close ties to notions of “science” and 
“rationality” aid in defending against their fall from influence.  Realisms persistence will 
be briefly discussed momentarily, though it is not this study’s purpose to engage in a 
debate over theoretical influence in the field of international relations. 
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constructions in international politics (and with regard to human relations in general) but 
frequently only pay little attention to the role of theory itself.  Related and overlapping 
approaches—more resolute constructivism, post-structuralism, post-modernism, and 
others—pay particular attention to doing so but often receive criticism for not offering 
their own alternative theoretical approaches to understanding international politics.  They 
receive criticism for engaging in the critique of theory without offering any 
(“productive”) theoretical alternative.86  Yet such criticism compromises and forgets the 
critical spirit of debate inherent to the scientific method while ignoring the potential of 
these alternative approaches to produce a different sort of understanding.  Did not E. H. 
Carr, often held as one of the founding fathers of realism, engage in this very same 
practice in his critique of idealism? 
 In The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr clearly outlined his belief in the subjectivity 
and historical conditionality of thought in his attack on idealism and utopianism.87  From 
this critique he made no attempt at offering an alternative theoretical approach or utopian 
vision out of his version of realism.  Carr found his realism incapable of providing the 
basis for a new framework of understanding.  Likewise, Carr did not see his realism as 
immune from its own weapons: the relativity of thought.  Instead, he offered his realism 
as way to critique, undermine, and tear down theories that have become problematic or 
                                                
86 Represented well by Keohane’s critique in Robert O. Keohane, “International 
Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4  (December 
1988). 
 
87 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-1939 (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
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harmful, as reportedly became of idealism leading up to and ultimately with the onset of 
World War II.  The idea inherent in Carr’s realism is not to undermine for the sake of 
undermining, it is to keep alive the realization of subjectivity, offer a mechanism to 
combat problematic theories and views of the world, and to encourage intellectual 
awareness.  Such a view, such a critique absent an alternative, is an unlikely predecessor 
to the various theories bearing its same namesake today: realism—the mantle of dealing 
with and treating the world as it truly exists and not as observers wish it might be.88  The 
only lasting influence Carr’s realism seems to have imparted upon contemporary 
realisms, aside from its namesake, is an aversion to idealism.  This aversion to moral and 
ideological influences, from Morgenthau through today, is quite interesting, as these 
realisms actually become their own ideologies of sorts: worldviews, lenses through which 
to interpret and interact with the world and its inhabitants, influencing behavior.  Carr’s 
realism might also provide the core of realism’s pessimism.  Ever since the horrors of 
World War II this pessimism has held great influence with international relations 
scholars, bordering on a form of neurosis.  This neurosis has led to the rise of what might 
be considered (pessimistic) theory addicts.  These are not addicts of theory in general, but 
of, relating back to Popper, their own particular dogmatic, intellectual fashions of 
preference, of which they cannot abstain and cannot clearly question from within, while 
under their own theory’s influence.  Perhaps this, this neurosis, explains realism’s 
persistence over time and its obsession with the dangers of idealism manifest as the need 
                                                
88 Carr’s realism likewise might not sit well with Popper’s idea of science, though Popper 
may be more apt to recognize the value of criticism by itself. 
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to take the world as it is (irrespective of whether realism actually does so), placing faith 
in the supposed methods of objectivity (not necessarily inter-subjectivity) and truth 
regarded as scientific.  With the great import of the behavioral revolution and dogmatism 
based on fear, realism persists.  
 It requires little effort to find fault with neorealism, its neoutilitarian brethren, or 
even Wendtian style constructivism (that is, softer, often state-centric forms of 
constructivism).  Nonetheless, exploring some of these limitations is instructive in 
exploring the benefits of adopting an identity centric approach to studying international 
politics as endorsed here.  Taking states as atomic actors, for instance, and situating them 
at the center of analysis may offer great theoretical simplicity but doing so comes at the 
expense of developing deeper understanding of the differences between states and the 
particularities of their interests and interactions, factors intrinsically related to 
understanding the diversity of relations between different states and the wide range and 
importance of their behavior.  States are neither irreducible nor by any means uniform.  
Moreover, states’ inner dynamics matter.  Ignoring these dynamics prevents 
understanding such important phenomena as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the fall of the 
Soviet Union.  The mantle of international relations itself does not presuppose a focus 
only on states of an unvarying nature with exogenously given interests.  To the extent it 
creates any sort of demarcation, this mantle does so only in restricting the field to that 
which has some bearing on international politics.  This broader conceptualization of the 
field’s scope allows for the inclusion of interesting factors and the study of international 
phenomena beyond the limitations imposed through a reification of theoretical states and 
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preoccupation with little more than limited notions of conflict.  It escapes the attempts of 
theory, not the discipline, to dictate that which is of importance and that which is not, 
those questions on which researchers should focus and those they should ignore.89  It 
rejects the practice of admitting while simultaneously forgetting that theory does not 
reflect truth, it recognizes that theoretical frameworks themselves possess productive 
power and influence the world researchers aspire to understand.  Theories are ideas, ones 
that once adopted influence, often unconsciously, perceptions and behaviors from the 
day-to-day lives of individuals and the groups they form to the studies conducted of 
them.  If otherwise, what do observers make of the statesman (or even the scholar), while 
peering over his shoulder, who questions whether other states are realist powers or some 
other sort?90  Recalling Popper, all observation is biased and theory impregnated.  
                                                
89 It is interesting that Waltz uses his structural theory, a theory found and formulated 
within international relations, to dictate which theories are theories of international 
relations and which are theories of foreign policy or are otherwise “reductionist” (this 
term is placed in quotation due to the somewhat diminutive, pejorative connotation it has 
come to represent).  Certainly, just because Waltz delineates a structural theory of 
international relations, which defines and limits his scope of study, does not mean that the 
sub-discipline as a whole is likewise restricted.  Assuredly, in Man, the State and War, 
before the later publication of his structural theory in Theory of International Politics 
(1979), Waltz notes the importance of first and second image (level) factors when 
examining international politics.  Even so, for some reason he since referred to his own 
theoretical insights to define the scope of study for the field of international relations 
itself.  It is uncertain whether anyone has noted the paradoxical nature of doing so.  For 
more on Waltz’s discussion of his three images or levels of analysis in international 
politics, see Kenneth N, Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New 
York:  Columbia University Press, 2001 [1954]). 
 
90 Such as the various attempts by policymakers and scholars to determine, define, and 
reveal to the world what sort of power China is, as noted previously. 
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Whatever terminology adopted—frameworks, approaches, worldviews, models—theories 
become part of the identities that shape perception and behavior. 
 
Contemporary Worldviews: Of Categories and Caricatures 
Despite the criticism it has received, realism, in some form, has arguably remained at the 
center of the field of international relations since its appearance as a response to 
idealism’s ostensible breakdown and supposed naiveté with the onset of World War II.91  
Though it holds great appeal and has weathered much criticism, quite obviously not all 
scholars adopt a realist framework.  For those that do, they do not necessarily do so 
uniformly.  The particularities of any one scholar’s realism may easily differ from those 
of another.  Regardless, realism maintains considerable authority in the field of 
international relations, perhaps most notably in the form of structural realism.  From this 
perspective, that of structural realism in general, the anarchic nature of the international 
system and states’ desires to survive interact to incite mistrust, self-help, and balance of 
power politics.  For its part, neoliberalism only expands upon neorealism (the expansion 
itself not insignificant), opening room for and seeking to explain the presence 
international cooperation that neorealism overlooks.  This underlies Ruggie’s 
classification of both as neoutilitarian theories.92  Both view the international system as 
anarchic, both typically take atomic, unitary states as the system’s primary actors, and 
                                                
91 Certainly many trace the origins of realism farther back into history, to the thought of 
Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli, even Thucydides.  Let it here suffice to recognize 
that such lineal tracings of the origins of realism are not uncontested. 
 
92 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. 
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both expect these actors to behave as rational utility maximizers primarily concerned with 
their own survival.  They differ in their pessimism concerning the importance of 
institutions and likelihood of cooperation in the international system.  In treating states as 
unitary actors, however, these approaches impose limitations on their own understandings 
of states and of international politics, referring to generalities instead of, to the extent 
possible, reality. 
The level of generality derived from treating states as rational, unitary actors 
might be considered similar to a caricature of sorts.  The general idea of any given state is 
represented, but some features are understated or, appearing normally, simply appear 
dwarfed by the exaggeration of others.93  In explaining international politics, structural 
realism’s caricature of states emphasizes survival, material capabilities, rationality, 
mistrust, and self-help while dramatically deemphasizing factors such as cooperation, 
ideas, values, and norms.  Neoliberal caricatures give more emphasis to these factors, and 
even to some nonstate actors such as international organizations, but ultimately not to the 
same degree as the factors of survival, material capabilities, rationality, mistrust, and self-
help.94  As caricatures distort reality, so too do neoutilitarian and other theories of social 
science.  The difference is that the blatant distortions of the former are always blatantly 
obvious, demanding observers’ attention, even making them more self-conscious and 
self-aware of them, while the distortions of theories, despite their intention of increasing 
                                                
93 Knowing that some states depart dramatically from this representation in terms of 
governance, stability, and so on, which supports the notion of a caricature. 
 
94 Though neoliberal studies quite obviously focus on cooperation and other factors 
important within the particular, individual variations of neoliberalism. 
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explanatory power and offering generalizability, far too often come to unconsciously 
substitute for reality in academic practice and real world politics.  Even when space exists 
to accommodate multiple caricatures, what results are essentialized categories of states, 
other actors, and important factors that detract from potentially informative, context 
specific understanding. 
Constructivism offers a more “radical” alternative,95 viewing the international 
system of states as a social construct in itself.  “Anarchy is what states make of it,” as 
Alexander Wendt once declared.96  In other words, the degree to which the anarchic 
international system is conflictual or cooperative and how it influences behavior depends 
on the beliefs and actions of states themselves and those who speak for or influence the 
state.  State behavior and the norms and structures it produces define the international 
system.  As noted earlier, however, constructivism often incurs criticism on the basis that 
it is less of a theory of international politics than a method or theoretically informed 
approach to understanding, which Ruggie himself admits.97  This criticism largely results 
from differences in views over theory and, more fundamentally, science between 
                                                
95 Interestingly, Stephen Walt identifies constructivism as a “radical” approach in his 
1998 article on international relations theories in Foreign Policy, while Jack Snyder, in 
his own 2004 Foreign Policy article—basically an updating of Walt’s article—on 
international relations theories treats idealism as a form of constructivism.  Prominent 
constructivists have refuted and questioned Snyder’s treatment and conflation of idealism 
with constructivism. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many 
Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 110 (Spring 1998) and Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival 
Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 145 (November/December 2004). 
 
96 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It.” 
 
97 Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity. 
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constructivist and traditional approaches, as explored earlier.  This study contends that 
while constructivist and similar approaches to understanding may not provide the sort of 
theory or explanation offered by more traditional approaches, they still promote 
understanding and often offer a richer understanding of international politics than 
traditional approaches. 
Identities and Social Behavior 
Following Popper, this study begins with a problem, a problem best described in the form 
of a question: what influences or characterizes the nature of relations between 
international actors and how, by what process?  The domain of international politics 
offers an endless array of potentially important factors to assess in exploring this 
question, factors that complicate some forms of explanation and understanding.  The 
realm of possible international actors includes states, here taken as diverse and unique 
entities composed of groups and individuals possessing various identities and interests.  
Overall, this realm includes actors from the individual through international levels.  The 
approach taken within this study contends that identities are fundamental to 
understanding international politics—more so, all social interactions—and influence the 
nature of relations between international and other actors.  In order to understand why 
relations between actors are conflictual, competitive, or cooperative researchers must 
examine the identities and attendant interests of relevant actors and how their identities 
and interests are constituted and drawn upon.  The narratives actors adopt and for what 
purposes are of particular interest in undertaking such an examination.  Identities are 
political, perhaps not entirely, but political nonetheless. 
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In adopting an identity centric approach to understanding international politics, it 
is important to note that actors form identities not only relationally and through 
interaction but, as Felix Berenskoetter points out, also with deference to the future and 
the uncertainty the future poses.98  Additionally, this approach takes into account the role 
of theory itself in influencing behavior, illustrated by questions, for instance, over 
whether a state is a “realist power,” not uncommon of analyses of China, demonstrating 
the productive power of theory.  Asking this question admits the variability in states’ 
views of the world and ultimately the variability of their identities and behavior.  The 
answers are neither absolute nor fixed.  The key to developing understanding of behavior 
lies in how identities arise, how they are drawn upon, and how they interact. 
Some studies of China have adopted similar approaches, perhaps the most well 
known of them examining the notion of strategic culture.  Strategic culture amounts to 
“ranked grand strategic preferences derived from central paradigmatic assumptions about 
the nature of conflict and the enemy, and [are] collectively shared by decision makers,” 
which roots “strategic choice in deeply historical, formative ideational legacies.”99  Such 
                                                
98 The purported novelty of this observation easily diminishes when considering that 
future uncertainty and speculation have driven, even if implicitly, many studies of Sino-
American relations.  Felix Berenskoetter, “Reclaiming the Vision Thing: Constructivists 
as Students of the Future,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (September 2011). 
 
99 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), IX.  Feng Huiyun offers a 
similar definition of strategic culture, arguing that it “is a cultural construct with 
operational dimensions that affect the behavior of individuals through the symbols, 
values or beliefs that it embodies, which affects the strategic thinking of leaders on war 
and peace, perceptions and assessments of threat, the utility of force and the possible 
outcomes.  Though differing conceptually, the definitions provided by scholars usually 
consist of two parts in most of the conceptualizations: the political/philosophical part and 
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studies typically share a common desire to determine whether China conducts itself 
offensively, more in accordance with realism (at least offensive realism), or in a peaceful 
fashion, more in accordance with China’s historical and philosophical schools of thought 
like Confucianism.  When Ian Alastair Johnston wrote Cultural Realism in 1995, 
examining the influence of China’s Seven Military Classics and Confucian-Mencian-
Daoist thought on Chinese strategic culture during the Ming dynasty, he argued that 
China’s behavior during that time reflected more of a parabellum, more of a realist, 
strategic culture.100  Johnston’s approach, however, suffered an inherent flaw: though it 
placed great emphasis on the roles of history and culture, it flirted with creating historic 
monotypes to then be determined whether representative of China or not.101  If scholars 
stop once arriving at the answer they feel is most correct, they ignore the influence and 
interaction of other answers still present in domestic and international discourse.  If, for 
sake of demonstration, Johnston’s conclusion that Ming dynasty China had more of a 
parabellum strategic culture is accepted, how and in what ways did the lesser strategic 
cultures still influence Chinese behavior and interact with the dominant parabellum 
strategic culture? 
                                                                                                                                            
the strategic/operational/instrumental part.”  Feng Huiyun, Chinese Strategic Culture and 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership, and War (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 32. 
 
100 However, Johnston was cautious in drawing conclusions about contemporary or future 
Chinese strategic culture based on the past.  Johnston, Cultural Realism. 
 
101 There are inherent flaws in Johnston’s study itself in that he does not elaborate upon 
how and why strategic culture functions, in terms of a causal mechanism or otherwise, 
nor does he incorporate variance within his study, such as including within case 
comparisons.  The latter flaw prevents concluding any support for a parabellum Chinese 
strategic culture over simply a neorealist explanation of international relations. 
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Feng Huiyun adopted a broader, more nuanced approach in her examination of 
modern Chinese strategic culture, finding that whether offensive, realist behavior or more 
benign, Confucian style behavior characterizes Chinese strategic culture varies dependent 
upon China’s leaders at a given time, even for specific leaders over time and in specific 
situations.  This allows for a more dynamic representation of Chinese strategic culture 
and behavior.  Ultimately, Feng finds that defensive, Confucian style behavior is most 
representative of Chinese international behavior, though there have been times when the 
country and its leaders have acted more aggressively, especially under Mao Zedong.  
Interestingly, however, Feng’s findings result in undermining the notion of strategic 
culture: the existence of mutually shared beliefs that are relatively stable over time.  If 
“strategic culture” varies among Chinese leaders (not to mention other actors), to what 
degree is it really shared?  Her findings support more of a strategic decision-making 
model or point toward the influence of identities in international politics rather than the 
importance of strategic culture as commonly defined.102  More broadly, Feng’s findings 
bear similarity to what some, including David Kang, term Chinese exceptionalism. 
The notion of Chinese exceptionalism questions whether China fits into and 
behaves according to traditional Western conceptions of international political behavior, 
specifically, does China behave in accordance with balance of power politics?  Kang 
                                                
102 It is also unclear how comparing Chinese leaders against a global norming group, as 
Feng does to determine the nature of Chinese leaders, indicates closeness to or deviance 
from Confucianism.  If a lack of deviance from the norming group of world leaders 
indicates Confucianism, does this imply that, on average, world (not just Chinese) leaders 
exhibit Confucian qualities? Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making. 
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argues that roughly six centuries of peaceful relations as head of the region’s tributary 
system characterizes Chinese history within East Asia, predisposing the country toward a 
peaceful rise with respect for the sovereignty of other states.103  Unfortunately, even 
though he notes the importance of international relations and history in constituting a 
state’s identity, Kang’s study creates the same sort of essentialized monotypes as 
Johnston’s, not allowing for the dynamism that Feng offers while, more importantly, 
ignoring the relational nature of identity.  Aside from all but superficially neglecting the 
possibility of variance, his study also risks predictions about future behavior without 
taking into consideration significant contemporary issues and events both internal and 
external to, but likewise affecting, the Chinese state. 
Though Feng’s study offers the greatest insight and depth of understanding 
among those aforementioned, they all suffer various flaws.  Each essentially examines the 
role of identity as it pertains to China or relations between China and the United States, 
even if only focusing on limited aspects of the concept or a limited conceptualization of 
identity itself.  Those that do note the relational nature of identity do not venture much 
beyond superficial recognition.  Moreover, these studies do not emphasize the importance 
of interests, the effects of perceptual gaps on relations between international actors,104 
                                                
103 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007). 
 
104 Gregory Moore goes into much detail on the role of perceptual gaps in understanding 
Washington and Beijing’s different reactions to the accidental U.S./NATO bombing of 
China’s Belgrade embassy and the impact of these differing perceptions on relations 
between the two.  Gregory J. Moore, “Not Very Material but Hardly Immaterial: China’s 
Bombed Embassy and Sino-American Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 1 
(January 2010). 
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illuminate the interplay of differences in identities and interests among influential 
individuals and groups within the state, or investigate why some cultural and historical 
facts appear more important in terms of identity than others.  Certainly culture and 
history matter, but how, to what extent, and in what relation to other factors? 
Peter Hayes Gries and William A. Callahan explore some of these issues in their 
respective assessments of Chinese nationalism and how it influences U.S.-China 
relations.105 Inherently related to the notion of identity, both studies effectively argue that 
with the end of the Cold War China sought a new nationalism to replace communism and 
maintain the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (hinting at the political nature of 
identity).  Both China’s rise and optimism for the future as well as the abuses China 
suffered at the hands of western powers and Japan since the late nineteenth century, 
known as the century of humiliation or simply the humiliation narrative, serve as the 
basis for this new nationalism.106  As Callahan describes, the humiliation narrative in 
particular has taken on a life of its own in China, reproduced by the Chinese population 
in a bottom up fashion and proliferated through a market of consumer goods with, for 
example, pictorial depictions of specific abuses.107  Both studies provide an excellent 
transition to a fuller, thicker study of identity in U.S.-China relations, an approach more 
                                                                                                                                            
 
105 Peter Hays Gries. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) and William A. Callahan, China: The 
Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
106 These two components explain Callahan’s title, China: The Pessoptimist Nation. 
 
107 Callahan, China. 
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broadly applicable to the field of international relations and allowing for deeper, more 
nuanced understanding of the relations between not only states, but individuals and 
groups as well.  These studies act only as transitional for a few reasons.  Neither study 
explicitly examines the role of competing identities and perceptions within China or the 
United States nor do they spend much time assessing the United States itself or the 
interaction between the nationalisms, the identities, of the two respective countries. 
Studies examining the role of identity or applying identity theory to international 
politics help build upon those dedicated to U.S.-China relations and help clarify the 
fundamentals of this study’s approach.  They also illuminate areas for improvement when 
discussing or problematizing the role of identity in international politics.108  In one such 
study, Ted Hopf, examining the role of identity in Moscow in Social Construction of 
International Politics, claims, “There is no canonical treatment of identity in political 
science,” and that his own understanding of identity was “…shaped by a great deal of 
happenstance, rather than the reading of a particular well-known consensually 
foundational literature.”109  While these statements ignore the various constructivist 
insights, both conventional and critical, that contribute to and overlap with the study of 
identity in the field of international relations, Hopf’s work does offer many important 
insights. 
                                                
108 Though they serve these functions, different studies obviously do not adopt a uniform 
approach to identity in international politics. 
 
109 Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies, 
Moscow, 1955 & 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002): x. 
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Hopf’s approach unabashedly represents a conventional, more traditional oriented 
constructivist approach to the study of identity in international relations.  His approach 
might even be more conventional than most other “mainstream” constructivist 
approaches, attempting to marry the interpretive account of identity he adopts with the 
mainstream social science methods to which he feels indebted.  Thusly, he states, “I am 
deeply committed to inductive interpretivist recovery of empirical evidence, while 
simultaneously using that evidence to test hypotheses deduced from a theory of how 
identity might affect foreign policy choice.”110  Hopf’s outlined approach shares many 
similarities with the approach adopted within this study, arguing that actors hold multiple 
identities, that identities are relational and intersubjective in nature, and that various 
actors in addition to the state matter.  However, Hopf also contends, “the only motive for 
the ubiquitous presence and operation of identities is the human desire to understand the 
social world and the consequent cognitive need for order, predictability, and certainty.  
Identities operate like cognitive devices or heuristics.”111  On this point the approaches 
begin to differ. 
Hopf’s study itself is quite narrow, largely due to ignoring international influences 
on identity in favor of limiting the scope of his analysis to the domestic scene, but the 
social cognitive theory of identity that he adopts offers much that deserves 
commendation: problematizing identity rather than taking it for granted or simply 
                                                
110 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, xi.  He does later admit the 
impossibility of taking a fully inductive approach. 
 
111 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, 4. 
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assigning it to actors; drawing upon empirical evidence and discursive representations in 
order to understand identity; drawing upon the identities uncovered to explain relations 
between actors; endogenizing interests as based upon identities; and making the 
important realization that attempts at theorizing and hypothesizing undermine attempts at 
understanding and explanation and that the identities he uncovers only hold as far as 
interpretation and intersubjectivity allow.  But after making these important declarations, 
Hopf paradoxically proceeds with a conventional social scientific approach to the study 
of identity.  Hopf justifies this move on the basis of the inductivist, phenomenological 
approach he adopts: searching not for particular Soviet or Russian identities but letting 
them “emerge” from the texts analyzed.112  He seems to want to placate both traditional 
political scientists—and perhaps his own traditional proclivities or other interests—as 
well as the criticism often heard echoing from more critical scholars.  As a result, Hopf’s 
approach flutters between the two, situated fully in neither. 
Hopf understands the untenable nature that the epistemological foundations of his 
approach create—the impossibility of a fully inductivist phenomenological approach—
only to remedy this problem with an attempt to be as inductive and unbiased as possible.  
He does at least pay explicit attention to these problems, but after doing so and even 
while focusing on the role of identity in international politics Hopf seems to engage in the 
same practice of strategically recognizing while simultaneously forgetting such problems 
as so often done by many other scholars.  While letting identities “emerge” through 
research rather than seeking out presupposed identities, even if problematic, is 
                                                
112 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, 23-4. 
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noteworthy, Hopf’s overall approach amounts to a confession of his intellectual sins 
when confession alone cannot bring intellectual salvation.  Again note Hopf’s own 
understanding of what he hopes to achieve, that “My work produces what I call a relative, 
working truth, that is, claims to validity that I expect to be true only in relation to other 
interpretive claims, not to some objective reality” and that “Theorizing is a form of 
interpretation, and it destroys meaning.  As soon as we begin to impose categories on 
evidence, that evidence stops meaning what it meant in its earlier context.”113  Despite 
spending so much time providing a beautifully nuanced discussion of the limitations not 
necessarily of social constructivist approaches but more so of traditional approaches (or, 
as he puts it, of “mainstream methods”) Hopf is adamant in conforming his 
“constructivist” approach to these “mainstream methods,” striving for some shred of 
generalizability or predictability despite his own admission of the impossibility of doing 
so and despite his previous critique (dithering between implicit and explicit) of 
mainstream methods.  Hopf’s efforts result more in a mainstream, traditional approach 
masquerading as constructivism than otherwise, regardless of his tireless admissions of 
sin.  Hopf’s study would have been better served by promoting the strengths of 
interpretive approaches to or even social constructivist theories of understanding on their 
own terms rather than attempting to fit identities into theoretical social cognitive 
structures that allow his approach to better fit within and placate the proponents of 
mainstream social science methods. 
                                                
113 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, 24 & 25. 
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Some critics of Hopf’s Social Construction of International Politics, such as 
Angela E. Stent, use his study to critique the application of constructivist or identity 
theories to foreign policy as a whole.  Despite inherent problems with Hopf’s study, such 
criticism is hollow at best.  Stent, explicitly using Hopf’s approach as representative of 
social constructivism as a whole, most notably argues: 
Finally there is a questionable relationship between social constructivism and the 
real world of foreign policy.  Monocausal explanations are insufficient to explain 
international behavior, and Hopf’s approach is most productive when combined 
with explanations that include the external environment as a determining factor.  
Anyone who has worked in a ministry of foreign affairs or has advised officials 
on foreign policy knows that foreign policy actions are rarely the result of theories 
or grand strategies and are usually the product of bargaining among officials and a 
series of ad hoc decisions.  Social constructivism is useful only in explaining the 
domestic context in which decision-makers understand their interests and view 
other countries.114 
 
The cavalier attitude with which Stent treats Hopf’s study and the applicability of social 
constructivism to foreign policy (if not international relations) is inexplicable.  First, 
though Hopf limits his scope to the domestic level within Moscow, anyone typically 
versed in political science methods and theory knows that explanations limited to a single 
level of analysis do not imply monocausality.  Stent is, however, correct in noting that 
Hopf’s approach might be more “productive” when considering the external 
environment.  She also rightly notes that foreign policy actions taken by officials are 
rarely the result of theories—at least explicitly (which, unfortunately, is not her 
intention).  Government officials serving in capacities dealing with foreign policy 
implicitly, at times explicitly, operate based upon certain views of the world, of specific 
                                                
114 Angela E. Stent, “Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign 
Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (review),” Journal of Cold War Studies 7 no. 1 (Winter 
2005): 185. 
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situations, and of specific others as do individuals in all realms.  The same holds for 
notions of “grand strategies,” but Stent’s use of this concept begs clarification as to 
whether she uses it interchangeably with “theories” or if she means the explicit (contrary 
to her statements) strategies sometimes outlined by governments and other times 
implicitly followed by them, as recognized by analysts and foreign policy officials.  Still, 
Stent’s most unconscionable line of criticism stems from her belief that apparently based 
on Hopf’s study alone—ignoring how much his study actually resembles a constructivist 
as opposed to traditional approach—that social constructivism is only useful in 
considering the domestic context related to foreign policy decisions.  This claim blatantly 
ignores the constructivist studies of U.S.-China relations discussed previously that treat 
identity (in some form) as relational in the international setting and betrays a stark lack of 
familiarity with constructivism in the field of international relations. 
 Contrary to this view of constructivism, this study contends that constructivist, or 
simply interpretivist, approaches offers greater insight into both foreign policy and 
international politics than (perhaps most) other available options.  Specifically, 
examining the narratives of the identities held by various international actors provides 
deeper contextual understanding of any given situation or relationship and escapes the 
essentialized, often reified, views proffered by adherents of traditional approaches and 
the general rather than detailed understandings and explanations they produce.  The 
benefits of this approach bear similarity to empirically oriented area studies while paying 
special attention to the influence and ever-dynamic nature of identities and other social 
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factors.  The goal is to understand the character of international politics and the meanings 
of social interaction. 
In hopes of allowing for a deeper understanding of international politics, this 
study’s approach emphasizes the importance of both domestic and international factors 
with regard to the relational formation of and interaction between identities.   It proceeds 
in light of the understanding that absolute truths will not be uncovered.  The approach 
might lead to a better approximation of the truth, but at the very least it aspires to produce 
a more intellectually honest attempt at understanding.  Very well, it may lead to little 
more than one possible interpretation among many.  With this admission, there is 
something to be said of intersubjectivity and Popper’s idea of critical discussion.  
Through this process, researchers might expand and refine their understanding of the 
various issues they may wish to study.  Does power loom, largely out of sight, in such 
discussions?  Yes, but does it do so unequivocally and as the sole factor in such 
discussion?  Not likely, for just as critical theorists hold some notion of what to critique, 
they also know that knowledge does not only serve power and that the role of power itself 
is varied.  Knowledge itself can possess a kind of power, an emancipatory power.  
Whatever this study produces, it does not intend to foster or impose any particular 
viewpoint or framework nor does it seek to impose identities upon the subjects under 
study.  This study seeks to understand identity and how it influences international politics 
and demonstrate the political nature of identity while encouraging critical discussion.  
Perhaps such an approach might, in some way, allow researchers to expose malign power 
at work and reduce the often conflictual nature of political difference. 
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The potential for this study’s approach to inform and refine understanding of 
important issues lies not only in examining narratives of identities themselves or even 
how they influence one another but also in exploring the existence of perceptual gaps 
(differences in perceptions and viewpoints) and drawing comparisons between competing 
or differing narratives.  Drawing such comparisons helps to illuminate these perceptual 
gaps, the interests of different actors, and role of power in international politics, however 
indirectly. 
As stated previously, this approach shares similarities with Hopf’s, as well as 
fundamental differences.  This holds likewise in comparison to other studies of identity 
and constructivism in international relations.  Developing a detailed understanding of 
(specifically) U.S.-China relations does, in many ways, require an act akin to 
Morgenthau’s observer, peering over the shoulder of the statesman.  This study’s 
approach, however, realizes that its own views and expectations influence its findings 
while findings of previous studies and the findings of this study in turn influence the 
subjects examined, directly or indirectly.  Later, examining relations between the United 
States and China, their perceptions of one another, how these perceptions differ and 
influence the perceptions of the other, and the nature of relations at any given time are all 
important.  So too is the political aspect of identity.  Interests and power are important, 
but not conceptualized so narrowly as Morgenthau’s interests defined in terms of power.  
Ultimately, social realities and identities are the key factors.  Both of the states this study 
analyzes, as all others, are not merely products of the system they inhabit.  Their actions 
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possess the ability to influence the system and the identities of others within it and, 
ostensibly, such actions serve some purpose. 
This study places identity towards the beginning of causal chains of human 
behavior and interaction, as well as with regard to the formation and maintenance of the 
structures that govern and influence this interaction, irrespective of level of analysis.115  
At its most basic, however, in what way is identity conceptualized?  Identities themselves 
are relational by nature; they do not exist in a vacuum.  Identities exist in a state of 
interaction with the identities held by others and with world in which they exist.  
Identities are neither fixed nor monolithic.  If nuances are emphasized and detailed 
understanding striven for, studying identity offers a wealth of insight and understanding.  
The heart of this potential lies in uncovering the interests related to and political nature of 
any given narrative of identity, primarily through methods of comparison.  This includes 
examining processes integral to identity formation and adoption, in other words, 
examining the process of the constitution of identity.  Though researchers cannot trace 
the ultimate origin and evolution of identities, they can discern their salient features over 
periods of time by examining what political actors say, by looking for rhetorical 
inconsistencies, by observing their behavior, and finally by noting any discrepancies 
between rhetoric and behavior.  Identities will always already exist in some form and will 
                                                
115 Factors more basic than identity might include innate human traits, composite of what 
some might term human nature.  An interest in self-preservation is often taken to be one 
such trait.  Though such factors often offer interesting insights, they are not necessarily 
pertinent to the focus of this study.  Further, determining the innateness of certain traits is 
in itself a difficult endeavor.  This, however, has not prevented the use of conclusions 
drawn about human nature to serve as a basis for explanations of social interactions at the 
individual through international levels.  With this, a certain danger lies in the reification 
of these conclusions. 
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always slightly differ with each passing moment.  Being political in nature, they surface 
in the narratives relating actors’ conceptions of self and others as well as in relating their 
interests, their hopes, and their fears. 
Berenskoetter aptly notes that uncertainty plays a central role in identity 
formation, the uncertainty of the future serving as an influential source of anxiety that 
influences identity (though his argument that uncertainty and the future often play only 
small roles in constructivist studies might be overstated).116  Drawing upon the work of 
Anthony Giddens, Berenskoetter relates the notion that individuals engage in “anxiety 
controlling mechanisms,” a process of allowing the self to conceive of itself as part of 
something bigger, transcendent of death, to cope with mortality.117  Not only does this 
notion recognize identity formation at work, it might also allow researchers to partially 
understand why individuals and groups seem to need some purpose, often in the form of 
an—but not just any—enemy, one able to pose a fathomable threat.  By the same token, 
“anxiety controlling mechanisms” need not be negative or fear based; positive hopes and 
aspirations may serve the same function.  However, along with these grander notions of 
identity exist those that are more common. 
Every day individuals use, adopt, or construct various theories or frameworks in 
an attempt to understand, explain, order, and navigate the world in which they live.  
Despite these efforts, uncertainty is the only characteristic of the world that holds 
                                                
116 Berenskoetter, “Reclaiming the Vision Thing,” 652. 
 
117 Berenskoetter, “Reclaiming the Vision Thing,” 654. 
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constant.118  Outcomes contrary to expectations are more than common.  Outliers and 
statistically insignificant occurrences sometimes matter most in the real world and to its 
inhabitants.  Frameworks and theories simply aid individuals and groups in navigating 
their relations with one another.  The possibility always exists that these cognitive 
devices will fail.  In the scientific sense, they are always falsifiable dependent upon 
quality and quantity of disconfirming evidence.  Scholars recognize the lack of a one to 
one relationship between the world and experiences of it, the world mediated by each 
individual’s own unique, sensory based perceptions.  From this, scholars know 
experiences are subjective.  Experiences and understandings can only attain a state of 
intersubjectivity.  Drawing a logical conclusion from the work of Thomas Kuhn, all 
knowledge—scientific and otherwise—fundamentally rests upon faith of some sort, at 
some level.119  Theories may be useful, researchers may place great confidence in them, 
but inductive logic prohibits ever proving any given theory true.120  The specter of 
disconfirming evidence lingers eternal.  This does not prove as problematic for the 
natural sciences as it does for the social sciences.  In the natural sciences scholars study 
subjects and phenomena more external to themselves and often inherently less prone to 
change when compared with the subjects of the social sciences.  Understandings and 
                                                
118 Thucydides often noted the role of chance, the uncertainties the future might bring, in 
his account of the Peloponnesian War.  Though by nature difficult to study, the role of 
uncertainty (not statistical probability) in international politics indeed deserves greater 
attention than it receives. 
 
119 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
 
120 Both true induction and the “induction” researchers might engage in after conceding 
the impossibility of true induction. 
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theories may fade in and out of favor but the phenomena studied in the natural sciences 
remain relatively stable.  Barring drastic changes to the Earth’s gravitational “force,” a 
ball dropped from a fixed height will likely fall at the same rate over repeated trials under 
similar, controlled conditions regardless of theoretical explanation.  In the social sciences, 
on the other hand, the social world occupies scholarly focus, a subject which scholars are 
inextricably part of.  This creates an interesting question of how, if possible, to study 
human behavior without influencing or being influenced by it. 
 In the social world, perceptions possess great influence.  Whether studying 
individuals or groups, the perception of others as passive or aggressive, as cooperative or 
competitive, or a range of other characteristics will likely effect behavioral differences 
resulting from the interactions of the actors under scrutiny.  The theories and models 
formulated to facilitate understanding of social interaction between individuals and their 
interactions with the social world never provide a true reflection of that world itself.  Of 
greater importance, these representations actually possess the capacity to shape the social 
world.  Contrary to the previous example of gravity and the natural sciences, social 
behavior does not necessarily hold constant in similar situations under similar conditions.  
To start, history matters.  If walking down a dimly lit, desolate street in an area plagued 
by crime an individual finds himself approached by a stranger, past experiences will 
likely influence his behavior.  Perhaps he was once mugged under similar circumstances, 
leading his muscles to tense, pulse to quicken, and ultimately to an attempt to avoid the 
stranger.  Even absent this personal experience, an individual may have heard stories of 
others suffering such fate, eliciting a similar response.  On the other hand, an individual 
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might not consider such a threat likely, especially depending upon perceptions of the 
stranger’s demeanor and intent.  Perhaps the stranger is quite elderly and walking with a 
cane.  Instead, of choosing avoidance, the individual might continue along, greeting the 
stranger with eye contact, a smile, even a courteous hello while passing.  Though 
considering counterfactuals has limitations, they do aid in exploring the basic roles of 
identity and perception and the importance of knowledge and history when examining 
social behavior.  But what of inherent human traits, what of human nature? 
The diversity of social relations reveals few, if any, fundamental human traits 
upon which to firmly build an objective basis for understanding.  If human behavior were 
characterized by intrinsic distrust and self-interest, how would observers account for the 
great societies of the world, of collections of individuals working in concert?121  On the 
other hand, if inherently peaceful and cooperative, the possibility of conflict and violence 
would instill little fear, and how, then, would observers account for the great horrors in 
world history?  Any theory arguing both or emphasizing the rationality of behavior 
ultimately fails due to an inability to specify when and why certain behaviors appear 
instead of others and due to an inability to define preferences and interests without 
resorting to tautological practices.  Though structural theories applicable to groups such 
as states emphasize the structural constraints that fundamentally influence behavior, they 
too fail to explain the diversity of social relations. 
Despite these problems, such theories are not without worth.  They do offer some 
insight into social relations.  They also demonstrate how certain risks and caveats 
                                                
121 Not to exclude or overlook historical examples of oppression and servitude. 
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accompany any insights offered.  The greatest danger with social theories, international 
or otherwise, extends from the tendency toward reification and ignorance of the 
productive power that theories possess.  “Theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose.”122  The very same applies to worldviews, which are little more than personally 
or collectively held frameworks through which to better understand and navigate social 
relations.  They act as implicit guides for behavior and interaction.  They are in many 
ways akin to stereotypes, cognitive timesaving mechanisms that allow individuals to 
assess and interact with their surroundings based on preconceptions without experiencing 
the cognitive overload of analyzing every specific detail they confront.  At times they 
exist as an implicit sort of theory.  Other times they are, or at least are the product of, 
more explicit theory, such as the foreign policy official that adopts a “realist” framework 
in examining the world.  Worldviews are the product of both experience and social 
conditioning.  The latter explains the productive power of social theories.  When they 
become generally accepted as norms or institutions, these social constructions come to 
influence behavior.  Human beings may not be inherently conflictual, but if individuals 
come to believe so they will likely tailor their behavior accordingly.  Thinking in terms of 
international politics take, for example, states.  States do not exist apart from human 
interaction and are neither an immutable fact of international relations nor of history, 
predated most recently by monarchical dynasties and religious rule.  The modern state is 
merely a social construction.  According to social theory, institutions, norms, and ideas 
                                                
122 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no, 2 (June 1981): 
128. 
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are malleable.  Though they may come to seem relatively fixed at times and come to be 
taken for granted, the potential for change never ceases.123 
 Paying heed to social constructions and realizing that theory itself induces 
abstractions of reality does not offer much new insight.  Conventional constructivists 
have well argued the former, more critical scholars the latter.124  It does, however, 
provide further ground for exploring an interpretive identity driven approach to 
understanding international politics.  Doing so requires viewing states as more than 
unitary actors and allowing for the inclusion of non-state actors, whether individuals or 
organizations, as units of analysis.  Thinking in terms of individuals and groups allows 
                                                
123 Take, for instance, conceptualizations of the state.  Increasing global 
interconnectedness allows groups and individuals residing within supposedly sovereign 
state borders to take action against other states on their own behalf, through acts of 
terrorism or even more peaceful methods (though not always peaceful) like the not 
infrequent anti-American protests found at times on the streets of Pakistan, in China, and 
elsewhere.  The same applies to the influence states can wield inside the sovereign 
borders of other states, as seemingly benign as trade, investment, and foreign aid to 
outright provocative behavior—including the more clandestine and covert sort—and 
armed conflict.  These realizations begin to unveil the myth of sovereignty.  Though 
states supposedly exert sovereign control over their own territories and populations, 
likewise respecting the sovereignty of others, sovereignty only exists to the extent that 
states are able to actually control their own populations and actually defend their 
territories from physical intrusion and foreign influence.  Sovereignty is not an 
unwavering fact of international politics.  At best, sovereignty is an influential 
international norm; at worst, sovereignty serves as a façade for power, a rhetorical tool 
used to justify action or inaction, to justify intervening in some situations and refraining 
from doing so in others, and to defend rhetorically against foreign influence.  The concept 
of sovereignty itself is, in short, porous, insecure, and political. 
 
124 Neither constructivism nor post-positivism present a unified approach.  The two 
approaches themselves are closely related to one another.  Here, take constructivism is 
taken to represent the belief that many of the structures of our world are social 
constructions and that individuals hold unique views of these constructions and of the 
world.  Post-positivism is taken as encompassing these notions in addition to more 
stridently reflecting the lack of epistemological objectivity, flirting with relativism. 
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for greater applicability for international politics over approaches that focus on states 
alone, especially states taken exogenously for granted.  What are states, aside from 
groups of individuals with common beliefs adhering to some organizational structure? 
Individuals find themselves member of or party to various groups existing at 
different levels.  These groups can overlap or compose larger groups.  They range 
anywhere from groupings of family and friends, to cities, states, and even to international 
organizations, with a plethora of possibilities in between.  The existence of multiple and 
overlapping groups at various levels creates a system of nested groups, orders of higher 
and lower level groups within groups.  The bonds between individuals and the groups of 
which they are part, even the bonds between groups themselves, are dynamic and 
variable.  The strength of these bonds exist in a state of flux and are unique to each 
member of a group.  Bonds may be stronger for some members than others.  Looking to 
identities allows researchers to understand this variation by accounting for what 
constitutes a given identity and what aspects of identity or interests are most salient for a 
particular actor (or group) in a given situation. 
 Also important, institutions, norms, and ideas have received much attention in the 
field of international relations.  Even some neoliberal scholars—including Joseph Nye, 
Robert Jervis, and Robert Keohane—have noted the importance of process in addition to 
structure with regard to learning and the transformation of interests and identities, though 
they still privilege structures.125  Wendt takes institutions to be relatively stable sets of 
                                                
125 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 393. 
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identities and interests, sometimes formally codified in terms of rules or norms that exist 
as cognitive entities.126  He argues that institutions are not simply beliefs.  They come to 
exist over and above their constituents.  Institutions come to exist through their 
constituents’ experience of them and institutions in turn exert influence.  Especially 
important, Wendt notes that institutions are not solely cooperative.  Conflictual 
institutions also exist.  With this, Wendt views neorealism’s system of international self-
help as an institution and not an inherent feature of an anarchic international order.  Still, 
Wendt takes states as central and unitary actors in international politics and 
underemphasizes the great global diversity of actors, ideas, institutions, and norms.  
Stronger social constructivist approaches that analyze states and their internal 
composition greatly strengthen this type of approach.  Examining U.S.-China relations, 
this study’s approach notes the importance of identities, perceptions, and interests not 
only for states but also important individuals and groups within the United States and 
China.  Instead of attempting to determine what sort of model the behavior of states such 
as China and the United States best fit, this approach looks for indications of these states’ 
own unique views of themselves and others, how these perceptions differ, and how they 
interact. 
 An influential contributor to discussions of the role of identity and identity theory 
in understanding social behavior, Henri Tajfel defines identity in terms of individuals’ 
self-conceptions derived from membership in social groups and the value and emotional 
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significance attached to their membership in those groups.127  This definition bears 
similarity to that offered by Wendt.  However, Tajfel also places importance upon 
individuals’ desire to hold positive self-views and the effect this has on identity 
formation.  Rupert Brown offers a similar argument, observing that individuals and 
groups are motivated to enhance their own status, as they are generally found to prefer 
holding positive over negative self-images.128  These definitions easily relate to the views 
offered by Felix Berenskoetter with regard to the need for individuals to identify with 
purposes larger than the self when faced with the uncertainty the future brings and 
anxiety driven by mortality.  While these definitions of identity and its importance add 
important insights to what constructivists such as Wendt offer, they still lack a firm 
explanation of how identities are constituted and of identity as a relational construct.  
David Campbell might come closest in Writing Security, where he states: 
Identity is an inescapable dimension of being.  No body could be without it.  
Inescapable as it is, identity – whether personal or collective, is not fixed by 
nature, given by God, or planned by intentional behavior.  Rather, identity is 
constituted in relation to difference.  But neither is difference fixed by nature, 
given by God, or planned by intentional behavior.  Difference is constituted in 
relation to identity.  The problematic of identity/difference contains, therefore, no 
foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation.  Whether we are talking 
of “the body” or “the state,” or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each 
is performatively constituted.  Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved 
through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an 
“outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign.”129 
                                                
127 Henri Tajfel (ed.), Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 2. 
 
128 Rupert Brown, Group Processes, Second Edition (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 
2000), 189. 
 
129 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity, Revised Edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9. 
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This explanation explicitly places fundamental importance on the relational aspect of 
identity and illustrates its performative nature.  Campbell notes that identities are 
constituted relationally out of the identity/difference relationship.  It may be more 
accurate to say that identities are constituted in relation to other identities.  Either way, 
this simple notion offers the foundation for this study’s approach to identity, resulting in 
important distinctions with other conceptualizations and approaches to the study of 
identity in international relations. 
Another important difference lies in the conceptualizations different approaches 
hold of institutions.  Institutions are here taken as cognitive constructs expressed as 
subjective, relatively stable systems of structures or beliefs based upon the identities and 
interests of their architects.  They are not simply a set of identities and interests 
themselves.  Neither identities nor interests are objective and cannot give rise to objective 
institutions.  Even if they become detached from individual identities to some degree as a 
result of representing their constituent parts, institutions serve some purpose and some 
members hold more influence than others.  The only objectivity to be found is in the 
existence of any particular institution—the fact that it exists and is recognized as such.  
The purposes institutions are created to serve, how they are applied, and for what reasons 
make them inherently subjective.130 
                                                
130 Wendt does not elaborate on why or how institutions are objective.  His 
characterization might match the one here provided but he does not make explicit 
whether he means institutions as objective in terms of being free from bias and any sort 
of predisposition or if he means objective in the sense of existing independently of 
individuals’ perceptions. 
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The institution of marriage, for example, might objectively exist but it also exists 
as a reflection of the beliefs of those that believe in it, regulating who is eligible to marry 
whom, for what reason, and under what circumstances.  Even institutions recognized 
throughout the world may differ in their localized reifications.  Conceptions of marriage 
in China or Iran are much different from marriage in the United Kingdom or the United 
States.  Neither is the normative institution of “self-help” objective.  It reflects a concern 
with personal survival founded on distrust, potentially to the detriment of others.  Even an 
institution such as “education” deserves question as to why education is important, for 
whom is it important, and how students are to be educated.  This reinforces the fact that 
institutions may promote both cooperation and a common good or inspire conflict, if not 
both simultaneously, all dependent upon interpretation.131 
 Conceptualizing institutions in this way requires some clarification.  Definitions 
of institutions often include organizations under this heading.  This points out a 
difference between more abstract and more concrete institutions.  In Ruggie’s terms, this 
relates to the distinction between social facts and brute facts: the former represents 
intersubjective or collectively held knowledge while the latter represents knowledge of 
the physical world.  Institutions such as marriage, even though codified into laws and 
norms and governed by regulations, are more abstract than institutions of education or 
governance, both usually expressed through much more extensive physical infrastructure 
and facilities.  Organizations also have members, employees, or some sort of more direct 
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relationship with individuals.132  Education itself might be defined as an institution but 
any particular realization of education takes shape as an organization.  With this in mind, 
thinking of organizations as institutions formalized by groups reduces confusion between 
the two. 
 Another difference relates to how institutions, identities, and the process of cause 
and effect are treated.  For Wendt, the actions of institutions, such as states, influence 
intersubjective understandings and expectations of other institutions.133  These then 
provide interpretations and definitions of a situation or actions of other institutions, which 
then compel action, which again influence intersubjective understandings and 
expectations.  Before addressing the path of cause and effect, certain aspects require 
explanation. 
Thinking of states as organizations, or better still as groups, rather than 
institutions reduces some confusion.  Doing so more clearly denotes that these are 
subjective, formalized institutions serving some purpose or interest at the behest of a 
certain group of actors.  Likewise, the identities of groups or individuals involved in any 
given scenario are of paramount importance.  At their most basic level, identities are 
relational, as noted previously and as both Gries and Callahan argue in their respective 
studies of Chinese nationalism.134  In other words, identities are constituted in light of 
other identities.  What constitutes any particular identity is just as important as what does 
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133 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 406. 
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not, and both require some reference point.  Wendt too depicts identity as a relational 
concept, further arguing—drawing heavily from Peter Berger—that identities are 
“relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self,” cultivated 
through participation in collective meaning, formed within a socially constructed world, 
linked to institutional roles, and that individuals and groups possess multiple identities, 
going on to argue identity as the basis of interest.135  He appears to place less emphasis on 
the relational character of identities, placing more on the relationship between identities 
and institutions.  Wendt’s implicit bias toward the importance of institutions and 
structural factors is also apparent. 
The most fundamental aspect of identity is difference.  Within this study, identity 
is defined as an individually or collectively held relational conceptualization that 
distinguishes the self from other individuals or groups and bestows either a positive or 
negative sense of self-worth on its holder.  It makes no sense to limit identity to positive 
self-conceptions.  Even though actors are most often found to take efforts that minimize 
cognitive dissonance, potentially preserving positive identity formations, nothing 
prohibits the possibility of holding negative self-conceptions.  Admitting this reinforces 
the relational character of identity, how identities are formed and judged in relation to 
others.  Additionally, not only individuals but groups too have identities.  Moreover, 
individuals and groups may possess multiple identities.  It does not follow, however, that 
all identities are reducible to individual identities.  This is similar to Ruggie’s observation 
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that not all beliefs are reducible to individual beliefs.136  Though an individual may 
identify with a group and group identity, nothing requires the individual to fully subscribe 
to any group’s identity. 
Some principles informed by social psychology aid in further understanding the 
concept of identity.  Many scholars, for instance, agree on the general belief that 
identities are somewhat stable and resistant to change.  Two principles in particular 
support this belief.  First, identities, especially group identities, are often times based on 
differences manifested in physical ways.  Language, appearance, and territory all might, 
but need not, serve as partial bases for identity.  Such bases are not prone to frequent or 
rapid transformation.  The longstanding conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, both 
tenaciously identifying with specific territories and systems of beliefs, provides a 
compelling example (it does not, however, follow that identities and beliefs are objective 
or removed from serving political purposes). 
Another possible explanation for the persistence of identity is the principle of 
commitment and consistency.  This principle holds that individuals or groups are prone to 
act in accordance with both commitments they have made and prior behavior in order to 
avoid personal cognitive dissonance and public disapproval from others.137  Thusly, 
consistency in social behavior is typically valued.  This principle also lends 
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understanding to other phenomena noted by social psychologists, including self-fulfilling 
prophecies and commitment traps and even the notion of path-dependence, the latter 
more frequently noted in political science.  Nothing, however, demands this behavioral 
norm to unwaveringly hold, nor that it holds in all situations and circumstances.  The 
value accorded to individuals who keep their commitments and act predictably is likely 
itself a social construction.  Interestingly, scholars and policymakers who study China 
often fear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will one day find itself in a 
commitment trap, forced to act or react aggressively to accidental or intentional injurious 
(physically or emotionally) behavior from, for example, the Republic of China (ROC, 
also known as Taiwan) or the United States, bound to do so by previous hard line rhetoric 
directed towards these countries but intended for Chinese domestic consumption.  So the 
fear holds, if the CCP fails to respond adequately to any foreign affront to its legitimacy, 
Chinese citizens might engage in demonstrations against their own government or seek 
political upheaval, both of which pose obvious threats to the survival of the CCP. 
 With this in mind, how are identities actually formed?  With regard to individuals, 
the self is distinguished from the other.  There is more to identity than a link to 
institutional roles, as Wendt and others argue.  Individual identity is constituted in 
comparison with others in terms of similarities and differences.  It is difficult to discern 
whether this relationship is inherently competitive—in other words, conflictual.  This 
holds even in Hobbes’ state of war, a state that he concedes may very well never have 
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existed in reality.138  Even if individuals are primarily concerned with self-preservation, 
they are not condemned to persistent conflict or to a state of war.  Many other species live 
in relative harmony among their own kind, even operating within orders of hierarchical 
organization with varying degrees of cooperation.  Competition and conflict exist but do 
not ultimately prevent cooperation.  It is difficult to conceive of a situation where an 
individual encounters another for the first time predisposed to threat rather than 
inquisitiveness, harder still to conceive of a situation where an individual is born without 
ties to one or both of their progenitors.  Experiments in the field of social psychology 
demonstrate that individuals identify with whom they share similar characteristics.139  
                                                
138 Hobbes’ later proclamation that, in the state of nature known as the state of war, every 
man has a right to everything, even one another’s belongings and own person, to the 
extent they can take them, also proves problematic.  It is difficult to conceive of any other 
“right” than what power (of some form) affords.  Absent this, it does not follow that each 
individual has a right to everything.  It follows more logically that rights do not exist, 
except perhaps a right to thy own self resulting from the distinction between self and 
other.  Aside from perhaps the self, individuals are neither entitled to nor prohibited from 
that which they encounter.  Instead, and more in line with Hobbes’ reasoning elsewhere, 
possessions and “rights” only exist so long as one is able to preserve them.  Still, this 
argument is tenuous at best, especially if the right to thy own self is accepted.  The 
distinction between self and other leads to distinctions between what is mine and what is 
yours, equating possession to rights absent any legitimating, governing body.  
Nonetheless, force or theft may breach and abrogate this right in a Hobbesian world, the 
only recourse being the same.  The distinction that possession equates to right in a state 
of war is moot, however, if this state of existence never actually existed, which Hobbes 
explicitly admits as to likely be the case. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc: Indianapolis, 1994), 77. 
 
139 Cialdini, Influence.  It is possible that identification with similar others is either a 
social construct or the result of an original, unique cause and effect relationship between 
individuals with ensuing path dependence.  Neither precludes alternate possibilities.  
Psychological experiments conducted today cannot ascertain this (at least adhering to any 
semblance of ethical standards), as neither can history, unable to provide an account of 
human origin.  More likely, it might be the extension of kinship, differences arising out of 
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This supports the idea of cooperation amongst members of the same species (further 
reducible to within species differences), opposite others or opposite nature itself.140  This 
provides a foundation for group formation. 
Interests compel group formation.  Desires, or wants, constitute interests, whether 
held individually or by groups, whether selfish or altruistic.  Interests also compel 
individual, group, institutional, or organizational behavior.  As previously described, 
groups are subjective and exist for some purpose, whether benign or malign.  However, 
the identities and behaviors of other individuals and groups influence one another, thus 
influencing their respective interests.  Identity is neither monolithic nor fixed.  Identity 
can act as cause or effect and ultimately turns into a feedback loop of sorts. 
There is no difficulty in conceiving that identities can both influence and be 
influenced by one another and by the outcomes of social interaction.  The degree to 
which this happens and how this happens depends upon the context of particular 
scenarios.  The outcomes of interaction then become part of history.  These outcomes 
need not necessarily influence present identities of the actors involved.  If not, they 
remain dormant in history, ready to be utilized, even manipulated, in the constitution of 
identity in terms of future interests and situations.  Groups are subject to the same process 
as individual actors, group identities affecting one another and giving rise to interests and 
behavior.  The only notable difference is that group identities are neither wholly 
representative of any single constituent’s identity nor a perfect amalgamation of each 
                                                                                                                                            
different evolutionary origins or the product of separation of kin over time, subject to 
different evolutionary paths, exacerbated by time. 
 
140 Opposite, not opposed to, an important distinction. 
  107 
constituent’s identities.  This does not imply, however, that group identities cannot 
influence individual identities. 
 Within international relations, emphasizing the role of identity allows for greater 
understanding and insight compared with more traditional approaches.  This study’s 
specific approach somewhat modifies the concept of identity as used by constructivists in 
terms of conceptualization, emphasis, and application.  The overarching argument is that 
identities characterize the nature of social relationships between individuals and groups.  
Identities determine whether relationships are cooperative or competitive, peaceful or 
tense, and to what degree.  The process of identity formation exists as a feedback loop, 
prior behaviors and interactions either reinforcing or directly influencing identities or 
lying dormant in history with the potential to have such an effect, to reverberate, at a later 
time.  This conceptualization reinforces what both Gries and Callahan argue in assessing 
Chinese nationalism in terms of U.S.-China relations.  Not only does it reinforce their 
overall arguments concerning nationalism, it provides a stronger theoretical base for their 
arguments, likewise reinforcing and complementing Campbell’s assessment of the United 
States in Writing Security, where he details the subjective use of history to constitute or 
reinforce certain identities or interests, legitimize behavior or legitimize the role of those 
in power (that is, legitimize their identity as rulers), and influence what issues are salient 
with regard to states’ interests and to their constituents. 
 This approach also bridges the divide between studies of international relations 
and studies of nationalism, typically identified as a subfield of comparative politics.  
According to Michael Hechter, nations (distinct from states) are relatively large groups of 
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individuals exhibiting a high degree of solidarity, realized as social constructions that are 
territorially bounded (this latter point distinguishing nations from ethnic groups).141  In 
terms of identity, nations are groups of individuals sharing a common identity that 
happen to be tied, in part, to some physical territory, a spatial extension.  Hechter defines 
nationalism, opposed to nation or national identity, as “…action designed to render the 
boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit,” reflecting the 
interests around which nationalism exists.142  Identity serves as a more fundamental basis 
for studies of nationalism under these definitions. 
Applying this approach to U.S.-China relations, this study primarily draws upon 
an interpretive approach to identity, drawing upon an examination of various primary 
                                                
141 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
10-4. 
 
142 Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 7-8.  Sometimes, according to Hechter, patriotism, 
the desire to raise the relative prestige and power of one’s own nation in the international 
system, is considered nationalistic.  However, under his definition of nationalism, this 
would entail that the boundaries of the nation and governance unit are already congruent, 
which rarely, if ever, happens, removing any impetus for nationalism and uncovering the 
flaw of such a characterization of patriotism.  Instead, Hechter argues that what is often 
taken to be patriotism is actually state-building nationalism, advancing the interests of 
one nation at the expense of others in a multinational state.  Thinking in terms of nations 
as territorially bound groups, however, where virtually any factors may serve as the basis 
for inclusion or exclusion, it is possible to think of the governing body of a state as a 
nation itself.  They are indeed territorially bound and at the very least share in the fact of 
their privileged position of power and share an interest in preserving their power.  If 
Hechter’s definition of nationalism is slightly modified, defining it as action designed to 
render or maintain the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governing 
body, this allows for patriotism defined as the desire to raise the relative prestige and 
power of one’s own state (rather than nation) in the international system.  This also 
allows for the consideration of state-based nationalism, the interest in preserving the 
state, instead of finding nationalism almost inapplicable to states outside of state-building 
nationalism. 
 
  109 
sources related to American and Chinese narratives for the cases analyzed.  Reliance 
upon primary sources serves two purposes: to determine the constitution of identities and 
develop a historiography, of sorts, of the relations between China and the United States 
(as well as other actors where relevant).  Examples of the primary sources utilized 
include current and archival government speeches, policy documents, reports, directives, 
public statements, and so on.  Military sources indicating the importance of identities at 
play, of interests, and of history are also utilized, including defense white papers, official 
reports, and public statements.  Sources emanating from other governmental bodies are 
also referenced, including legislative bodies and departments or ministries responsible for 
foreign relations, defense, economy, commerce, and trade.  As the classification of 
materials poses a great challenge in conducting research on contemporary foreign policy 
interests, news and journal sources offering insight into official views supplement these 
sources. 
 For foreign language primary sources, English translations are used where 
available.  However, for other Chinese language open sources, the U.S. Open Source 
Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS) offers translations of 
many Chinese language news and journal publications.  More than supplementing official 
sources of information, the translations of these sources provided by the Open Source 
Center include official statements and offer general insight into sentiments into on the 
relationship between the U.S. and China as well as reactions to various bilateral and 
international issues.  Examples include insight into the conflictual maritime encounters 
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between China and Japan and the various tense issues in U.S.-China relations, from trade 
to the development and deployment of military systems to military accidents.143 
 In the following case studies, background information and a general overview of 
each particular case are first provided, at times including details on general identities or 
narratives to provide greater context.  Afterward, U.S. and Chinese narratives and 
identities are individually analyzed with regard to each case.  Last, the interaction 
between the identities of each side is considered.
                                                
143 The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the EP-3E incident 
provide examples of the latter. 
  111 
III 
 
THE POLITICS OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 
 
 
Both sides assumed the other was out to get something materially from its policy, 
and both underestimated the importance of the ideational element in the other 
side’s policy.  Material-driven assumptions about policy behavior seem to make 
these kinds of misunderstandings more likely † 
 
–Gregory J. Moore 
 
 
Despite increasing openness in China’s economy and society with the implementation of 
market and other reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, U.S.-China relations 
remained beset by varying degrees of tension moving towards the twenty-first century.  
Even as western and other foreign goods, investment, and people gained ever-greater 
access to the historic “Middle Kingdom,” trust between Washington and Beijing 
remained tenuous amidst strategic geopolitical concerns and fundamental differences in 
the identities of the two countries.  Exacerbating existing differences, over the years 
various events transpired that negatively impacted the nature of U.S.-China relations.  
This was particularly apparent with the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident and later 
unfortunate events such as the 1999 accidental U.S./NATO bombing of China’s Belgrade 
embassy during the Kosovo War and the 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy (USN) EP-
3E reconnaissance aircraft with a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fighter jet 
                                                
† Gregory J. Moore, “Not Very Material but Hardly Immaterial: China’s Bombed 
Embassy and Sino-American Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, no. 1 (January 
2010): 39. 
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approximately 70 miles southeast of China’s Hainan island.144  These type of events, 
namely each countries’ reactions to them, clearly illuminate the dearth of trust and 
competition of ideals and interests experienced by the governments and populations on 
both sides of the Pacific Ocean, feeding at times hostile sentiments and rhetoric from 
officials and citizens alike. 
Approaching the turn of the century, before al Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States, the nature of relations between the U.S. and China 
appeared oriented to remain characteristically wanting if not embarking upon a path of 
increasing tension or deterioration, epitomized by growing levels of concern over China’s 
rise by some within the U.S. combined with the influence of the aforementioned 
incidents.  With the 11 September 2001 attacks, however, U.S. focus quickly shifted from 
China to al Qaeda, Afghanistan, and the threat of international terrorism.  While the Bush 
administration came to office poised to take a tougher stance towards China, al Qaeda’s 
attacks created an opportunity for a shift in and improvement of U.S.-China relations.  
China quickly expressed sympathy for the United States, offering support in the United 
Nations and encouraging Pakistan to work with the United States (along with other forms 
of support and cooperation) in the aftermath of the attacks, taking advantage of this 
opportunity opened by the United States’ new overriding security focus to potentially 
improve relations.  Negative expressions of the other in the media outlets of both 
                                                
144 Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of incidents negatively impacting U.S.-China 
relations over this period.  The 1995-1996 events related to the Taiwan Strait missile 
crisis serves as an additional example. 
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countries waned significantly.145  Though abhorrent, al Qaeda’s attacks opened space for 
the formation of more cooperative U.S. and Chinese identities and a more cooperative 
relationship. 
Though 11 September 2001 led to an immediate improvement in the nature of 
U.S.-China relations, this improvement has been little more than fleeting.  Neither side 
has capitalized on the opportunity for improvement in ways leading to a lasting, 
fundamental shift in bilateral or broader relations.  Instead, old concerns over the China 
threat in the U.S. and over U.S. containment and hegemony in China have resurfaced in 
seeming concurrence with the rise of multiple points of tension and conflict between both 
sides, as well as in conjunction with the waning of the United States’ predominant focus 
on terrorism—and Iraq—giving way to a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy concerns to 
the Asia-Pacific region.  This reorientation of U.S. foreign policy has been termed the 
Obama administration’s “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific.  Some of the points of tension and 
conflict between China and the U.S. include economic concerns, human rights issues, 
China’s maritime territorial disputes, allegations of Chinese cyber espionage and attacks, 
and Beijing’s stance opposite U.S. and western interests with regard to crises involving 
regimes in North Korea, Syria, and elsewhere.  Differences in identities based on 
opposing perceptions and worldviews starkly similar to those found before September 11, 
2001, have returned, doing so at a time when China appears not only stronger in the 
international system but also more assertive, thus in many ways adversely affecting the 
nature of U.S.-China relations. 
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Examining the shifts in U.S.-China relations bracketing 11 September 2001 
allows for an examination of the importance of identities and their constitutive elements 
in international politics.146  The significance of this tragic event opened space for—and 
for a time effected—a change in bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington by 
transforming the salience of U.S. foreign policy concerns and, importantly, allowing both 
sides to identify a basis upon which to emphasize cooperation and even common 
concerns over issues such as radical Islamic extremism (China long concerned over 
radical extremism in its Western province of Xinjiang, for example).  Inimical, at times, 
narratives of the other and associated rhetoric became largely suspended in favor of 
increasingly common themes of cooperation coupled with actual attempts at increased 
cooperation and collaboration.  U.S. and Chinese identities, or at least salient aspects of 
their identities, shifted, approaching closer congruence.   As previously stated, however, 
attempts at increased cooperation and the suspension of negative views and adversarial 
narratives did not last, signs of this trend’s brevity appearing as early as the 2003 U.S. 
invasion of Iraq (a decision opposed by China and much of the rest of the world). 
How the U.S. and China viewed one another in relation to their own identities and 
interests over the last few decades with respect to the various events that have occurred 
presents an interesting period for analysis.  Notwithstanding their lack of permanence or 
persistence, the shifts in narratives and identities on both sides of the Pacific and their 
affects on U.S.-China relations demonstrates not only that identities matter and how they 
hold power and influence but also how their social construction represents the relational 
                                                
146 The case itself offers the ability to conduct a within-case comparison over time under 
the logic of a Most Similar Systems (MSS) comparative research design. 
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and at times political nature of the identities at play in international politics.  Analyzing 
events in U.S.-China relations leading up to, including, and after 11 September 2001, this 
chapter demonstrates how the interactions between identities and between identities and 
international events influenced and characterized the nature of relations between Beijing 
and Washington over this period, shifts in this relationship over time allowing for a 
within case comparison of sorts.   
Undertaking this analysis, this section specifically analyzes relations surrounding 
the accidental U.S./NATO bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy in 1999, the April 
2001 EP-3E collision incident, the changes in the dynamics of U.S.-China relations 
resulting from the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, and the relapse in relations that 
has occurred since.  Not only did the first two of these events clearly exacerbate tension 
in U.S.-China relations, leading to bitter sentiments and malicious rhetoric on both sides, 
they also illuminate the gulf of difference existing between the perceptions—the 
perceptual gaps—of both sides extenuating from their own unique identities and interests, 
all with regard to two events considered by many (but not all) as unfortunate accidents.147  
These events were so meaningful as to motivate anti-U.S. demonstrations among Chinese 
citizens—physical protests and cyber attacks against the U.S.—reflecting the possibility 
                                                
147 Though interpretation of these events is somewhat biased along ethnocentric lines and 
differing viewpoints do exist pertaining to whether either event was accidental and over 
which party was responsible for the in-flight collision involving the U.S. EP-3E aircraft 
and Chinese jet fighter.  As noted by Moore in 2010 on the topic of the embassy 
bombing, “While Americans explained that the embassy bombing was a horrible mistake, 
most Chinese are convinced to this day that it was an intentional attack.”  Moore, “Not 
Very Material but Hardly Immaterial,” 23. 
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and actual ability of perceptions and beliefs, thus identities, to influence actors’ behavior 
from both the top-down and from the bottom-up. 
The improvement experienced in U.S.-China relations immediately after 11 
September 2001 raises questions not only about how the identities on both sides shifted, 
but also as to why this shift took place.  The following analysis will explore what affect 
the interests of either side had on this shift in relations, such as (but not limited to) the 
view that the attacks simply diverted U.S. foreign policy attention and security concerns 
from China to other actors, offering the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the benefit of 
more time for undisturbed development and growth of power within the international 
system, perhaps even extending this period of time by taking advantage of the 
opportunity to draw closer to the United States.148  The regression away from the 
improvement in relations and increased cooperation after 11 September 2001 offers an 
opportunity to explore why improvement did not last as well as examine fundamental 
questions pertaining to the malleability of identity, its political nature, the importance of 
history, and to what extent international actors have control over their relationships. 
The perceptions and narratives divulged through primary sources, including 
official policy statements and documents produced by both Washington and Beijing as 
well as reports from popular media outlets, provide the chief method for analyzing the 
identities of both countries (including their interests and perceptions) and thus the impact 
of these identities on behavior and the nature of U.S.-China relations over the period of 
time encompassed by the events outlined above.  Depictions of these events and of “the 
                                                
148 This view is laden with assumptions about Chinese identities and interests, which will 
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other” as well as the actual actions taken by Beijing and Washington provide a means of 
exploring the function and influence of identity and its affect on international politics. 
Accident or Intentional Attack: The Bombing of China’s Belgrade Embassy 
During 7 May 1999, a U.S. B-2 bomber attacked China’s embassy in Belgrade as part of 
the U.S. led NATO intervention in Kosovo, killing three Chinese journalists and 
wounding over twenty others.  The U.S. claimed the bombing to be an unintentional 
mistake resulting from outdated maps and flawed targeting information, intending instead 
to attack the Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement building of the Yugoslav 
Army.149  In essence, the U.S. accurately bombed the precise location desired but mistook 
the building occupying this space.  After realizing the mistake, President Clinton and 
NATO issued official apologies for the accidental bombing.  However, many Chinese 
citizens remained suspicious of whether the attack was accidental for various reasons.  
Regardless, the attack ignited widespread protests throughout China.  Prominently, 
protestors demonstrated in front of U.S. facilities, going so far as to throw projectiles at 
the U.S. (and British) embassy and harass U.S. journalists.150  Demonstrators also 
defaced buildings, burned the U.S. consulate in Chengdu, and defaced and boycotted U.S. 
fast-food restaurants such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) in what James Miles 
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150 Rebecca MacKinnon, Brent Sadler, Chris Black, and Andrea Koppel, “Chinese in 
Belgrade, Beijing protest NATO embassy bombing,” CNN, May 9, 1999, accessed 
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described as “…the most widespread display of discontent over any issue in China since 
the Tiananmen Square unrest.”151 
 Clearly, both China and the U.S. perceived and reacted to the Belgrade embassy 
bombing quite differently.  Beyond the effect of China being the victim in this case, the 
identities and interests of both sides largely impacted their conflicting perceptions of the 
bombing.  In other words, a gap existed with regard to each side’s perceptions: a 
perceptual gap. 
U.S. Perspective of the Embassy Bombing 
For the United States, the bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy represented an 
unfortunate accident amidst its intervention in Kosovo.  In the incident’s immediate 
aftermath, dominant aspects of the U.S. narrative concerning the event included 
expressions of apology, regret, and condolence, including a letter issued by President 
Clinton to Chinese President Jiang Zemin (as well as phone calls) and the U.S. 
Ambassador to China, James Sasser’s, expression of America’s regret over the accident.  
China postponed reporting these U.S. expressions of remorse in its newspapers.152  
Meanwhile, U.S. facilities and personnel within China experienced a barrage of protests 
and hostile reactions, from the throwing of projectiles to harassment of U.S. officials and 
reporters.  Beijing both publicly rejected U.S. claims that the bombing was an accident 
and endorsed its citizens’ legal rights to lawful demonstrations. 
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The U.S. initially attributed the bombing accident to the possibility of outdated 
maps of the area, though during its official investigation the U.S. later identified the 
occurrence of “a long series of errors over time,” in addition to outdated maps, that were 
responsible for the mistake, outlined in an official account provided to Chinese officials 
in person by Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering during June 1999.153  These 
errors included not only outdated maps failing to account for the change in location of 
China’s embassy in 1996, but also bureaucratic and targeting selection mistakes.  Later, 
during July, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, divulged that the Central 
Intelligence Agency selected the target, the Federal Directorate of Supply and 
Procurement building of the Yugoslav Army, but did so using a “flawed technique” for 
locating it.154  Ultimately, the U.S. government agreed to pay China compensation for 
damage to its embassy and to the families of the deceased and those injured in the attack 
while the CIA dismissed one of its officers and punished six others as responsible for the 
mistake.  However, almost a year after the bombing occurred, China continued to reject 
the official U.S. narrative and deemed the action taken by the CIA as inadequate.155 
The most salient aspects of U.S. identity regarding this situation are those of 
remorse and responsibility.  The U.S. did not deny responsibility for bombing the 
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Chinese embassy in Belgrade or delegitimize the situation’s importance.  However, U.S. 
maintained the importance of its intervention in Kosovo and of its identity as a guardian 
of humanitarian concerns. 
Chinese Perspective of the Embassy Bombing 
On the other side of the Pacific, as already intimated, Beijing remained skeptical of 
Washington’s claims and explanations, rejecting the notion that the bombing was 
accidental on multiple occasions during talks with U.S. officials over the ensuing months.  
So being, Chinese officials remained persistent in demanding a full and transparent 
investigation of the incident by the U.S., that those within the U.S. government 
responsible for the bombing be held accountable, and that the families of the three 
journalists killed as well as the twenty or so injured receive compensation (The U.S. 
made a reciprocal claim for compensation covering damages to its embassy, burned 
consulate in Chengdu, and damages to other facilities resulting from Chinese 
demonstrations).156  Vice President Hu Jintao, on the Saturday after the bombing, stated 
that the bombing was both a criminal and brutal act, going on to say that “The Chinese 
people are people who uphold justice and love peace.  We are willing, together with the 
people of other countries across the world, to support each other and strengthen 
cooperation, and work in concerted efforts for mankind’s great cause of peace and 
development.”157 
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Chinese officials and citizens cited many sources for their skepticism in response 
to the U.S. official explanation of the incident as an accident, ranging from the accuracy 
of the munitions used (how could the U.S. make such a mistake, especially in conjunction 
with its overall technical superiority) to the Chinese embassy’s unmistakable markings 
and blue glass to the improbability of the multiple different groups of actors involved not 
catching the error regarding the target’s identity before undertaking the military strike.158  
Upon news of the embassy bombing, hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens 
participated in protests over a four day period, with the central government condoning 
and even assisting demonstrations during this time.159  During the second day of protests, 
on May 9, up to 100,000 people demonstrated outside the U.S. embassy.160  Elsewhere, as 
one example, over 15,000 students from local universities gathered in front of the U.S. 
Shanghai Consulate on May 8, many believing that the bombing was intentional, akin to 
attacking Chinese territory, and an affront to Chinese sovereignty.161  In many cases, 
demonstrators vandalized U.S. facilities by defacing them with paint or by hurling 
projectiles like bricks, rocks, and bottles to break windows.  Demonstrators also set fire 
to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu.  On the Tuesday morning following the embassy 
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bombing, Chinese media sources reported the apologies of President Clinton and NATO 
leaders that had been previously postponed, even though they were issued immediately 
after the incident (though the apologies reportedly did not make front page news in The 
People’s Daily—mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party—the cover instead 
carrying commentary referring to the incident as barbaric and criminal).162  Bringing 
“…an emotional close to the anti-American activity” over the previous days (that is, the 
widespread protests), on May 13 Beijing awarded the title of “revolutionary martyr” to 
the journalists killed in the embassy bombing and encouraged its population to focus on 
strengthening China.163  However, Chinese officials continued to demand a full account 
of the bombing from the United States government.  Also in response to the incident, the 
Chinese government suspended its official human rights dialogue with the U.S., 
suspended other high-level contacts, and suspended discussion of China’s entry to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In the aftermath of the bombing of its embassy, China adopted a narrative 
identifying itself a victim not of an accident, but of a deliberate U.S./NATO attack.  
Chinese officials defined the incident as criminal and barbaric, implicitly extending these 
definitions to the U.S. and, in many ways, its intervention in Kosovo.  Outrage spanned 
the country along with declining views of the United States and its actions in 
international politics.  However, more than identifying itself simply as victim, China 
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identified itself as a victim unafraid of opposing the views of the world’s hegemon, the 
United States. 
The Intersection of Competing Identities 
Beyond the simple reality of the embassy bombing itself, China and the United States 
perceived the incident based on their own unique, identity based perceptions.  These 
differing perceptions interacted to influence, in this case adversely, the already tenuous 
nature of U.S.-China relations in the aftermath of the bombing.  While China’s outrage 
over the bombing may be justified to some extent, as China was legitimately the victim in 
this case, a history of mutual distrust, suspicion, and conflicting worldviews interacted to 
exacerbate the situation and China’s reaction.  Instead of leaning towards acceptance of 
the United States’ narrative regarding the bombing as accidental, a number of factors 
composite of China’s identity and worldview predisposed the country to react more 
adversely and propose an alternate narrative. 
Chinese nationalism presents one key factor influencing China’s response to the 
May 1999 U.S./NATO bombing of its Belgrade embassy.  Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union and declining influence of communism, many have suggested that China sought a 
new issue around which to build Chinese identity and encourage support for and the 
legitimacy of the Chinese government as a replacement for communism.  To replace 
communism as the solidifying factor of Chinese society, Beijing turned to a form of 
nationalism based on remembrance of the historic mistreatment of China during the 19th 
and 20th centuries—the century of humiliation, known as the humiliation narrative—and 
an emphasis on and pride in Chinese modernization and economic growth.  During the 
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early 1990s, the Chinese government even initiated a patriotic education campaign in 
support of China’s so-called new nationalism.164 
China’s opposition to the U.S./NATO intervention in Kosovo further 
compounded the country’s reaction to the embassy bombing.  While the U.S. narrative 
claimed the intervention was a humanitarian cause, China viewed the intervention as a 
way for the U.S. to pursue material gains: to strengthen its foothold in the region.  For its 
part, the U.S. viewed Chinese opposition to the Kosovo intervention as materially driven 
to keep the U.S. from encroaching closer to its sphere of influence and to prevent the 
intervention from providing any sort of precedent for humanitarian intervention (of 
whatever sort) in China or support for separatist elements within its own country.165  This 
account of the differences in U.S. and Chinese perceptions and narratives and of their 
reactions to the incident, however, only begs further examination into the underlying 
characteristics of these differences. 
The previous discussion has already indicated that differences in identities 
between the U.S. and China influenced their views of the May 1999 Chinese Belgrade 
embassy bombing and thus the nature of relations between the two countries.  Endemic 
mistrust led many in the Chinese government and general population to view the 
bombing as an intentional attack and reject the U.S. claims and official narrative that it 
was an accident.  This mistrust may be traced to at least a few sources, such as China’s 
century of humiliation and capitalization on the humiliation narrative to serve and 
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buttress Chinese nationalism and its overall identity.  This aspect of Chinese nationalism 
possesses the ability to predispose Chinese officials and citizens toward mistrust, 
skepticism, and even animosity toward the United States and its allies, especially with 
and exacerbated by the occurrence of any sort of conflict.  Further, as Gregory Moore 
notes, both parties believed they were acting in accordance with “…lofty ideals and 
norms of justice in their policy stands on the Kosovo intervention, [and] they saw the 
other as acting out of ‘baser’ material interests.”166  By extension, these narratives 
informed both sides’ views of and responses to the embassy bombing. 
Here, the notion of Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) helps inform 
understanding of the situation.  As Moore relates from the work of Gries (who himself 
draws upon the concept from the realm of social psychology), FAE contends that in 
situations of conflict (or whenever differences arise), “‘we’ attribute ‘our’ group’s 
problems or mistakes to situational factors, while attributing other group’s problems or 
mistakes to dispositional factors like a flawed personality or ill intentions.”167  This 
coincides neatly with the difference in perceptions and narratives concerning the embassy 
bombing.  For example, the U.S. attributed the bombing to a myriad of errors, ultimately 
regarding it as an unfortunate accident, while the Chinese viewed it as a barbaric, 
criminal, and quite possibly intentional attack based on U.S. interests.168  In the eyes of 
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the Chinese, possible U.S. interests included gaining a stronger presence in the region and 
containing China (all the while, Chinese media sources “virtually ignored” Serbian 
atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo169).  In the U.S., some, such as Senator and then 
presidential candidate John McCain, voiced that China was orchestrating the anti-U.S. 
protests occurring at the time for political purposes.170 
The differing interpretations held by China and the United States over the 
embassy bombing demonstrate that in some ways each side viewed the other much in line 
with a realist worldview of international politics, or at least of their bilateral relationship.  
However, for the reasons discussed above, a more complete understanding recognizes 
that each side’s views of not only the other but also the self interacted to intensify tension 
in U.S.-China relations at the time.  However, according to Dingxin Zhao, expressions of 
Chinese nationalism also occurred in a bottom-up fashion.  The Chinese government felt 
the need to allow and condone the protests over the embassy bombing in order to avoid 
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being seen as weak in response to the United States, despite but also due to worries that 
the protests might morph into expressions of grievances over the Chinese government 
and the CCP and into questioning its legitimacy.171  The demonstrations themselves may 
have been an outlet and guise for such feelings. 
On the other hand, some, such as Simon Shen, argue that China’s primary goal in 
the aftermath of the embassy bombing was to save face and that the government’s 
behavior did not match the nationalist rhetoric that the incident inspired, primarily 
seeking an apology from the U.S.172  However, this explanation does not account for 
issues such as China’s delayed reporting of President Clinton’s and NATO’s apologies 
for the bombing, suspension of high-level contacts, or official depictions of the incident 
as barbaric, criminal, and deliberate.  In the world of international politics, rhetoric 
possesses the ability to mutually influence perceptions and behavior. 
 The perceptions and various other factors surrounding the bombing of China’s 
Belgrade embassy defy simple explanation.  China and the U.S. might certainly have 
possessed competing interests, but the identities of both countries did more to influence 
their perceptions and responses to the incident.  The century of humiliation predisposes 
China towards heightened sensitivity in response to any affront to its dignity or 
sovereignty.  However, this sensitivity is also tied to the legitimacy of China’s rulers, as 
much of Chinese narratives of nationalism and identity since the fall of communism in 
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Eastern Europe are based on both the humiliation narrative and pride in and desire for 
increased modernization and economic growth.  Even so, the politicization of the 
embassy bombing lurks in the midst of these other factors.  China rejected U.S. claims 
that the bombing was an accident, imposing upon the U.S. (intentionally or 
unintentionally) the identity of a self-interested hegemon and aggressor in international 
politics.  The Chinese government also chose to intentionally delay the release of 
President Clinton’s and NATO’s apologies for the embassy bombing while condoning 
and facilitating the demonstrations that occurred in response to the incident.  David 
Shambaugh attributed this behavior to the Chinese government’s manipulation of popular 
emotions to bolster its own legitimacy.173  However, Chinese citizens do not lack 
autonomy, and the Chinese government may indeed have felt some need to respond to its 
citizens sense of indignation and outrage by allowing, even to some extent encouraging, 
their nationalist and anti-U.S. sentiments. 
 While China may have politically manipulated perceptions of the embassy 
bombing to some extent, dismissing the reactions of the Chinese government and its 
population based on this alone delegitimizes any true sense of grievance experienced by 
the Chinese while imposing little more than a material-driven, self-interested narrative of 
identity upon the country and its leadership.  Similarly, China’s apparent first and 
foremost reaction to the incident as a deliberate act, characterizing it as barbaric and 
criminal, with little discussion otherwise and withholding U.S. and NATO expressions of 
apology and regret, exposes not only the mistrust existing between the China and the 
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U.S., but indeed China’s politicization of the event.  With already endemic mistrust and 
tension in the U.S.-China relationship, both sides perceived and interpreted the May 1999 
embassy bombing according to their own identities and interests with little reflection (and 
little penchant for such reflection) on the views of the other.  The intermixture of this 
international incident with existing discordant identities and political motives resulted in 
a more conflictual and tense bilateral relationship for some time. 
Collision Material/Immaterial: The EP-3E Incident 
Over time, relations between the U.S. and China began to stabilize after the May 1999 
Belgrade embassy bombing.174  After the initial demonstrations by Chinese citizens, 
protestors largely heeded the central government’s advice to focus on strengthening 
China through study and hard work.175  Heightened tension and mistrust in U.S.-China 
relations would, however, soon resurface with the midair collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3E 
Aries II reconnaissance plane with a People’s Liberation Army Navy fighter jet near 
China’s Hainan Island on April 1, 2001.  The collision resulted in the loss of the Chinese 
pilot’s life while the U.S. aircraft and crew made an emergency, though unauthorized, 
landing at a Chinese military base on Hainan Island.  This incident occurred only months 
after President George W. Bush took office as 43rd President of the United States.  
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Tension in U.S.-China relations was already rising, as President Bush came to office 
intent to maintain his presidential campaign pledges to take a tougher stance on China 
(upon taking office, the President made telephone calls to every major world leader 
except Chinese President Jiang Zemin).176  President Bush’s more adversarial approach to 
China included adopting a narrative defining the relationship as one of “strategic 
competition” rather than a “strategic partnership,” as defined during the Clinton 
administration.177  The midair collision between the two Pacific powers only further 
increased tension. 
In terms of responsibility for the midair collision between the U.S. EP-3E plane 
and Chinese fighter jet, both sides perceived the incident differently.  The U.S. claimed 
that its plane enjoyed freedom of navigation as it was flying over international waters.  
Beijing, however, “claimed that such freedoms are not absolute, and that such foreign 
aircraft flying over its EEZ should abide by China’s laws and ‘refrain from activities 
which endanger the sovereignty, security and national interests’ of the coastal 
country.”178  China also officially remarked that after the collision, the U.S. aircraft 
entered Chinese airspace and landed without permission.  China detained the aircraft’s 
crew of 24 personnel, releasing the crew on April 11 and releasing the dismantled aircraft 
on July 3.  Overall, China’s narrative of the event placed blame upon the crew of the 
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aircraft for suddenly veering while in proximity to the Chinese jet.  Initially, the U.S. 
largely refrained from immediately assigning blame for the incident, referring to it as an 
accident while speculating on the role of how closely the Chinese jet fighter was trailing 
the slow moving and less maneuverable U.S. aircraft in the situation.179  After the midair 
collision, Foreign Minister Zhu Bangzao stated that the release of the U.S. crew depended 
on a U.S. apology and explanation of the incident, squarely placing blame on the United 
States and calling upon Washington to take full responsibility.  The U.S. concluded that 
the accident most likely occurred due to a miscue by the “speedier” Chinese jet, trailing 
the U.S. aircraft at unsafe distances.180  However, the U.S. did express its regret over the 
situation. 
Chinese Perspective of the Collision 
According to one analyst, “Having demanded and obtained an apology from the Bush 
Administration for the spy plane incident, China not only enhanced its image as a great 
power by demonstrating its will and capability to stand up to the sole superpower, but 
was also seen as defining the limits of U.S. power in the Pacific” (the “apology” actually 
more an expression of regret, though some sources within the Chinese media regarded it 
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as an official apology).181  As with the May 1999 embassy bombing, there are also 
indications that aspects of Chinese identity relating to its history during the century of 
humiliation influenced its perceptions and response to the midair collision between U.S. 
and Chinese aircraft.  These sorts of incidents increase the salience of Chinese concerns 
over U.S. hegemony and the possibility of U.S. containment, seen in China’s narratives 
of the incident, pushing Beijing towards a state-centric foreign policy emphasizing 
national independence and sovereignty.182  As noted by Cheng and Ngok, “If the incident 
had occurred between the U.S. and one of its allies, it might have been an accident.  But 
apparently the Chinese government and the Chinese people could not perceive it as an 
accident,” and that “On the basis of the series of unfriendly acts by the U.S. towards 
China, they easily came to the conclusion that the air collision incident had been the 
inevitable outcome of U.S. hegemonism provoking China and treating China with 
hostility.”183  Similar to the Belgrade embassy bombing, though to a lesser extent, 
China’s narratives served to define itself as a victim of (but not afraid to stand up to) the 
hegemonism of the United States. 
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U.S. Perspective of the Collision 
The fact that the United States conducts reconnaissance missions off China’s coastal 
waters indicates that at least some elements within the United States view China as either 
a current or potential threat.  Power-holders influenced by the “China threat” narrative (or 
simply the uncertainty thereof), to say nothing of whether such views and concerns are 
warranted, are disposed to undertaking actions such as reconnaissance flights and other 
activities that are in some ways adversarial in nature.  Moreover, these views—quite 
logically—dispose officials towards some degree of conflictual interpretations of and 
relations with the People’s Republic of China.  These views are primarily rooted in 
power-rivalry type notions of international politics fundamental to various forms of 
realism.184  These perceptions of international politics and specifically of China influence 
U.S. views of not only the midair collision but also views of the necessity for such 
activities as the reconnaissance flight in the first place. 
 Opposite China, U.S. narratives of the midair collision between U.S. and Chinese 
aircraft adopted a more measured approach in initially assigning blame for the accident, 
though U.S. officials directly hinted at the possibility it was the Chinese pilot’s fault.  
Ultimately, the U.S. denied responsibility and refused to issue China an official apology.  
The U.S. also maintained its right to undertake such reconnaissance flights.  Ignoring 
U.S. rights to do so, U.S. perceived need to do so illustrates ways in which the U.S. views 
China and the world. 
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The Intersection of Competing Identities 
Washington adopted a hard line in response to China’s demands for an apology and 
overall interpretation of the midair collision.  However, this incident did not lead to an 
increase in tension in bilateral relations on the same scale caused by the Belgrade 
embassy bombing.  Still, though widespread demonstrations did not occur, both Chinese 
and U.S. “hackers” did participate in a “cyber war” of sorts185, somewhat similar to the 
cyber attacks experienced by the United States after the embassy bombing.  Not long 
after the collision, the United States also “approved a significant new arms package for 
Taiwan.”186  China viewed these actions and others, such as the U.S. granting a visa to 
former Taiwan President Lee Tenghui, as attempts by some U.S. politicians to launch an 
anti-China campaign.187 
As to the legality of the U.S. reconnaissance flight itself, looking to international 
law, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea holds that countries have: a 12 
nautical mile territorial sea where they retain sovereignty over most activities and where 
only innocent passage by others is allowed; and a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) where countries maintain rights to resources but where others retain most of 
their rights to freedom of navigation.  Though the U.N. Convention suffers some degree 
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of ambiguity—and some countries maintain they retain more rights and a greater degree 
of sovereignty in their EEZs—many treat activities such as those conducted by the U.S. 
EP-3E reconnaissance plane as permitted under international law.188  Accepting this 
belief, the legal issue surrounding the midair collision disappears, leaving only the issue 
of responsibility for the collision.  Here, both sides maintained their own views on the 
cause of the collision.  However, instead of attempting to ascertain responsibility for the 
collision, it is more informative to examine each side’s responses and narratives related to 
the collision itself.  Not only did two aircraft from two different countries collide, but so 
did these countries’ identities and interests, discernable through their conflicting 
perceptions of the event. 
As the April 2001 collision demonstrates, as well as the May 1999 embassy 
bombing, views and discursive representations of the other in U.S.-China relations—both 
in general and with regard to specific events—directly impact the nature of the bilateral 
relationship.  Both adopted adversarial and opposing identities due to the midair collision.  
With the relationship’s history of varying degrees of tension and the ability of historic 
points of tension or conflict to serve as salient aspects influencing its nature, much of 
recent U.S.-China relations has existed in a tenuous state, seemingly perpetually on the 
precipice of confrontation or conflict.  This holds especially so since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  To some, China easily filled the void left by the Soviet Union in U.S. security 
concerns, becoming the United States’ new “enemy,” supported by ideological and other 
differences as well as international issues such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
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massacre.189  With the occurrence of al Qaeda’s September, 2001, terrorist attacks, 
however, not only did a new threat emerge to occupy the United States’ security focus, an 
opportunity for more cooperative U.S.-China relations arose. 
11 September 2001 and U.S.-China Relations 
Perhaps most importantly with regard to U.S.-China relations, the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda against the United States diverted U.S. attention 
away from the so-called “China Threat.”  Simultaneously, China expressed its 
condolences to and support of the United States, including supporting the American 
invasion of Afghanistan, despite long-held concerns over the U.S. strengthening its 
presence in Central Asia—around China’s periphery.  Supporting the U.S. “war on 
terror,” Chinese leaders believed, would also offer them greater support in dealing with 
their own domestic threats.  Interestingly, the Department of Defense Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report released shortly after 11 September 2001, but composed before al 
Qaeda’s attacks, warned of the rise of an Asian competitor to the United States, one able 
to deny the U.S. access to East and Southeast Asian waters.190  By September of the next 
year, however, “the White House’s September 2002 National Security Strategy 
emphasized ‘the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China,’ with additional 
calls for U.S.-China collaboration in areas of overlapping interest, including opposition to 
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terrorism and the promotion of stability on the Korean peninsula,”191 reflecting the 
official shift in U.S. foreign policy concerns. 
In contrast with China’s support for the U.S. after September 11, an opposing 
interpretation contends that China’s leaders saw in the September 11 attacks an 
opportunity to adopt, at the time, fashionable political cover—combating radical Islamic 
extremism—to exert greater domestic control over certain areas and aspects of its own 
society.192  There is much concern, for instance, over whether Chinese actions taken in 
response to violent extremism in places such as Xinjiang are justified or a guise for 
suppressing potentially justifiable domestic grievances and unrest.  The extent to which 
Muslims in China’s western provinces self-identify primarily along religious rather than 
nationalistic lines is itself worthy of question, as is the extent congruence exists between 
China’s Muslims and Muslims elsewhere in the world, not to mention radical extremists. 
 In a way, the United States’ response to September 11 also re-illustrated its 
military superiority in relation to China, especially in terms of power projection 
capabilities, notwithstanding the difficulties the U.S. faced in terms of insurgencies and 
terrorism in Afghanistan as well as with its intervention in Iraq.  With the state of events 
after September 11, China chose to support the U.S. and cooperate in ways such as 
sharing intelligence on terrorist threats and encouraging Pakistan to work with the United 
States.  At the same time, China also enjoyed a reprieve from being seen as one of the 
                                                
191 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,  
September 2002, as quoted in Jonathan D. Pollack, “Asia’s Shifting Strategic Landscape: 
China and the United States Post-9/11,” Orbis 47, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 618. 
 
192 Friedberg, “11 September and the future of Sino-American relations,” 36. 
 
  138 
primary potential threats to U.S. interests and security since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Moreover, China sought to link the worldwide campaign against terrorism with its own 
efforts against separatism in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan.193 
The Intersection of Shared Identities 
According to previously used terminology, it might be argued that China and the U.S. 
experienced a sort of perceptual congruence with regard to their interests after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks (as opposed to perceptual gap).  Thus, it makes intuitive 
sense to explore their identities in conjunction rather than individually. 
On the surface, both sides appeared to find a new basis for cooperation after 11 
September 2001.  China became a partner in combating terrorism with the United States.  
The growing rift between the two countries, the mutual criticism expressed from both 
sides of the Pacific and even rising and proliferating open contemplation of the 
possibilities of armed conflict with the U.S. over issues such as Taiwan,194 largely ceased 
after September 11.  For example, “In the US, the previous torrent of criticism and 
condemnation of China in the media suddenly became a trickle.  While one still read 
hostile comments on and dire warnings about China from hardliners, the erstwhile 
deafening anti-China chorus dwindled to a few lonely tunes” and, “In China, the media, 
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which used to be quite critical of America prior to 9-11, began to churn out sympathetic 
reports on US efforts to combat terrorism.”195  According to Jia Qingguo: 
The single most important factor responsible for the improvement of the relations 
between China and the US after 9-11 is the change in US foreign policy priorities 
as a result of the terrorist attacks.  The priority change provided room for China to 
assume a more cooperative posture in managing its relations with the U.S.  This, 
in turn, generated goodwill on the part of the Bush administration and led to the 
improvement in relations between the two countries.196 
 
Before the September 11 attacks, the U.S. hoped for, if not sought to influence, 
political and other changes in China, while China first and foremost sought political 
stability, pitting the two countries and their identities at odds with one another.  
September 11 directed U.S. attention away from China, allowing China to adopt a more 
cooperative approach in its relations with the United States as well as pursue other 
concerns related to its own stability, such as focusing on separatist movements existing 
within the Chinese mainland.  In some ways, the United States’ quick and easy shift in 
security focus away from China possibly demonstrates that the People’s Republic of 
China and its policies were not necessarily considerable or imminent threats to the United 
States prior to al Qaeda’s attacks, despite the previous tension in relations between both 
countries.  This also indicates the degree to which tense relations may have been the 
product of social constructions and ill-conceived discursive representations. 
In light of widespread international support of the United States immediately after 
the September 11 attacks, whether China had any choice but to side with the United 
States deserves consideration.  Whether so is difficult to ascertain, though Beijing’s 
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closer relationship with Washington did pose certain benefits, those discussed previously.  
Primarily, these included the possibility for China to pursue further growth and 
modernization while weathering less criticism or opposition and the possibility of 
combating separatist movements within mainland China under the guise of the global 
“war on terror.”  However, the U.S. and its allies largely opposed officially identifying 
Chinese separatist groups (primarily Uighurs from Xinjiang) as terrorist groups and 
President Bush cautioned President Jiang Zemin that “the war on terror ‘must never be an 
excuse to persecute minorities.’”197 
 Even with the arrival of an opportunity for increased cooperation, China still 
reportedly perceived the U.S. pursuit of its war on terror as a way to strengthen its global 
hegemony, Chinese analysts clinging to worldviews and perceptions bound by power 
politics.198  In any event, the improvement experienced in U.S.-China relations soon 
dissipated. 
U.S.-China Relations Beyond 11 September 2001 
In the years after September 11, a resurgence in tension between the U.S. and China arose 
as a fundamental difference in each side’s identities and perceptions resurfaced.  
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Moreover, issues exacerbating confrontation and conflict in U.S.-China relations 
continued to arise, from China’s maritime territorial disputes in the South and East China 
Seas to its support of North Korea to differences over humanitarian, economic, and other 
concerns.  Further, as U.S. involvement and interest in its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
began to wane, a resurgence in tension in the U.S.-China relationship was readily 
apparent.  The September 11 attacks and fleeting degrees of cooperation experienced 
afterward—including the decrease in official and public criticism of the other by each 
country, perhaps the greatest benefit to U.S.-China relations resulting from al Qaeda’s 
attacks—indicate the lack of resolution to not only the fundamental differences and issues 
existing between the U.S. and China, but the fact that any perceptual congruence 
experienced after the terrorist attacks was superficial at best.  Actual perceptual gaps, and 
the tendency for them, in U.S.-China relations resulting from each country’s opposing 
identities and conflicting views of the other and the others’ interests were only 
temporarily shelved or overshadowed in the immediacy after September 11.  Indeed, as 
some argue,199 the possibility exists that China may have only sought to buy time for 
unhindered modernization and development, politically taking advantage of the 
opportunity.  The resurgence in tension in U.S.-China relations has largely continued 
through the present, as illustrated by the foreign policies of the governments in both 
countries.  The following case studies of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute as it relates 
to U.S.-China relations and the conflicts between Beijing and Washington in “cyber 
space” further illustrate this argument.
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IV 
 




To recognize that the dominant geopolitical map has been imposed on the world 
by power rather than simply emerging as an evolutionary historical inevitability, 
as the dominant consensual narratives would have it, one needs to achieve an 
effective conceptual distance, to think outside of the state system’s mode of global 
comprehension, outside of the spatial predicates of its structures of power, 
authority, and recognition.† 
 
–Michael J. Shapiro 
 
 
Within the East China Sea lie a small group of islands over which the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and Japan each hold competing claims of 
sovereignty.  Known as the Diaoyu Islands by the PRC, the Senkaku Islands by Japan, 
and Diaoyutai Islands by the ROC, the islands themselves lie approximately halfway 
between Taiwan and the Japanese Ryukyu islands.200  Despite Taipei’s own claims, this 
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(reference listed toward the end of this footnote).  Seeking to avoid promoting any 
position with regard to this territorial dispute, this study refrains from referring to the 
islands by any one name in this analysis.  Instead, from here forward they are referred to 
as the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands out of respect for neutrality and convention, as most 
references to the islands adopt this approach.  Here, this study treats the precedence of the 
Chinese name as alphabetic, not political.  At one point Linus Hagström sought neutrality 
by referring to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in English as the Pinnacle Islands.  However, 
he has since recanted this position, as “Pinnacle” is a direct translation of “Senkaku” and 
as the approach failed to be influential.  This study’s approach to neutrality in referring to 
the islands follows and is informed by Hagström’s present approach.  See Linus 
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territorial dispute has been most salient between China and Japan, especially since the 
Chinese fishing trawler, the Minjinyu 5179, collided with two different Japanese 
coastguard patrol ships near the islands on 7 September 2010, leading to the detention of 
the Minjinyu’s captain and crew by the Japanese. 
Despite competing claims of sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, they 
remain uninhabited and are physically unremarkable, often referred to diminutively as 
islets rather than islands, simply as maritime features, or as insular formations.201  Mark 
E. Manyin notes that the islands are “sometimes described as five islets and three 
rocks.”202  These eight maritime features comprise the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, only two 
of which are larger than 1km2—Diaoyudao, the largest at approximately 4.3km2 and only 
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362 meters above sea level and Huangweiyu at approximately 1.1km2.  Only the three 
largest of the islands have vegetation, the remaining five barren, and only Diaoyudao 
hosts fresh water.  Despite their seeming insignificance, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands bear 
great importance to both China and Japan as well as the United States. 203  Due to U.S. 
interests in the Asia-Pacific, especially an interest in regional stability and relations with 
both Beijing and Tokyo, the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands bears great 
influence on U.S.-China relations.  To start, the United States shares a mutual security 
treaty with Japan and has been involved with the islands and the dispute since the end of 
World War II, when Washington took over administration of Japanese territories, 
negotiating the return of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japanese administrative control 
with the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971. 
 Understanding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute and the effect it has on 
relations between China and the United States calls for a multifaceted approach.  Claims 
to the islands result in narratives summoning notions of sovereignty, territoriality, 
materiality, and, most importantly, identity.204  This last factor, identity, is most important 
not only because it can—and does—encompass these other concepts but also due to the 
intense nationalism that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute incites amongst China and 
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Japan.  The dispute involves a mixture of domestic and international influences—the 
interaction between these two levels only making separate distinctions between them 
problematic—and a number of competing narratives that, when analyzed, allow glimpses 
into the identities and interests involved in the dispute and how these narratives and 
related identities influence and interact with each other, ultimately characterizing the 
nature of U.S.-China relations.  Due to the U.S. relationship with Japan, U.S. interests in 
the Asia-Pacific, and how China views U.S. interests, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute 
has important implications for the nature of this relationship.  Likewise, U.S. views of 
China’s claims and behavior with regard to the islands also impact the nature of U.S.-
China relations.  Assessing the narratives of both sides in order to understand their 
identities demonstrates how the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute does more than simply 
increase tension in relations between China and the United States; it demonstrates the 
differences in the dominant narratives related to the dispute and how the actors involved 
draw upon the issue politically. 
The following analysis applies an identity centric approach to understanding the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute that focuses on U.S. and Chinese narratives in order to 
understand the dispute as well as gain greater insight into U.S.-China relations.  Unlike 
other studies, even though Japan is one of the two major claimants in this dispute, 
Japanese nationalism, Japanese interests, and Japanese identities will only receive little 
examination.  This study’s argument is that for Japan, the U.S.-Japan mutual security 
treaty provides the cornerstone of Tokyo’s resolute opposition to China’s claims to the 
islands while Washington’s desire for a peaceful resolution or, at least, maintenance of 
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the status quo ensures regional and global stability.  Before engaging in this discussion, 
however, an examination of the background of the dispute itself followed by a discussion 
of traditional explanations follows. 
Rocks in the Sea 
 Presently, claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands made on historical bases provide little 
objective support to any specific claimant.  This is not to say that the history of the 
dispute and sovereignty over the islands is not important; it is, very much so.  Rather, 
such historical justifications become a political game.  Any given side cites evidence 
ready to refute the claims of the other and support its own claims, though the importance 
of the evidence in question, and thus legitimacy of the claims, rests on little more than 
subjective interpretation, another level of political gamesmanship.  To provide two brief 
examples, observers might ask what sort of legitimacy or right to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands China’s centuries old claims to them—predating the founding of both the 
Republic of China and People’s Republic of China—really offer?  And for Japan, what 
do observers make of the fact that the islands were not included in the original San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, only added months after the signing of the original?  Adopting 
an international perspective, does the physical geographic insignificance of the islands 
betray a certain degree of triviality as far as more firm conceptualizations of sovereignty 
and territoriality are concerned?  Does this betray the political foundations of the dispute? 
 China’s narrative concerning its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands rests upon 
multiple premises, primarily that China discovered the islands no later than the thirteenth 
century and that the Ming Dynasty placed the islands under its coastal defense during the 
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dynasty’s early years, actually placing the islands under the authority of Taiwan.  This 
assertion essentially strengthens Taiwan’s claims to the islands more than China’s, which 
in turn strengthens China’s claims as the People’s Republic of China asserts authority and 
sovereignty over the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan.205  The current Chinese 
government argues that Japan’s claims to the islands based upon annexation as “terra 
nullius” and based on the territory surrendered to Japan under Treaty of Shimonoseki at 
the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 are illegal.  China also takes issue with the fact 
that after the end of World War II stipulations about the return of administration of the 
islands to Japan were appended to the Treaty of Peace with Japan (Treaty of San 
Francisco) on 29 February 1952, months after the signing of the original treaty on 8 
September 1951.206  The People’s Republic of China fundamentally maintains its claim to 
the disputed islands based on the supposed Ming Dynasty, Taiwan, and later Republic of 
China rule and authority over the islands.  However, after the U.S. agreed to revert 
administration of the islands to Japan with the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, China 
did not make a formal claim to the islands (based on historical justifications or otherwise) 
until six months later, on 30 December 1971.207 
 Like China, Japan claims indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, though Japan, unlike China, does not officially acknowledge that sovereignty 
                                                
205 Though neither of these governments existed during the thirteenth century. 
 
206 State Council Information Office, The People’s Republic of China. Diaoyu Dao, an 
Inherent Territory of China, September 2012, accessed January 6, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm. 
 
207 Krista E. Wiegand, “China’s Strategy in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Issue 
Linkage and Coercive Diplomacy,” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 172. 
  148 
over the islands is under dispute.  Japan’s narrative regarding its claims draws upon 
history and surveys of the islands during 1885 and shortly thereafter, showing them to be 
uninhabited with no signs of control by China or Taiwan.  In 1895, Japan then decided to 
erect a marker on the islands, essentially annexing them to Japan’s overall territorial 
sovereignty.  Japan rejects the importance of the Treaty of Shimonoseki altogether, 
arguing its irrelevance (not its legality, as disputed by China), as the islands were not 
considered part of Taiwan or the Pescadores Islands, which were ceded to Japan by China 
under the stipulations of the treaty.208  With the end of World War II, the Japanese 
government contends that the islands were thus not renounced by Japan and instead have 
been considered part of the Japanese Nansei Shoto Islands since annexation, hence 
rightfully placed under administration of the United States with the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and subsequently reverted to Japan with the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. 
 Since the signing of the Okinawa Reversion treaty in 1971, the United States itself 
has maintained a narrative that avoids taking an official position on the sovereignty of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, instead adopting a stance of neutrality.209  Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton noted as much in remarks made during October of 2010, shortly after 
tension rose between China and Japan with the fishing trawler incident near the islands 
during the prior month.  However, Secretary Clinton also noted that while the U.S. 
encourages both China and Japan to resolve the dispute peacefully and through dialogue, 
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the islands do fall under Japan’s administration and for this reason are covered by the 
United States’ mutual defense treaty obligations with Japan, a statement made by other 
U.S. officials before and since.210  Endorsing peaceful resolution to the islands dispute 
while emphasizing U.S. security commitments to Japan serve as key features of the U.S. 
narrative.  This raises a question, turned to shortly, over whether the U.S. tacitly endorses 
Japanese sovereignty over the islands.  The fact that the most recent U.S. Congressional 
Research Service report on the dispute refers to the islands primarily as the Senkaku 
islands and that the 2009 through 2011 Department of Defense annual reports to 
Congress on China’s military refer to the islands only as the Senkakus—the 2012 report 
notably refraining from referring to the islands by any specific name—further supports 
the importance of this question over U.S. neutrality.211  Before turning to this question, 
recent events leading to increased tension over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are 
explored. 
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The Clash of Nationalisms 
 Though both China and Japan (as well as Taiwan) have disputed the sovereignty 
of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for quite some time, with the 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship Between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, both sides essentially 
decided to shelve the issue until a later point in time in order to facilitate normalization of 
relations and increase trade.212  Even though the dispute has experienced periods of 
tension over ensuing years—such as China deploying five naval ships in the vicinity of 
the islands during September 2005, one being a destroyer which happened to point its 
guns at a Japanese P3-C Orion surveillance plane, and “government backed” Chinese 
activists attempting to land on the islands—the conflict over this maritime territorial 
dispute reignited most prominently with the 2010 fishing trawler incident.213  On the 
morning of 7 September 2010, Japanese coastguard patrol vessels encountered a Chinese 
fishing trawler, the Minjinyu 5179 with a crew of 15, operating near the vicinity of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  After the Japanese ordered the fishing trawler to leave the area, 
the Minjinyu collided with one of the Japanese ships, the Yonakuni.  Shortly after an 
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ensuing chase in response to the first collision, the Minjinyu then collided with the other 
Japanese vessel, the Mizuki, at 10:56 am.214 
 After this incident the Japanese detained the Minjinyu 5179’s captain and 
fourteen crewmembers.  The event elicited nationalistic protests in both countries.  In 
China, thousands of college students took to the streets to protest the detention of the 
fishing trawler’s crew and captain in addition to protesting Japan’s general claims to 
sovereignty over the islands.  Many Japanese stores had to close once demonstrators 
began breaking into them or attacking structures and personnel.  Nationalist sentiments 
expectedly “reverberated around China’s leading Internet forums.”215  With the size of 
China’s population and growth in popularity and availability of the internet, message 
boards provide a popular way for Chinese citizens (and citizens throughout the world) to 
communicate with one another, including venting grievances.  In response to the 
situation, Beijing cancelled many planned official and unofficial exchanges with Japan 
and enacted a temporary cessation of rare earth metal exports to Japan.216  In relation to 
the United States, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed disapproval toward 
Secretary Clinton’s remarks that mentioned the disputed islands in the context of the 
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U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty, even if the U.S. officially maintains a position of 
neutrality.217 
From each side’s respective viewpoint, the action of the other represented a 
violation of sovereignty with regard to a territory, while disputed (though Japan claims no 
dispute exists), where both sides maintain that their own sovereign claims are legitimate.  
The fishing trawler incident led to increasing tension between Beijing and Tokyo as well 
as discussion of the situation by both sides and their media outlets in terms of more than 
just competing centers of power in the Asia-Pacific but increasingly in terms of 
nationalism and nationalistic identities.  As Pan notes, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
dispute is relevant both internationally and domestically, both between and within Japan 
and China.  The domestic importance reflects the legitimacy of the Chinese and Japanese 
governments.218  Though implicit in these thoughts, it is important to pay specific 
attention to the ways in which both of these levels—the domestic and the international—
interact with and influence one another.  Pan later goes on to state that though 
nationalism represents one important factor with regard to this dispute, “nationalists in 
China generally link Japan’s actions on the Diaoyu Islands with Japanese militarism and 
aggression, other than with [the] Chinese government’s legitimacy.”219  However, this 
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statement is somewhat misleading, as it neglects the importance of how Chinese 
nationalists view their country’s response regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.220 
 Despite the ebb and flow of periodic flare-ups since the September 2010 incident, 
the island dispute did not reach such heightened tension again until two years later.  This 
tension began to build when activists from Hong Kong, Macau, and China were detained 
by Japan after landing on one of the islands during August 2012.  Unsurprisingly, this 
situation spurred protests in both countries.  In China, protestors directed violence at 
Japanese citizens, businesses, and buildings.  The situation in turn spurred attempts by 
Japanese citizens to land on the islands.221  Earlier, in April 2012, amidst increasing 
tension and heated nationalist sentiments, Tokyo’s governor stated he would buy three of 
the islands from their private owners.  Governor Shintaro Ishihara reached this decision 
due to the perceived inaction of the Japanese government in resolving the dispute.  As 
tension continued to rise, a few months later, on 11 September 2012, the Japanese 
government stated its intention to purchase three of the disputed islands from their private 
owners.222  The Japanese government claims it decided on this course of action to defuse 
the building tension that Tokyo’s nationalist governor Shintaro Ishihara had ignited by 
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stating his own intent to purchase and develop the islands.  The government’s decision 
spurred widespread outrage within China.  Protests again ensued, with Japanese citizens 
and companies within China suffering attacks, necessitating their hiding or businesses to 
close their doors.  China responded to Japan’s decision to purchase the islands by sending 
six surveillance ships to the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  All the while, the 
United States, as stated by Defense Secretary Panetta, maintained its commitment to 
stand by Japan in the event of armed conflict while reaffirming Washington’s neutrality 
with regard to the dispute itself.223 
 In the months following the flare in tension resulting from the purchase of the 
islands both sides have routinely sent ships within their vicinity.  More recently, on 5 
February 2013, Japan disclosed that on 30 January 2013 a Chinese ship used its fire 
control radar to target one of Japan’s naval vessels near the islands for at least a few 
minutes.  Japan also made public that this was the second time China acted in this way, a 
Chinese frigate training its fire control radar on a Japanese helicopter earlier during that 
same month, on January 19, with no communication between the involved forces in 
either situation.224  Quite clearly, this sort of circumstance demonstrates the potential for 
miscalculation and unintended escalation based on reactions extenuating from 
perceptions of seemingly hostile behavior or simply due to overreaction to provocative 
behavior. 
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 The maritime dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
raises the question about why the claimants care so much about the islands.  Indeed, 
though they seem insignificant, there are reasons for each side’s interests in the islands.  
These reasons are best understood in terms of the dominant narratives of the parties 
involved.  One reason for interest in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is due to the reported 
presence of natural resources in the surrounding territorial waters.  Another possible 
reason is for the security of and control over the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).  
By no means a definitive list of possible reasons, another is the interaction of each side’s 
identities and the meaning they attach not only to the islands but also to their possession 
or loss of them.  The United States is drawn into the dispute as an important actor due to 
its close relationship with Japan, its interests in the region, and the relationship between 
U.S. and Chinese identities.  China views the U.S. pivot towards the Asia-Pacific, 
emphasis on Air Sea Battle, and other forms of influence in the region often as 
provocative.225  Specifically given the focus of this study, the dispute and its related 
narratives influence and characterize U.S.-China relations.  After briefly discussing other 
important factors and possible explanations, particularly what might be considered the 
material importance of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, this study argues that the identities 
involved in the dispute are the most important factor, primarily those between China and 
the United States, influencing the nature of relations between the involved actors and that 
the dispute itself significantly influences relations between Beijing and Washington. 
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The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute 
The waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are believed to hold large oil and natural 
gas deposits.226  These possible reserves were first discovered during the 1960s and the 
potential importance of this factor is not lost on observers noting that China trails only 
the United States in oil consumption.  According to The World Factbook produced by the 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2011 Chinese oil consumption was estimated at 9,400,000 
barrels per day (bbl/day), 2010 U.S. oil consumption was estimated at 19,150,000 
bbl/day, and the 2010 oil consumption estimate for Japan, the world’s third single largest 
oil consumer, was 4,452,000 bbl/day.  This leads some to the conclusion that the dispute 
over the islands is at least partly resource based, with China’s fast growing rate of oil and 
other natural resource consumption.227  Japan itself contends that China only started 
making claims to the islands after evidence of such resources emerged during the 1960s 
and 1970s.228  For their part, the Chinese officially reject this assertion and claim that the 
dispute is not over resources but instead over the issue of sovereignty.229 
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 Considering that concern over resources likely influences the importance of the 
disputed islands for Beijing, at least in part, takes little stretch of imagination.  However, 
Chinese officials rarely discuss the potential resources located in the waters surrounding 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and reject that resources have anything to do with their 
claims.  Instead, official narratives discuss the islands in highly nationalistic terms.  
Instead of resources, officials discuss the islands as an issue of sovereignty, of territory, 
and even state China’s need to defend its claims in the face of Japan’s own claims or 
aggression.  Unlike Japan, claiming that no dispute exists and that the islands fall entirely 
under Japanese sovereignty, China’s narrative publically recognizes that there is a dispute 
and calls upon Japan to do the same.230 
Chinese Perspective of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute 
China interprets, at least rhetorically, Japan’s claims to and behavior with regard to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in militaristic terms.  The dispute fits into Chinese fears of 
Japanese neo-militarism and fear of right wing Japanese politicians—supportive of more 
nationalistic policies—as well as the periodic discussion within the Japanese government 
about reforming its constitution and current renunciation of warfare in pursuit of a greater 
international military and diplomatic role.231  China also worries about Washington’s 
desire for Japan to adopt a greater diplomatic and military role in global politics and 
become more of a “normal” power, noting the reforms Japan has on occasion passed to 
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do so, even deploying non-combat troops to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.232  
Interestingly, an article from Liaowang states that “Although the US’s bottom line is not 
clear, it can be predicted that the United States will not allow Japan to step too far out of 
line, nor will the United States allow Japan to lose too much face.”233  This provides a 
slightly different interpretation from the narrative more often found in Chinese 
publications on U.S. involvement in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute. 
Typically, Chinese sources condemn statements made by U.S. officials on coming 
to Japan’s aid in the event of a dispute with China over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands while 
claiming to take a neutral stance on their sovereignty.  The more measured interpretation 
in the Liaowang article mentioned above recognizes that U.S. behavior is directed more 
at maintaining the current status quo.  At the same time, however, the Chinese military 
notes the need to develop and display military force opposite Japan and the United States 
in this dispute.  Examining the mutual security relationship between Japan and the United 
States, the article also contends that the United States’ primary objective and its primary 
interest in the region is to contain China’s rise, explicitly linking the mutual defense 
treaty with containing China.234  This narrative also strives to identify the U.S. as an 
adversarial other opposed to China’s interests. 
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 These notions begin to suggest the prevalence of power politics with regard to the 
U.S. and China in the Asia-Pacific.  The Untied States, according to this sort of 
explanation, is reorienting its strategic focus and military might towards East Asia, home 
to the only immediately foreseeable potential peer competitor to the United States at 
present.  This narrative explains the U.S. pivot, the agreement with Australia to rotate 
U.S. troops through Australian bases, and the shifting of 60% of U.S. naval forces as well 
as the deployment of radar early warning systems and ballistic missile defense to the 
region.235  The fact that Chinese officials explicitly state the need to pursue military 
modernization and demonstrate their capabilities with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute and opposite the United States also may indicate that China too adopts 
more of a power politics view of the Asia-Pacific and of its relations with the United 
States.  Other considerations, however, also exist. 
Phil Deans contends that the symbolism of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is 
particularly important to China.  He does so based on the importance of nationalism to 
the CCP’s legitimacy and due to the historic abuses China has suffered at the hands of 
Japan.236  Deans basically links the significance of Chinese nationalism to regime 
legitimacy and explains the level of tension over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in terms of 
nationalist sentiments.  During the 1990s, nationalism became increasingly important in 
China with the waning global influence of communism.  While Deans notes that the 
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Chinese government both used nationalism and attempted to play it down in the 1996 
lighthouse dispute with Japan on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, demonstrating competing 
interests within the Chinese government, today nationalism appears directed more at the 
United States, at times by way of Japan as a proxy or an additional source inspiring 
nationalist sentiment, and seems less controlled. 
 As presented earlier, Chinese news sources have contributed heated, nationalist 
sentiments to the narrative regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute and the position 
taken by the United States.  In 1996, domestic news sources such as the Renmin Ribao 
played down the dispute while other sources, such as Chinese military journals, were 
highly critical.237  These latter sources are directed more towards Chinese officials and 
armed forces than the Chinese populace, much less a global audience.  Interestingly, 
some of the Jiefangjun Bao articles published recently express a more measured 
interpretation of tension over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, though still critical of 
both the United States and Japan.  Moreover, recently China has experienced widespread 
protests during periods of increased tension over the disputed islands, a situation Deans 
argues the CCP tried to prevent in the 1990s for fear of demonstrations against Japan 
spiraling into protests against the CCP itself.  Quite the opposite during recent years, the 
Chinese government seems to have adopted a relatively open approach to allowing 
criticism of Japan and the United States while allowing widespread, large 
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demonstrations—possibly even endorsing them—up to and often only reigning them in 
after they turn violent. 
 One plausible reason for recent attempts at fanning—or simply unbridling—
nationalism with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute may have been the 
beginning of the Chinese leadership transition in 2012.  The island dispute provides 
“others,” possibly even enemies, on which the Chinese populace can focus and also with 
which they may construct positive self-conceptions in relation to—relative to the United 
States and Japan—possibly strengthening regime stability and distracting Chinese 
citizens from domestic issues.  Consider how Chinese narratives attempt to assert moral 
superiority by referring to Japan’s militaristic past, raising notions of resurgent or neo-
militarist Japanese sentiments, recognizing there is a dispute while condemning Japan for 
not doing so, and even (not infrequently) stating that Japanese actions, such as the 
detention of the fishing trawler captain and crew in 2010, hurt the feelings of China’s 
citizens.  Appropriating the victim narrative in relation to much stronger others offers 
China a powerful political tool and source with which to build stronger internal and 
international identities relative to less “moral” others and possibly by which to derive 
international sympathy. 
 Explaining the heights of China’s provocative behavior, targeting Japanese forces 
with missile radars, is more difficult to understand.  It could indicate signaling behavior 
meant to demonstrate China’s resolve and that it should not be expected to back down.  
However, such behavior is inherently risky and could easily be misinterpreted and lead to 
unintentional and unwanted escalation.  This might indicate Chinese military forces 
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acting of their own accord for a variety of reasons, from a lack of experience to a desire 
to test their targeting systems, even to a lack of operational maturity.  It could also 
indicate a more nationalist or hawkish stance amongst the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN).  Whatever the reason, these actions could indicate the presence of a gap 
between PLA and government decision making.  Regardless, the ease with which such 
behavior might lead to unintended consequences and the fact that it has happened more 
than once is disconcerting.  What is important to take away from this discussion and the 
preceding factors is the importance of domestic as well as international factors and the 
importance of how actors view themselves, others, and the situations they interact in. 
It is notable that China’s defense white papers do not mention the islands.  
Contrary to what Deans noted during the 1990s, perhaps the opposite is true today.  
Perhaps the Chinese government is more concerned with maintaining a less provocative 
stance toward the islands in official sources that might be given more credence as to 
China’s intentions by the U.S. or Japan than its news sources.  Nationalist Chinese 
rhetoric appears most often to be targeted towards the domestic population.  This could 
reinforce the view that the island dispute is used rhetorically as a tool of political 
legitimacy and to serve other interests, such as stabilizing the leadership transition and 
buttressing overall governmental legitimacy.  However, China does make direct 
responses to and criticism of the United States.  It remains unclear whether the 
cancellation of Secretary Clinton’s meeting with Xi Jinping during her September 2012 
visit to Beijing resulted from Xi’s supposed back injury, as officially claimed, or whether 
the abrupt cancellation resulted either from the need to take Xi out of the spotlight while 
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the Chinese government consolidated its views on China’s upcoming leadership 
transition or if the cancellation was a direct snub to the United States in response to 
increasing tension in the island Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute.  Any of these three 
explanations might hold, but it seems unlikely for such a high profile meeting to be 
cancelled due to an apparent minor back injury.  The latter two explanations seem more 
credible.  Both, in fact, may bear some truth.  The cancellation of the meeting might have 
been an intentional, though internationally ambiguous, snub to the United States in order 
to demonstrate Xi Jinping’s character and ability to take a hard line opposite the United 
States.  
 Overall, the Chinese narrative presents the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in 
terms of U.S. hegemonic interests, drawing on notions of the humiliation narrative 
(especially sensitive due to Japan’s involvement) and China’s identity as a victim at the 
hands of other powers.  Doing so, however, China not only defends its claims to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands rhetorically, but also by deploying ships within their vicinity.  
This reflects China’s desire and ability to oppose others where its interests are concerned.   
U.S. Perspective of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute 
The United States holds many interests in the Asia-Pacific, including the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute.  Judging from the relatively unified stance taken by high-level U.S. 
officials, including the President and Secretaries of Defense and State, Washington’s 
narrative of the dispute is most concerned with regional stability, perhaps to prevent 
economic instability.  The emphasis found in the U.S. narrative on maintaining neutrality 
with regard to sovereignty over the islands and assertion that the dispute needs to be 
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resolved peacefully while simultaneously declaring that the islands fall under the 
administration of Japan, and thus under the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty, most likely 
seeks to maintain the status quo.238  The United States cannot abdicate its security 
responsibilities to Japan without some measure of fear of losing hope for a peaceful 
resolution to the dispute or preventing it from devolving to the point of armed conflict.  
The uncertainty of this possibility is enough to compel the United States to maintain its 
current stance, as there is greater certainty in China avoiding direct conflict with the 
United States than with Japan alone, the former much more powerful as well as 
possessing nuclear weapons. 
 The United States also cannot extricate itself from the dispute due to domestic 
concerns.  Though less heated than the Chinese or even Japanese media, much of the 
reporting on China from within the United States focuses on Chinese provocative 
behavior.  This might result from a fear or China’s rise or, similar to the situation within 
China, the need for an “other” upon which to project fear and from which to construct 
positive self conceptions of identity. Narratives that portray China as such an other—
from the top-down, bottom-up, or a mixture of both—work to increase tension in U.S.-
China relations.  A desire to maintain international stability is itself inherent to U.S. 
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identity, for liberal or humanitarian reasons or, at the very least, when U.S. interests are at 
stake (such as considering threats to global economic stability, from which the U.S. 
benefits greatly).  Regardless of failures to fully adhere to liberal values regarding human 
rights, the United States also finds itself at odds with China on this issue. 
 The domestic political theatre within the U.S. exacerbates these factors, leading to 
political posturing based upon speculation on the threat of China’s rise and specific 
policies emanating from Beijing.  When salient, U.S. politicians cannot afford to ignore 
issues related to China where American electoral concerns exist.  Doing so impacts their 
legitimacy and electability as candidates for government office within the United States.  
This is why the Diaoyu/Sekakau Islands dispute, at times (though less so than other 
issues) becomes a domestic political issue. 
 U.S. neutrality over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands presents another interesting 
aspect of the dispute and with regard to U.S.-China relations.  Briefly noted earlier, the 
2009 through 2011 Department of Defense reports to Congress on China’s military only 
refer to the disputed islands by their Japanese name, as the Senkakus.  The 2012 annual 
report conspicuously refrains from referring to the islands by either their Japanese or 
Chinese names.239  Also, while it does mention both names, the 2012 Congressional 
                                                
239 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2012;  Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China, 2011;  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to 
Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 
2010;  and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military 
Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2009. 
 
  166 
Research Service report on the islands refers to them primarily as the Senkaku Islands.240  
There are at least two possible explanations for why the United States primarily refers to 
the islands by their Japanese name, adding insight into the U.S. narrative related to the 
islands and the dispute.  First, this convention may be nothing more than a holdover from 
when the United States administered the islands in place of Japan after World War II, 
adopting the Japanese name before any dispute over the islands became significant.  
However, this explanation ignores the fact that the majority of other sources within the 
Untied States refer to the islands by both names, as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  This is 
especially true in the U.S. media, where discussion of the dispute has made frequent 
headlines over the past few years.  It is unlikely that different sectors of the U.S. military 
and government are ignorant of this dual naming convention and failed to notice the 
disparity between this convention and the government’s practice of referring to the 
islands by their Japanese name.241  In fact, it is surprising that China has not, at least more 
prominently, noted and criticized this practice.  That the 2012 Department of Defense 
report fails to mention the islands by either name shows that there must be some 
awareness of this issue in the United States, at least recently. 
 This change in naming convention in the Department of Defense reports could 
signal an attempt by the United States to decrease tension with China over the island 
dispute.  In addition to refusing to refer to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands by any name, the 
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2012 report pays even less attention to the issue than previous reports.  This possibly 
demonstrates that the dispute over the islands is not necessarily a core issue for the U.S. 
military and that the U.S. wishes to prevent tension over the dispute from increasing and 
adversely affecting U.S.-China relations.  However, the fact that the U.S. has, in many 
instances, referred to the islands primarily as the Senkakus seems to betray a de facto 
stance on the rightful sovereignty over them, fitting well with aspects of the U.S. 
narrative regarding the dispute such as coming to Japan’s defense over the islands.  If the 
U.S. did not hold such a stance, even if tacit or implicit, how much would the U.S. 
otherwise care about the dispute?  The United States primary goal might be to maintain 
the current status quo with regard to the islands until the situation can be resolved 
peacefully either in Japan’s favor or at least under terms accepted by Japan.  It is less 
surprising that both China and Japan refer to the islands in their own languages, since 
both sides claim sovereignty over the islands. 
 The U.S. narrative of the disputed islands endorses maintaining the current status 
quo until a peaceful resolution to the dispute is possible.  This has the effect of defining 
the U.S. as the region’s arbiter of peace and stability, especially in light of renewed U.S. 
interest in and commitment to the Asia-Pacific.  However, the U.S. also appears to 
support Japan’s administration of the islands and tacitly endorse Japan’s sovereign claims 
to them.  U.S. references to the islands primarily as the Senkakus and the U.S. alliance 
with Japan both intimate this possibility.  Thus, the U.S. may not be an entirely 
disinterested mediator, though U.S. interests in stability likely outweigh any concern over 
ultimate control over the islands.  
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The Intersection of Competing Identities 
Overall, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute appears driven primarily by domestic factors, 
namely political posturing in support of electoral politics (in Japan and the United States) 
as well as legitimacy and stability (in China).  These domestic factors are expressed in the 
narratives that speak to the identities of each side involved in the island dispute.  These 
domestic factors then lead to complex interactions for these international relationships.  
China’s narrative depicts the dispute in terms of sovereignty and its humiliation narrative, 
the century of abuses it suffered at the hands of Japan and the West until after World War 
II.  These depictions support China’s identity as both a victim and as a power standing up 
for its interests and its people opposite Japan and the United States, likely serving the 
purpose of promoting regime legitimacy and stability.  However, these identities are then 
adopted by and reproduced by the Chinese populace, influencing the Chinese leadership 
in a bottom up fashion.  This creates an interesting scenario where the narratives adopted 
by the leadership actually come full circle, in a feedback loop, to likewise influence their 
own behavior.  There are also questions as to the positions of various groups within 
China.  Deans pointed out a difference in stances on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute 
during the 1990s within the Chinese leadership, some leaders more nationalistic than 
others.  This may apply to the current leadership or even the Chinese military, especially 
as the latter provocatively targeted Japanese ships and planes with missile radar during 
January 2013. 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute appears within domestic U.S. politics as 
well, but not with as much salience as within China.  Other issues seem more important 
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for American elections and partisan posturing, such as the U.S. trade deficit with China 
and China’s currency manipulation.  However, the dispute does gain some attention.  In 
fact, it gains much attention in the U.S. media and from U.S. foreign policy officials.  
This attention indicates a narrative emphasizing maintaining stability in the region and 
preventing the dispute from escalating to the point of armed conflict between China and 
Japan, potentially drawing in the United States.  Though the U.S. tacitly seems to endorse 
Japan’s sovereignty over the islands, seen in how the U.S. refers to the islands and 
includes them under the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty, it more importantly attempts 
to maintain the status quo.  In order to do so, the United States must demonstrate its own 
resolve with regard to the situation, specifically by indicating that it will come to Japan’s 
defense if needed.  China would certainly be more wary of engaging in conflict with both 
Japan and the United States than the former alone, although the possibility of armed 
conflict with Japan itself is perhaps enough to deter escalation.  However, China’s 
targeting of Japanese forces with missile radars demonstrates just how easily this game of 
brinkmanship practiced by all sides may spiral out of control.  Miscalculations and 
missteps might easily exacerbate the uncertainty over the intentions of the “other,” 
especially when operating within such close proximity under scenarios of heightened 
tension.  The situation definitely poses a dangerous potential flashpoint, perhaps at 
present even more so than Taiwan, as the latter depends largely on whether the 
government in Taipei makes any sort of indications or moves toward independence. 
The interaction of U.S. and Chinese identities with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute increases tension in this bilateral relationship.  Drawing upon the 
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humiliation narrative and notions of its victimization, China identifies itself opposite 
Japan and, by extension, the United States.  The United States identifies itself as a 
mediator of sorts, interested primarily in peace and stability (though U.S. impartiality 
may be questioned in light of its alliance with Japan).  While U.S. involvement in the 
situation may decrease the likelihood of intentional armed conflict between China and 
Japan, this involvement also situates the U.S. at odds with China.  So being, the situation 
increases and acts as a point of tension in the U.S.-China relationship, illustrated by 
desires of Chinese officials to refrain from discussing the dispute (or its disputes in the 
South China Sea) during multilateral forums while the U.S. specifically raises these 
issues during such forums. 
The Future of the Dispute 
Looking towards the future of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, analysts might 
attempt to gauge current policy decisions and behavior and how shifts in relations or 
behavior may influence the future of the dispute.  As noted, the situation could easily 
escalate to the point of armed conflict with little warning.  To mediate this possibility, all 
sides should only consider highly measured military responses to what they interpret as 
provocation behavior by the other.  Measured military responses indicates taking a more 
cautious approach to deploying ships and other forces to the waters surrounding the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and implementing strict rules of engagement to prevent 
unwarranted provocative behavior and misinterpretation or overreaction to such behavior. 
 For its part, Japan’s interests might be best served by actually recognizing that a 
dispute over the islands’ sovereignty does exist.  Doing so, both China and Japan might 
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then agree to arbitrate the territorial dispute at the international level and commit to 
accepting whatever verdict on their sovereignty may come to pass.  Otherwise, both sides 
would best be served by reverting to the stance of shelving the issue until a later time 
when cooler or more adept heads prevail.  This latter suggestion is, however, improbable, 
as internal nationalist sentiments and dynamics may influence the governments of either 
side in a bottom up fashion and force undesirable tension or behavior.  To lessen this 
possibility, the governments on all sides should refrain from exacerbating the nationalist 
sentiments with regard to the islands, knowing that fundamental uncertainty about the 
future of the dispute could easily lead to conflict. 
 Instead of adopting a somewhat weak or misleading stance of neutrality, the 
United States should make more efforts to work towards a resolution of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute.  The U.S. should do so not through bilateral discussions 
among top foreign policy officials or independent statements, but through brokering joint 
discussions with both China and Japan in order to come to a resolution.  As the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute holds much less salience in domestic U.S. politics, this 
may be possible.  However, the fact still remains that the issue may become more salient 
within for U.S., especially if attempts to broker a discussion between both sides came to 
be interpreted and defined as taking too weak a stance toward China.  Some U.S. media 
outlets and many in Congress are already critical of the stance the U.S. takes towards 
China, advocating more of a hard line policy. 
 Whatever the future might hold, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute displays the 
importance of identities as expressed through narratives while offering glimpses of them.  
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Each party operates under specific conceptions of self and other, often privileging their 
own self-conceptions and interests, such as a need for political stability, legitimacy, or 
electability, in interpreting and drawing upon the dispute.  Understanding these nuances 
offers a more detailed understanding of the dispute in addition to potential insights into a 
future approach to its resolution.  This all depends, however, on how each actor, 
especially China and the United States, tailors their responses to the dispute and visions 
of one another.
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V 
 
THIEVES CALLING TO CATCH THIEVES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF CYBER 
“SPACE” AND CYBER IDENTITIES IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
 
 
Indeed, because of its greater dependence on cyber-controlled systems and its 
inability thus far to create national cyber defenses, the United States is currently 
far more vulnerable to cyber war than Russia or China.  The U.S. is more at risk 
from cyber war than are minor states like North Korea.† 
 
–Richard A. Clarke 
 
 
Concern over cyber space and the notion of cyber warfare have grown in recent years, as 
has the frequency of discussion of these topics within the government and popular media.  
In the United States focus often lies on the People’s Republic of China and high profile 
hacking attacks undertaken against U.S. government and private sector targets, 
supposedly by the Chinese.  In China, focus seems to rest primarily on refuting these 
claims, opposition to all forms of hacking and cyber warfare, and pointing to the number 
of cyber attacks that China itself suffers.  Both sides build narratives raising concern over 
the activities of the other in cyber space.  These narratives include aspects and identities 
such as the victim, the moral authority, the defender of freedom and intellectual property, 
the China threat theory, Cold War thinking, and so on.  However, with increasing concern 
over the realm of cyber space, much of the representation of this concern too often proves 
misleading, misconstrued, and over exaggerated while becoming self-serving in support 
of these differing narratives.  Indeed, China and the United States both certainly partake 
in cyber activities at the other’s expense (despite U.S. lack of public commentary about 
                                                
† Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National 
Security and What to Do About It (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), 155. 
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its own cyber activities and despite Chinese claims that it does not endorse hacking or 
cyber warfare), all the while calling for the other to put an end to such behavior; a thief 
calling to catch a thief.  They may not engage in direct cyber attacks against one another, 
but both countries assuredly engage in cyber espionage and, reportedly, the practice of 
laying the groundwork for future confrontations in cyber “space.”242  As discussed in this 
section, much misinformation exists concerning the realm of cyber “space,” which is no 
longer new and not so much a “space” as a compression of space, time, and mass.  Due in 
part to lack of a fixed conceptualization of cyber space and the rules and norms that 
govern it, contestation over what these rules and norms should be has risen alongside 
tension and competition in U.S.-China relations, within cyber space and elsewhere, 
illuminating and opening space for examination of the identities at play on both sides and 
with regard to cyber space itself. 
As cyber space no longer warrants references as a new or novel space, neither is 
the importance of this space itself new or novel.  Some, including Richard Clarke, have 
raised warnings about the potential threats extenuating from cyber space for some 
time.243  While this is the case, the popular portrayal of the threats posed by cyber space 
and by the People’s Republic of China in particular (and other actors) present quite the 
opposite, a new and immediate threat of growing importance.  The latter may be true, 
                                                
242 Such as searching for exploits, vulnerabilities, and remote access to either plant logic 
bombs or at some point in the future utilize remote access in order to conduct cyber 
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243 Clarke himself and Clarke and Knake provide a decent account of some such warnings 
by others, to say nothing of whether the specific warnings they raise are warranted, in 
Clarke and Knake, Cyber War.
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threats may be growing in importance, but cyber threats are by no means new.  
Promoting this realization and accounting for the increased interest in cyber space are at 
least three distinct but somewhat interrelated situations: the growing awareness of the 
threats that cyber space creates and facilitates; competition between the United States and 
China for domestic and international political purposes; and self interested attempts to 
appropriate, define, and govern the realm of cyber space.  More generally speaking, the 
identity of cyber space is maturing while sources of power compete over influencing the 
identity of this space while in turn constituting and shaping their own identities in this 
supposed new “domain” of warfare.  Examining U.S.-China relations in cyber space 
provides an opportunity to examine these identities in a state of flux as well as how they 
relate to overall U.S.-Chinese relations. 
 Recent media coverage in both the U.S. and China provides ample evidence for 
the importance of understanding how these two states relate to one another with regard to 
cyber space.  This importance persists even if the situation—even if the perceptions of 
“threats” either side face from the other—is to some degree exaggerated.244  Casting the 
issue as a question might aid in clarifying and better understanding its importance: what 
is at stake in the competition over cyber space, over its identities, and the identities of 
those within it?  Potential answers might offer insight into how this “space” is defined by 
its most influential actors, into decisions on the legitimacy of certain types of behavior 
within cyber space, into the roles of the important actors involved, and into limitations or 
lack thereof on their interests and capabilities. 
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Examining these questions and the general nature of cyber space in U.S.-China 
relations, this study argues that this space has come to represent a realm of competition 
largely due to the publicization of the threats within it.  The primary threat faced by both 
sides is espionage, which cyber space facilitates in an unprecedented way by increasing 
the reward resulting from engaging in this behavior while reducing associated risks.  
However, this competition is mediated by simultaneous attempts on both sides to 
downplay the tension in relations not only in cyber space but in general due to shared 
American and Chinese interests in other areas, such as U.S.-China economic relations.  
This state of affairs bears similarity to other aspects of U.S.-China relations, speaking to 
David Shambaugh’s coining of the term “coopetition” to define the overall state of 
relations between both countries.245  More specifically, this dual conceptualization of 
U.S.-China relations demonstrates the complexity of not only this relationship, but 
relations between states in general and other actors.  This complexity demonstrates a 
reality where not only one or two such conceptualizations might speak some truth to a 
situation, such as cooperation and competition (coopetition), but where 
conceptualizations, where identities, fluctuate and proliferate.246 
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246 This dual conceptualization is misleading because it creates an arbitrary binary 
relationship that implies competition and cooperation are both of a defined and opposite 
nature.  This may not be what Shambaugh intends, but thinking more in depth about the 
notion of coopetition quickly leads to a far more complex picture.  The same holds for 
Callahan’s representation of China as a “pessoptimist” nation, a state that draws upon 
narratives of both its past victimization at the hands of the West and Japan while also 
drawing upon its historic greatness and recent economic success. Shambaugh, “Tangled 
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 With the goal of further enhancing understanding of relations between the U.S. 
and China, this case study looks to cyber space through the prism of identity for general 
insights about U.S.-China relations as well as to specific insights about this much 
publicized “space” itself, examining the narratives and representational strategies 
engaged in on behalf of both sides.  First, however, the realm of cyber space and the 
nascent theoretical attempts at understanding it will be explored.  These attempts notably 
include drawing parallels to deterrence theory and the Cold War.  Contrary to these 
attempts, this study argues that despite naming conventions and its treatment as an 
additional domain of warfare by the U.S. and the Department of Defense, cyber “space” 
is not so much a space at all, instead representing more of a factor—a collection of 
technological capacities—that facilitates behavior in other spaces.  With this in mind, 
drawing parallels to the realm of intelligence offers more promise for understanding this 
“space” and how actors relate to one another within it.  Rather than speaking in terms of 
cyber “space” and considering it as a new domain of warfare, analysts should speak in 
terms of how cyber capabilities facilitate warfare in other domains—air, land, sea, and 
space—and in terms of cyber intelligence (CYINT).  This discussion will lead and lend 
itself to understanding cyber “space” and U.S-China relations therein from the vantage of 
identities, how they are coming to form, shape, and influence cyber space and both cyber 
and real world relations between the Washington and Beijing. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Titans: Conceptualizing the U.S.-China Relationship,” in Tangled Titans and William A. 
Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Locating Cyber Space 
Within the electronic signals transmitted through wire and air an artificial space exists, 
cyber space.  Observers might as easily refer to this space as a virtual space, a virtual 
reality.  Though it encompasses much of individuals’ contemporary lives—from work to 
pleasure, from social interaction to isolated endeavors—many interpret this space as 
intangible; it exists somewhere out there, as if independent of us while simultaneously 
surrounding us, yet dependent on our very existence.  Such characterizations begin to 
demonstrate the mythic identity of cyber space and belie a certain lack of understanding 
among cyber savvy and cyber callow alike.  This supposed domain of human interaction 
exists only by virtue of interconnectivity.  As cyber expert Jeffrey Carr acutely argues, 
“Cyberspace as a warfighting domain is a very challenging concept.  The temptation to 
classify it as just another domain, like air, land, sea, and space, is frequently the first 
mistake that’s made by our military and political leaders and policy makers.”247  He goes 
on to offer an alternate metaphor: thinking of cyber space in terms of science fiction 
parallel universes in order to avoid the problems of thinking of cyber space along the 
same lines as “meat” space. 
The term cyber “space,” considering it as a domain, is problematic for a number 
of reasons.  Cyber space does not occupy much space at all in the traditional sense, nor 
does it exist “out there” on its own, as if in a (the) cloud.  All of the information 
transmitted throughout cyber space—web pages, personal information, software, and 
more—exists within the storage capacity of interconnected computer systems and similar 
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devices in our better-known physical world.  Rather than replace one fictional 
representation with another—the current representation of cyber space with a metaphor 
of parallel universes—this study argues that it is prudent to refrain from thinking of cyber 
“space” as a space at all and instead to think in terms of the Internet and how cyber 
activities facilitate and threaten “real” world capabilities and lives. 
 The mythic construction, the romanticized understanding, of cyber space probably 
derives from a lack of understanding and lack of interest in understanding how the 
Internet functions.  Invariably, this mythic construction detracts from the fact that the 
websites individuals visit, the emails they send, the online financial transactions they 
undertake, are little more than pieces of information stored as electronic data and 
transmitted from one physical site to another through physical communication 
infrastructure and stored at any number of points during its journey.248  According to the 
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), “Cyberspace is the 
interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructures, and includes the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers in critical industries.”249  What cyber space does is compress space, and, in a 
way, time and mass.  Instead of transporting a physical book, for example, from one 
location to another hundreds of miles away, the Internet can allow for a digital 
representation of the book to traverse that same distance almost instantaneously with a 
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file size allowing it to be store on the smallest of storage devices.  This compression 
facilitates sharing information and presents this information to individuals through a 
novel (yet no longer too novel) medium—the computer. 
To say that cyber space does not truly exist as a space goes against conventional 
writing and wisdom on the subject.  However, this conventional narrative of cyber space 
is simply taken for granted and thus perpetuated without question.  Cyber space bears 
similarity to the telephone networks that ultimately provided the Internet’s early 
foundation and platform for development.  Both compress distances of thousands of 
miles—compressing space—and the time it would take to travel such distances to the 
here and now through networks of communication systems.250  The difference between 
the two is a difference in medium.  While telephone systems preserve oratory 
conversation (though cellular phones and networks are now often part and parcel of the 
“cyber space”) the Internet, though over recent years it has made great advances in 
preserving oratory and video communication, takes information and communication and 
converts it largely into specialized text or graphical user interfaces.  Thus, it makes no 
more sense to speak of a cyber “space” than it does to speak of a telephone or 
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telecommunication “space.”  Instead, it is more accurate to speak of the Internet itself and 
cyber capabilities and activities. 
The way that the Internet compresses time bears similarity to its ability to 
compress space.  Not only can individuals undertake communication (even conducting 
business and other endeavors) over thousands of miles under a breakdown of many of the 
restrictions imposed by physical distance, they can do so nearly instantaneously.  
Individuals with high speed Internet access can chat with others across the world by text, 
speech, or video with little delay, accessing information and engaging in activities (such 
as telecommuting or taking online university courses) with the same benefits. 
Compression of mass results not from the Internet but from the use of 
computerized systems and the methods used for converting physical to digital 
information and storing it.  Libraries’ worth of digital information can fit onto removable 
storage media from about the size of a postage stamp to that of half a sandwich.251  This 
compression of physical mass to digital information (and further ability to often 
significantly compress digital information, especially for storing data or transmitting it 
over the Internet) coupled with increasing Internet speeds has resulted in an 
unprecedented capacity for accessing and sharing information, legally or otherwise.  For 
instance, in 2009 the United States became aware of the downloading of several terabytes 
of information on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) by what appeared to be Chinese 
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“hackers.”252  In the past, such attempts at espionage would require physically infiltrating 
an adversary’s government or defense industry to physically extract lesser but physically 
bulkier amounts of information—an endeavor carrying higher risk, likely with less payoff 
in terms of the amount of information able to be acquired. 
 Thinking of the Internet, instead of cyber space, and its ability to compress space, 
time, and mass in many important ways offers a significant first step to understanding 
and examining cyber relations between state and non-state actors.  However, in addition 
to this hopefully more accurate understanding of the Internet (that is, cyber space), 
international actors possess a variety of cyber capabilities and may engage in a variety of 
cyber activities that can be used against one another towards various ends.  These 
capabilities and activities might be broken down into different categories of behavior, 
realizing, however, that these categories are by no means definitive, fixed, or free from 
overlap or contestation. 
The purpose of engaging in the categorization of cyber activities serves only to 
enhance discussion in the most basic of ways.  For instance, while either physically 
spying on or physically attacking an other might both be seen as adversarial or as doing 
some sort of violence to the other (violence in a broader sense than solely physical harm), 
a doubtless difference between these two activities exists.  This study’s attempt at a 
categorization of cyber behaviors (if the term categorization here even best fits this 
proposition) only seeks to illuminate some of these differences.  The potential types of 
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cyber behavior or activities include cyber crime, cyber hacktivism, cyber warfare, and 
cyber espionage.253  Each type of activity bears its own distinctions and each may be used 
by the realm of international actors against others and may be directed at government, 
military, or civilian sectors of society. 
Cyber Crime 
Cyber crime refers primarily to illegal activities undertaken for financial gain over the 
Internet.  When it comes to those that undertake this sort of behavior, they are not 
“hackers,” a too poorly understood and misused term, but cyber criminals.  As Clarke 
notes, “Originally ‘hacker’ meant just somebody who could write instructions in the code 
that is the language of computers to get them to do new things.  When they do something 
like going where they are not authorized, hackers become cyber criminals.  When they 
work for the U.S. military, we call them cyber warriors.”254  Cyber criminals increasingly 
proliferate throughout the Internet. 
A number of various activities might be included under the heading of cyber 
crime, from attempts to compromise individuals’ financial information through phishing 
attempts—the online tactic, often through email, used to acquire individuals’ account 
information by impersonating a trustworthy individual or institution—or security 
exploits, through scams directed at tricking unsuspecting individuals into transferring 
sums of money to the cyber criminals, and even through economic espionage directed at 
                                                
253 These categories follow those of Jeffrey Carr, though with the addition of cyber 
hacktivism. 
 
254 Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, 72.  Further on this point, many computer 
programmers, network specialists, and others opposed to illegal cyber activities call or 
consider themselves “hackers.” 
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intellectual property theft or gaining intelligence related to business negotiations and 
contracts.  As the goal of cyber crime is to either steal money or gain favorable business 
or economic advantages, cyber criminals typically do not undertake attacks aimed at 
causing a denial or disruption of the services or cyber capabilities of others.  Instead, 
cyber criminals make use of security exploits or human gullibility in order to gain the 
information or access needed to achieve their goals.  Thus, the heading cyber criminals 
can include individuals, groups, and businesses.255  However, even though other sorts of 
behavior, such as participating in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, might 
break laws within or across state borders, discrepancies of purpose and intent 
differentiate this sort of behavior, what might in some cases might be called cyber 
hacktivism, from cyber crime.256 
Cyber Hacktivism 
Cyber hacktivism blurs the boundary with (and might be considered a form of) cyber 
crime.  Though activities undertaken by hacktivists are often illegal, such as partaking in 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or defacing websites through the use of 
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occur within. 
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security exploits or remote access, these activities are, however, often undertaken for 
political purposes rather than financial gain, thus presenting a distinction between cyber 
crime and hacktivism.  When these activities are not undertaken for such purposes and 
are instead engaged in as a form of challenge or entertainment, the behavior then 
represents little more than simple crime (albeit of a more innocuous nature compared to 
other forms of cyber crime).  A 2013 Congressional Research Service report, distorting 
this important distinction, defines “cyberhacktivists” as “individuals who perform 
cyberattacks for pleasure, or for philosophical or other nonmonetary reasons.”257  This 
definition might characterize a large number of “hackers,” but the term hacktivist, 
composite of both hackers and activists, implies behavior for some purpose. 
Hacktivists themselves often exist as groups of individuals seeking to promote 
specific social or political causes.  Consider the attacks undertaken by the group 
Anonymous against the Department of Justice (DoJ), Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and others after New 
Zealand law enforcement agencies took down the file-storage and sharing website 
Megaupload, and the attacks taken against MasterCard, Visa, and PayPal in support of 
WikiLeaks and Julian Assange.258  While different types of DDoS attacks exist, these 
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specific attacks used brute force to overload the systems and bandwidth of the targeted 
websites.  This type of brute force DDoS attack makes use of hundreds or thousands of 
willing participants or compromised computer systems—part of what is commonly 
referred to as a botnet—to essentially make numerous and repeated web requests to the 
target in order to consume its bandwidth and thus block legitimate internet requests—and 
thus normal internet users—from accessing the targeted website or system. 
Sometimes likened to numerous individuals simultaneously and repeatedly hitting 
their Internet browsers’ refresh button for a given webpage, a parallel that may clarify 
how a DDoS attack works might be the front door to an individual’s home.  Imagine 
thousands of strangers knocking on an individual’s door, asking to be let in, and that the 
homeowner must respond to each of these requests.  Likewise, the individual frequently 
host visitors to their home and these visitors attempt to visit amidst all of the strangers.  
All of the traffic to the homeowner’s door will strain his ability to respond to the various 
requests for entrance, not to mention his ability to single out and respond to legitimate 
requests from legitimate visitors.  At some point, the homeowner might simply stop 
responding to any and all requests. 
While this is but one type of cyber attack, and but one form of cyber hacktivism, 
this attack method has often been used to successfully disrupt the services and systems of 
those targeted.259  However, this disruptive capability proves more of a nuisance than 
much more.  While service to targeted websites or other systems might be temporarily 
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disrupted, methods to stymie the attacks are typically undertaken quickly, or the interest 
of the attackers often wanes to the point where service once again continues as normal.  
While not inconceivable that such attacks might be used as part of a cyber warfare 
strategy to disrupt certain services of an adversary, such as the DDoS attacks against 
Georgian government and other websites during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, intent 
differs as hacktivists seek to make a political or social statement more akin to protest 
rather than complement a broader warfare strategy.260 
Cyber Warfare 
Cyber warfare presents another type of cyber behavior, though it remains perhaps the 
most ill defined of those discussed within this study.  Most official U.S. government 
documents dealing with cyber space (such as the U.S. 2011 International Strategy for 
Cyberspace and the 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace) 
do not speak in terms of cyber warfare so much as cyber security, cyber threats, and 
cyber attacks.  The U.S. government does, however, treat cyber “space” as a new domain 
of war fighting.  While this study argues that cyber “space” does not present a new 
domain of warfare, instead facilitating war fighting in other domains, it does make sense 
to speak in terms of cyber warfare as a type of behavior or tactic differentiated from other 
types of cyber activities. 
A tendency among the media and policymakers to treat cyber warfare in an 
indeterminate way further complicates understanding this concept.  The consensus that 
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does exist seems to agree that cyber warfare is undertaken largely by state or state 
sponsored actors to achieve their strategic objectives or complement other forms of 
warfare.  However, actors participating in cyber warfare do not necessarily need to be 
states or state sponsored.  Cyber terrorists can also undertake cyber attacks against their 
enemies to further their own objectives.  The commonality shared between these various 
types of actors and cyber warfare is engagement in cyber attacks directed towards 
harming an adversaries computer or network systems and infrastructure, disrupting 
society, or preventing their ability to engage in warfare themselves.  This includes cyber 
activities undertaken towards effecting these sorts of outcomes at a later point in time, 
sabotaging or compromising computer systems now to provide access or execute certain 
actions in the future.  Examples of this sort of behavior include the planting of logic 
bombs—computer code set to execute when specific future conditions are met—or 
ensuring remote access can still be attained at a later date.  Computer hardware itself is 
also a concern with regard to this sort of behavior, as hardware might be altered or 
tampered with during production, transit, or otherwise for these same ends.  Thus the 
concern over the use of foreign manufactured hardware by the U.S. government and U.S. 
military. 
Cyber Espionage 
While often conflated, there is no doubt that just as a distinction exists between physical 
warfare and physical espionage a distinction exists between cyber warfare and cyber 
espionage.  All countries engage in espionage against enemies, competitors, and even 
allies.  Like advanced communications systems, the Internet facilitates espionage by 
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allowing for the ability to access and transmit massive amounts of information with little 
personal risk compared with the challenges and restrictions faced in the realm of physical 
espionage.  Not only does the Internet compress space, time, and mass, it also offers a 
high level of anonymity.  According to the U.S. Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), “Cyberspace is a unique complement to the 
espionage environment because it provides foreign collectors with relative anonymity, 
facilitates the transfer of a vast amount of information, and makes it more difficult for 
victims and governments to assign blame by masking geographic locations.”261  For 
victims of cyber espionage, this means facing the difficulties presented by the attribution 
problem, the difficulty of accurately identifying the source of cyber espionage and other 
cyber activities due to the very nature of the Internet and the ability of individuals to 
obfuscate their identities by conducting their activities from nearly anywhere in the world 
while also routing their internet traffic through various locales.  For cyber spies, this 
means both a reduction in risk and consequences. 
Thinking of Cyber Space: The Deterrence or Intelligence Parallel? 
Before turning to U.S. and Chinese narratives and identities related to “cyber space,” this 
space itself deserves greater contemplation.  Many are apt to liken cyber space and the 
threats posed therein to the Cold War, pointing to the need for a deterrence strategy to 
deal with cyber threats, hearkening to the nuclear deterrence strategy of the major powers 
during that period.  However, depending upon the sort of cyber behavior analyzed and 
whether cyber attacks accompany a broader warfare strategy, deterrence proves an ill-
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fitting strategy and the Cold War an ill-fitting parallel.  The reasons for this are, at least, 
twofold: the fact that much state linked cyber activity falls under the domain of espionage 
and the fact that attribution of activities in cyber space often proves highly difficult.  The 
Internet offers the ability for actors to undertake espionage, attacks, and other forms of 
malicious cyber behavior from virtually anywhere they have access to a computer and an 
Internet connection.  This, combined with the ability of attackers to employ mechanisms 
to spoof or obfuscate their identity, routing their Internet traffic through various sorts of 
proxies, makes it difficult to determine both an attack’s origins and who to hold 
responsible.  An inability to know the perpetrator of an attack undermines deterrence. 
 Rather than thinking of cyber “space” and cyber warfare in terms of the Cold War 
or along the lines of deterrence, this study argues that the realm of intelligence offers a 
more fitting parallel.  Those concerned might even consider establishing a new domain of 
intelligence, cyber intelligence (CYINT), rather than a new domain of warfare.  
Intelligence represents practices aimed at the collection and analysis of information as 
well as covert operations, both activities directed towards identifying threats posed by 
other international actors and influencing actors to adopt policies or behave in ways that 
promote one’s own security and prosperity.  States and other international actors typically 
undertake such activities clandestinely, seeking to at least maintain the prospect of 
plausible deniability when it comes to intelligence collection and covert operations.  
While no parallel will match perfectly, these same aspects are present in cyber “space.”  
One of the most prevalent cyber activities engaged in by states falls under the practice of 
intelligence itself: espionage.  When cyber espionage is detected, such as Titan Rain in 
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2002 (discussed later), the nature of the Internet and the problem of attribution offer 
plausible deniability.  While the U.S. government attributes Titan Rain to the Chinese 
government, publicly available information offers little in the way of a definitive 
conclusion. 
Likewise, cyber operations share much similarity with covert intelligence 
operations.  Take, for instance, the U.S. and Israeli use of the Stuxnet virus to attack 
Iran’s nuclear facilities, specifically the centrifuges used at those facilities in the process 
of Uranium enrichment.  Though officials have supposedly taken credit for this attack off 
the record, the U.S. and Israel have not officially taken credit for this operation, 
maintaining plausible deniability.262  Moreover, the attack itself was not undertaken as 
part of a broader warfare strategy, but in a clandestine or covert way to, apparently, 
promote the overall strategic goals and security of both the U.S. and Israel.  Rather than 
reflecting an act of cyber war, Stuxnet represents a covert cyber intelligence operation.  
Observers might question the fit of the intelligence parallel when it comes to the use of 
cyber capabilities during warfare, but in times of war intelligence agencies are typically 
involved in paramilitary capacities.263  In warfare, as intelligence becomes part of serving 
a broader warfare strategy, so too does cyber intelligence (CYINT).  To better understand 
the poor fit between deterrence and Cold War parallels to cyber “space” and the 
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alternative of thinking of cyber “space” in terms of intelligence, both will be explored.  
Doing so will aid the following discussion of U.S.-China relations in cyber “space.” 
Many physical assets and critical infrastructure rely on cyber capabilities: power 
grids, communication systems, banking and financial transaction systems, and so on.  
Fear exists that a successful cyber attack targeting critical infrastructure holds the 
potential to cripple a targeted state, or at least cripple certain aspects of it, potentially 
with little to no early warning.  This may happen with no or little loss of life, but not 
necessarily.  If an attacker targeted the U.S. electrical grid in part of the country 
experiencing a severe snowstorm many might die as a result.  Illustrating the ability of 
hackers to inflict this sort of physical harm, in an experiment code-named Aurora the 
U.S. government set up a lab in Idaho connecting a power generator to a standard control 
network.  Government hackers then succeeded in their attempt to penetrate the control 
system from the Internet and access the program for altering the generator’s rotational 
speed, coming only keystrokes away from causing the generator to fail and incur physical 
damage.  Worse yet, such generators are basically made to order.  According to Clarke 
and Knake, “They are not sitting around, waiting to be sold.  If a big generator is badly 
damaged or destroyed, it is unlikely to be replaced for months.”264  Much of the same 
concerns hold if an attacker targeted U.S. water systems or other critical infrastructure.  
Undertaking cyber attacks against the U.S. financial industry might even result in societal 
disruption, riots, and potential loss of life. 
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These possibilities and scenarios have gained growing attention over recent years.  
Fear exists that these potential threats may become a reality.  While these possibilities 
might certainly accompany the warfare strategies of any parties involved in a direct 
armed conflict, a fear seems to exist that states and nonstate actors might be more likely 
to engage in such attacks for their own sake, not accompanied by broader warfare, to 
promote their own interests, owing to the uncertainty afforded by the attribution problem.  
That is, fear exists that international actors might be willing to engage in cyber operations 
that might severely disrupt various aspects of their adversaries’ public and private sectors 
thanks to the cloak of anonymity and deniability offered by the Internet.  The response by 
the United States has been to classify cyber “space” as a new domain of warfare 
alongside air, land, sea, and space and to attempt to apply the notion of deterrence to this 
“space.”  The applicability of the Cold War and deterrence to cyber “space” are 
interesting issues. 
Attempts to overlay deterrence and the Cold War onto cyber “space” are apparent 
throughout the U.S. government and society.  As stated by Singer and Shachtman, 
“Again and again in policy circles, cyber-security’s dynamics, threats, and responses are 
consistently compared to the technology of nuclear weapons and the standoff between the 
United States and Soviet Union.  Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, for 
instance, describes the Cold War and cybersecurity as ‘eerily similar,’ while journalist 
David Ignatius summed up his meetings with top Pentagon officials in a 2010 article 
titled ‘Cold War Feelings on Cybersecurity’” and that “Even network security firm 
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McAfee is susceptible to such talk.”265  The U.S. Department of Defense speaks of 
treating cyber “space” as one of its operational domains, in addition to air, land, sea, and 
space, in the public version of its Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace, supposedly announcing its doctrine of “equivalence,” treating cyber space 
equivalent to other domains of warfare while justifying responses to potential cyber 
attacks with responses in these other domains, in a classified version of this report.266  
The DOD goes further in explicitly discussing deterrence and reserving the right to 
respond to hostile acts in cyber space as it would any other traditional threats to the 
United States in a 2011 policy report to Congress.267  The 2011 White House 
International Strategy for Cyberspace promotes this same cyber “space” policy, noting 
that “We reserve the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, 
in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.”268 
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As discussed earlier, there are problems in conceptualizing cyber “space” as a 
new domain of warfare rather than a facilitator of activities and relations in other 
domains.  Just as a guided missile might facilitate destroying an adversary’s nuclear 
facilities, lines of malicious computer code might cause physical damage to the 
centrifuges used at those facilities, yet analysts do not speak of guided missiles as a 
domain of warfare, they facilitate warfare in other domains.  Thus, observers should not 
speak of cyber warfare as a domain of warfare, as endorsed by official U.S. narratives, 
but simply as a type of cyber behavior. 
On the similarities between the Cold War and the current state of cyber affairs, 
two lines of thought appear to underlie the reasoning behind this parallel.  First, though 
the U.S. faces numerous cyber threats and attempts to probe and penetrate its systems 
from various state and nonstate actors every day, the threats posed by China receive 
primary attention among public officials and coverage by U.S. media sources.  Even 
though official U.S. reports typically refrain from specifically identifying China or other 
nations as cyber threats, as Lieberthal and Singer note, “While it did not specify any 
individual nation, the Pentagon Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace was clearly keyed 
to China as among the many threats it foresaw in this realm.  It sought to lay out an 
explicit cyber deterrence doctrine clearly targeting state actors, including leaving open 
the option for escalation to traditional military means in the physical realm if the U.S. 
ever felt it suffered too dearly in the cyber realm.”269  The second reason is the very focus 
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on deterrence itself and its application to cyber “space,” invariably conjuring notions of 
Cold War nuclear deterrence. 
To begin, concern surrounding China’s rise primarily fuels the parallel drawn 
between the Cold War and cyber “space.”  This concern extenuates from U.S. views of 
China as a potential strategic competitor.  Though Russia, for instance, rivals U.S. cyber 
capabilities and has the potential to pose a greater cyber threat to the United States than 
China according to U.S. intelligence officials, the threat posed by China receives more 
attention.270  Part of this may be due to the fact that China’s attempts at cyber espionage 
or attacks are easier to detect than those of Russia, thus they gain more attention.  
However, a more probable account involves a combination of this explanation with 
contemporary concern over China in U.S. foreign policy.  This is seen not only in 
concern over the cyber threat posed by China but by the general concern over China’s 
rise within the U.S. government and society, especially in terms of the U.S. economy.  
U.S. elected officials, such as Representatives Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger 
(among others) have, for example, raised concern over China waging a trade war against 
the United States, conducting intellectual property theft through cyber “attacks,” 
including theft of critical defense information.271  While most official reports refrain from 
identifying specific states as cyber threats, a 2011 ONCIX report does note that much 
cyber espionage activity appears to originate from China, that China views itself as a 
strategic competitor to the United States, and that China engages in economic and 
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technological espionage against the United States as part of its strategy of catching up to 
and surpassing the U.S.272 
Second, the focus on deterrence feeds into this “Cold War feeling” on cyber 
“space.”  Not only do many in the U.S. fixate on China as a potential threat—leaving 
aside to what degree this fixation is founded—this potential threat possesses 
capabilities—cyber and otherwise—that pose a real and apparently severe threat to the 
United States that must be matched and deterred—leaving aside whether such threats are 
over-exaggerated.  However, this parallel only holds to the extent that this narrative 
presents an accurate depiction of the current state of affairs with regard to U.S.-China 
relations and cyber “space.”   
One of the greatest problems with the Cold War and deterrence parallel to cyber 
“space” is that the biggest threat posed is not cyber warfare but cyber crime and 
espionage.  Singer and Shachtman put it quite well when they state: 
Massive, simultaneous, all-encompassing cyberattacks on the power grid, the 
banking system, transportation networks, etc. along the lines of a Cold War first 
strike or what Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has called the “next Pearl Harbor” 
(another overused and ill-suited analogy) would certainly have major 
consequences, but they also remain completely theoretical, and the nation would 
recover.  In the meantime, a real national security danger is being ignored: the 
combination of online crime and espionage that’s gradually undermining our 
finances, our know-how, and our entrepreneurial edge.  While would-be cyber 
Cold Warriors stare at the sky and wait for it to fall, they’re getting their wallets 
stolen and their offices robbed.273 
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As these authors note, the cyber attacks seen thus far, like the 2007 Russian cyber attacks 
on Estonia and cyber attacks accompanying physical attacks during the Russia-Georgia 
War in 2008, have been of little real consequence, taking government and similar 
websites down for a period of time, acting as more of a nuisance than major security or 
societal concern.  However, Clarke notes that the Russians showed much restraint in 
these cases, probably saving their best capabilities for the United States or other 
adversaries.  The world has also seen one of the foremost cyber powers, the U.S., show 
restraint in refraining from using cyber warfare as part of its overall warfare strategy 
during both of its wars with Iraq and in its involvement in Libya for fear of unintended 
consequences, such as accidentally affecting networks and systems more widespread than 
those targeted, and for fear of the precedent it might set.274  Even so, while cyber tactics 
might be used during times of conflict or war to actually do much more damage than the 
cyber attacks the world has so far witnessed, the same ends could be achieved by other 
means. 
In warfare, targeting civil infrastructure with either cyber attacks or conventional 
kinetic weapons may cause similar disruptions to the targeted country, albeit with more 
physical destruction and the potential for longer-term effects expectedly accompanying 
the use of kinetic weapons.  Any state considering such attacks would likely entertain a 
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similar calculus in deciding whether or not to undertake a cyber or physical attack to 
cripple their adversary’s critical infrastructure as part of a broader warfare strategy, as 
plausible deniability would certainly erode during a time of actual conflict.  Cyber attacks 
may offer advantages in reducing the attacker’s risks and the costs associated with an 
attack, but little else.  During times of relative peace, states are unlikely (but not unable) 
to engage in such attacks against one another, even with the levels of anonymity offered 
by the Internet and the attribution problem.  Traditional deterrence and the prospect of 
uncertainty when it comes hiding behind the veil of the attribution problem should 
dissuade many states from engaging in large-scale cyber attacks against one another.  
Thus, deterrence need not be applied anew to cyber “space” or reformulated to cater to 
cyber attacks and cyber warfare (cyber attacks engaged in by terrorists and other 
criminals, on the other hand, prove a more significant challenge).275 
In its 2011 report to Congress on cyber space, the Department of Defense stated, 
“Deterrence in cyberspace, as with other domains, relies on two principal mechanisms: 
denying an adversary’s objectives and, if necessary, imposing costs on an adversary for 
aggression.”276  As Lieberthal and Singer noted, in its Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace the Pentagon sought to outline a deterrence strategy allowing for escalation 
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to the use of traditional military forces in response to cyber attacks.277  These sorts of 
approaches to dealing with cyber space come despite remarks by those such as former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III that “Cold War deterrence models of 
assured retaliation do not apply to cyberspace, where it is difficult and time consuming to 
identify an attack’s perpetrator” going on to argue the need to focus more on denying any 
benefits to an attacker rather than focusing on imposing retaliatory costs.278  Assured 
retaliation definitely faces fundamental problems due to the attribution problem.  
However, focusing on denying benefits to potential attackers will also likely do little to 
deter malicious cyber behavior.  While it is in the interests of the U.S. and others to 
mitigate the benefit of cyber attacks and espionage to would be attackers, doing so will 
not deter those with malicious intent from probing the networks of their adversaries, 
searching for exploits, and seeking out vulnerabilities since denying benefits does not 
impose any sort of increased costs for this behavior and thus does not function in the way 
of deterrence as traditionally understood.  Governments certainly pursue strategies to 
minimize the effects of more traditional espionage, for instance, but this does not deter 
other governments from engaging in espionage.  Moreover, thinking of deterrence in this 
way creates a slippage of sorts between cyber warfare and an emphasis on cyber attacks 
and cyber espionage. 
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The greatest threat facing the U.S. and other countries is cyber espionage.279  
Cyber espionage falls under the practice of intelligence and calls for broader thinking 
than solely in terms of deterrence to understand this threat and how to respond to it.  With 
cyber intelligence, the retaliatory aspect of deterrence offers little benefit during times of 
relative peace due to the attribution problem and a lack of plausible retaliatory measures 
in response to acts of espionage.  The denying benefit aspect of deterrence alone might 
prove beneficial to some extent but is not full proof.  Regardless of actions taken to 
protect computer networks and information, this sort of defensive behavior, while 
worthwhile, will not put an end to or deter cyber espionage and other threats.  Often 
vulnerabilities and threats only receive awareness and attention after they have been used 
or exploited.  Thus, states and nonstate actors can engage in the use of zero-day 
exploits—new security exploits that have yet to be used or discovered by others—when 
available in order to achieve their goals.  Also, with the low-risk associated with cyber 
espionage, the benefits of attempting to engage in this practice will persist. 
 In order to overcome more of the threat posed by cyber espionage states, 
businesses, and other groups need to work together to share information on espionage, 
attacks, security exploits, and vulnerabilities (rather than keeping such information to 
themselves out of a concern for their image) as well as promote international cooperation 
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on sharing cyber forensic information related to acts of cyber espionage or to cyber 
attacks.  International cooperation would aid in attempting to overcome the attribution 
problem.  Since malicious cyber actors often route their Internet traffic through various 
countries, cooperation is needed to access the various system log files necessary to trace 
malicious cyber behavior as close to its origin as possible.  Further, states and other 
actors should engage in denying benefits of cyber espionage to their adversaries and 
engage in cyber counterintelligence operations to mitigate the threats they face.  
Attempting to do so, however, requires not a deterrence strategy but one focused on 
international cooperation, law enforcement, and the practices of intelligence and 
counterintelligence.  Cyber space presents not a realm of deterrence but a realm of 
intelligence and only has a “Cold War feeling” in rhetoric.  As discussed below, though 
many comment upon the Cold War character of cyber space due to the apparent nature of 
relations between the United States and China, both sides do attempt to mitigate such 
concerns out of respect for their relations in other areas. 
U.S.-China Relations in Cyber Space: From Reality to Virtual Reality 
 
The relations between China and the United States in cyber “space” reflect the prevalent 
mistrust generally found between both countries.  This mistrust leads Beijing and 
Washington to engage in practices that largely cast the identity of cyber space as a realm 
of competition in terms of national and economic security and increasingly define one 
another in an adversarial way.  While some take this to imply a current or developing 
“Cold War” relationship with regard to cyber “space” or general U.S.-China relations, 
such thinking ignores the fact that both sides also attempt to mitigate the adversarial 
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aspects of their relations in cyber “space” and elsewhere.  Take, for instance, that during 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent visit to Beijing (April 2013) both the U.S. and 
China agreed to set up cyber security working group to promote trust and cooperation 
between the two countries.280  Though still too early to tell what sort of effect this 
agreement will have, it indicates a more complex, nuanced relationship than simply a 
“Cold War” style relationship implies.  Moreover, thinking of U.S.-China cyber relations 
akin to the Cold War inflates the perception of cyber threats and creates a sense of need 
for a cyber deterrence strategy even though espionage currently poses the greatest cyber 
threat to either side, a threat for which deterrence offers little remedy. 
In their cyber relations, China and the United states engage in representational 
practices and adopt narratives that define the identity of cyber “space,” of each other, and 
of themselves.  Their relations in cyber “space” demonstrate the mixed identity of cyber 
space and of both actors.  Though often conflated with other cyber threats, cyber 
espionage presents the most salient and controversial issue facing the United States and 
China with regard to cyber “space.”  In particular, the United States worries about 
Chinese technological and business espionage.  It is more difficult to ascertain China’s 
specific concerns regarding cyber espionage but as the U.S. holds a technological and 
economic advantage, Beijing’s concerns most likely relate more to U.S. dominance in 
cyber space, general intelligence collection and, not trivially, their international image 
with respect to accusations of Chinese “hacking.”  Where these concerns receive most 
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attention is in the media outlets of both countries, which then increases the need for both 
sides to respond to publicized cyber threats or the accusations of the other. 
 The conflation of concern over cyber espionage with other forms of cyber threats 
and the frequent exaggeration of these threats plays into the Cold War identity of cyber 
“space,” despite the high levels of economic cooperation enjoyed by both Beijing and 
Washington and other key differences in their overall relations in both the real and cyber 
worlds.  The narratives adopted by both sides serve to increasingly depict one another 
and U.S.-China relations competitively, though amidst attempts made to refrain from 
explicitly doing so.281  Both sides are essentially defining the identity of cyber “space” 
and one another while they engage in these practices.  However, these definitions are 
anything but definite and unambiguous.  While the U.S. and China are forming an 
adversarial identity of cyber “space” in their relations with one another, the attempts by 
both sides to mitigate the contrarian aspects of their relationship in cyber “space” and 
elsewhere show that they are not Cold War adversaries competing in a new Cold War 
(cyber) battle space.  Instead, despite their adversarial relations in cyber “space,” the 
relationship and identities are ever fluctuating and somewhat indeterminate, exhibiting 
somewhat of a dual nature, at least for the time being.  
 Many issues and incidents promote the adversarial identity of cyber “space” in 
U.S.-China relations.  Both sides increasingly focus on cyber “space” as it relates to their 
overall security and their ability to conduct cyber warfare.  In 2009, the United States 
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Department of Defense (DOD) went as far as to establish the very world’s first cyber 
command, CYBERCOM, to protect U.S. government and military computer networks 
from increasing cyber threats.  Overall, however, the U.S. appears to be “quietly” 
developing its cyber warfare capabilities, as they receive little public discussion aside 
from relatively restrained information on defensive policies.  This especially holds for 
U.S. development of offensive cyber capabilities.  China does publicly indicate some 
high level focus and attention on developing and training a preponderant cyber warfare 
force, hoping to leapfrog past the United States in terms of military technology instead of 
attempting match the United States’ far superior traditional military capabilities, 
especially when assessing cyber espionage undertaken against the United States.  As 
Susan Brenner states, China even “has already articulated plans for cyber warfare that 
involve using civilians and civilian entities in attacking foreign corporate and financial 
institutions.”282  While both sides undoubtedly plan and develop offensive cyber 
capabilities, the actual activities undertaken by both sides remain primarily defined in 
terms of cyber intelligence and espionage.  However, focus on cyber warfare—defense 
and offense—by both sides has a militarizing effect on the identity of cyber “space” in 
international politics. 
U.S. Perspective of U.S.-China relations in Cyber Space 
U.S. decisions to pay increasing attention to cyber space come largely due to the many 
cases of cyber espionage that the government and civil society have experienced over 
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recent years, often reportedly originating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).283  
The U.S. government claims that its networks are “probed thousands of times and 
scanned millions of times” every day.284  “Titan Rain,” for instance, offers one example 
of what the United States faces: “‘Titan Rain’ is the informal code name for ongoing acts 
of Chinese cyber espionage directed against the U.S. Department of Defense since 2002.  
According to Lieutenant General William Lord, the Air Force’s Chief of Warfighting 
Integration and Chief Information Officer, ‘China has downloaded 10 to 20 terabytes of 
data from the NIPRNet (the DOD’s Non-Classified IP Router Network).’”285  It is also 
believed that China was behind the downloading of information related to the Joint Strike 
fighter, that China has targeted members of the defense industry, that China recently 
targeted major U.S. newspapers, and that China has even targeted the Internet search 
giant Google.  In January 2010, Google experienced cyber “attacks” apparently 
originating from within China, “aimed, at least in part, at the Gmail user accounts of 
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Chinese human rights activists.”286  During June of 2011 Google again experienced 
“attacks” originating from China, with strong suspicions of links to the Chinese 
government, Google claiming it had been the target of a “cyberspying” campaign.287  
China refuted these claims, though suspicion of the Chinese government is explicitly 
reflected in a Beijing embassy cable, classified Secret, from 2010 released by WikiLeaks.  
The cable states that the nephew of a Politburo Standing Committee member informed 
his contact that the Google attacks were coordinated out of the State Council information 
office with oversight by Standing Committee members.288 
Recently, the computer security firm Mandiant even released a report providing 
strong (but still not entirely conclusive) evidence linking the Chinese military, 
specifically Unit 61398 in Shanghai, to “hacking” aimed at the United States.289  
Mandiant reports that this unit has stolen hundreds of terabytes of information from at 
least 141 different organizations throughout the world.  These different cases demonstrate 
the cyber espionage threat faced by the United States and reasoning behind increasing 
concern over cyber “space” within Washington. 
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For U.S.-China relations regarding cyber space, the United States adopts a 
narrative asserting its own identity as a victim at the hands of Chinese cyber attacks and 
belligerence.  The U.S. has also asserted a correlation between cyber space, deterrence, 
and the Cold War.  As such, the U.S. expresses the need and has taken action to define 
the identity of cyber “space” in terms of recognized domains of warfare, not only 
defining the identity of cyber space, but defining its own role in establishing this identity 
and the rules (informal as they may be) governing this domain.  Even if arguably 
inaccurate or misguided, identifying cyber space as a domain of warfare serves to 
strengthen U.S. power and influence with regard to this space.  Doing so also projects 
onto China the identity of a, to some degree, belligerent adversary while casting the U.S.-
China relationship, at least in cyber space, in light of Cold War sentiments and views of 
international politics. 
Chinese Perspective of U.S.-China relations in Cyber Space 
In response to claims by U.S. government officials and private businesses that they are 
the victim of Chinese “hacking,” Beijing asserts that China itself is one of the world’s 
foremost “hacking” victims and that they oppose all forms of hacking and cyber 
warfare.290  Responding to the specific claims made by Mandiant, Chinese Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Hong Lei stated that the allegations were groundless, asserted 
China’s opposition to hacking, and reported that, according to China’s National 
Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Coordination Center, “73,000 
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foreign IP addresses had been linked to attacks on 14 million Chinese computers.”291  
During the first two months of 2013, China’s Xinhua claimed that more than half of the 
attacks China experienced came from the U.S.292  Some in China attribute claims of 
Chinese hacking to political and commercial interests within the U.S. as well as the need 
for an enemy in order to justify building a strong cyber military force.  Many also point to 
the significance of the attribution problem facing U.S. claims of Chinese hacking.293  
More pointedly, China often argues that U.S. claims of Chinese hacking are simply part 
of the U.S. China threat theory.294 
 In addition to China’s unwavering denial of culpability in the face of U.S. and 
worldwide claims of Chinese hacking and China’s own statements that it faces numerous 
hacking attempts itself, Beijing also argues that the U.S. adopts a narrative identifying 
itself as the victim when it comes to “hacking” claims in order to serve its own purposes.  
Specifically, officials and academics in China argue that U.S. accusations represent 
hegemonic practices and a hidden purpose to reinforce and support the United States’ 
desires to build its cyber security forces, wage cyber warfare, and contain the China 
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threat.295  Assuming the role of cyber victim thus reinforces the need to pursue these 
desires.  Similar claims also seem to demonstrate fear of the United States pursuing a 
strategy to “spur the international community into drawing up rules for cyber warfare, in 
order to put a cloak of legality on its ‘preemptive strike’ strategy in cyber warfare.”296  As 
part of its response to these characterizations of U.S. behavior, China’s Foreign Ministry 
states that it supports working towards international rules and cooperation in cyber 
“space” while promoting openness and peace.297 
 China’s own narrative draws upon notions of openness and international 
cooperation in defining its own identity while defining the U.S. as little more than a self-
interested hegemon with designs on strengthening its own cyber capabilities and shaping 
international cyber laws in its favor.  Beijing implies the political nature of U.S. 
assertions of victimization with regard to cyber attacks, asserting China’s own 
victimization extenuating from U.S hegemonism and. cyber attacks. 
Intersection of Competing Identities 
It is interesting that China simultaneously criticizes the United States for claiming 
victimization in cyber space while Beijing declares its own victimization.  Beijing does 
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often point to its own victimization in international politics.  However, while the 
humiliation narrative—Beijing’s frequent remembrance of China’s historic abuse at the 
hands of Western powers and Japan, often rhetorically linked to present day issues—is 
often seen in Chinese rhetoric, claims of cyber victimization do not appear to be closely 
related to this narrative.  Instead, China’s claims of cyber victimization seem to stand 
more independently of the humiliation narrative and as a direct response to U.S. claims of 
victimization. 
 Also noteworthy, even though China voices its opposition to “hacking” and cyber 
warfare, those within the country do discuss the importance of cyber warfare to some 
extent.  In a 2012 article in China’s Jiefangjun Bao Online, Li and He discuss the 
importance of “the net” to modern combat operations and the importance of sabotaging 
the net in determining victors in combat.298  On the whole, however, relatively little 
public information exists on China’s cyber space policies or cyber warfare strategy.  
Beijing has not released any official reports on cyber space policy, as has the United 
States, and only the most recent of China’s defense white papers even mentions cyber 
space, devoting almost no attention to the subject.299 
 For its part, the United States indeed treats cyber “space” with increasing concern.  
In 2007, for example, Rex Hughes noted, “Since 2001, deep in the Pentagon, a small 
team of military visionaries has been quietly laying the ground work for the 
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transformation of cyber space into a premier warfighting domain.  The principal aim is to 
[establish] a military arena on a par with land, sea and air.”300  Since that time concern 
has only increased.  Regardless of whether cyber “space” represents a new domain of 
warfare, the treatment of this space as such essentially militarizes this space while the 
U.S. asserts its role as arbiter of cyber activity in international politics.  However, the 
U.S. does face significant threats in the form of espionage originating (to some 
indeterminable extent) from China.301  These threats serve to reinforce U.S. attempts to 
define cyber “space.”  According to President Obama during a recent interview, some 
cyber attacks originating from China are indeed state sponsored.302  During this 
interview, the President does note that a difference exists between cyber espionage, 
attacks, and a hot war.  Indicating the importance of cyber “space” to the U.S. 
government, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper also recently “told a Senate 
committee that cyber attacks and cyber espionage had supplanted terrorism as the top 
security threat facing the country” and that State Department officials report discussing 
hacking in almost every meeting they have with Chinese officials.303  The President has 
even reportedly raised the issue of cyber security directly with China’s new President, Xi 
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Jinping.304  In response to accusations of “hacking,” Chinese officials repeat the narrative 
that such claims are groundless, that China opposes hacking, and that China itself is a 
major target of global hacking, new Premier Li Keqiang being the highest ranking official 
to have apparently publicly commented on and refuted U.S. claims.305 
 The U.S. does seem to have legitimate concern over Chinese cyber espionage, 
directed at the government and at private businesses.  Whether malicious cyber activities 
originating from within China are state sponsored is difficult to determine, but the 2010 
Beijing Embassy cable released by WikiLeaks, the Mandiant report, and official public 
statements by President Obama offer strong evidence that some cases of Chinese 
“hacking” are indeed state sponsored.  However, it is also likely that China experiences 
cyber espionage at the hands of the United States government (and nonstate “hacking” 
originating from within the U.S.).  In this sense, both countries are victims to some 
extent, though both are also likely guilty of cyber espionage (or attacks).  On the other 
hand, how the U.S. and China respond to and interact with one another primarily serves 
their own interests, creating an increasingly adversarial and militarized cyber “space.” 
In addition to the importance of cyber espionage and attacks, the U.S. narrative 
regarding cyber “space” also emphasizes the importance of Internet freedom.  For 
example, in remarks made during 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton levied strong 
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condemnation at the practice of Internet censorship in general.306  This position 
fundamentally rests on U.S. liberal ideals and notions of personal freedom and 
democracy.  China responded to Secretary Clinton’s remarks with refutations and 
criticism of their own while also censoring her remarks and discussion of them on 
China’s Internet.  This reflects another aspect of the interaction of identities related to 
cyber space and both the U.S. and China.  U.S. desires to promote a free and open 
Internet stand at odds with China’s repressive Internet censorship.  As Beijing censored 
Secretary Clinton’s remarks and discussion of Internet freedom, they also often censor 
other sensitive issues, from the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident to the Bo Xilai scandal 
and general criticism of the Chinese Communist Party.  These actions stand opposite the 
Chinese narrative supportive of a free and open Internet.  The U.S., on the other hand, 
adopts the role of moral authority on the issue of Internet freedom.  This issue, however, 
is not currently as prominent as others in U.S.-China cyber relations.  Even so, it adds 
another aspect to understanding these relations and the identities of both parties. 
Moving Forward in a Connected World 
The growing importance of cyber space in international politics and specifically in U.S.-
China relations provides a novel area for assessing the identity of cyber space and the 
identities of these two countries.  While many journalistic, academic, and government 
accounts attempt to define cyber space as a new domain of warfare and focus on cyber 
attacks and the need for a deterrence strategy, these accounts often create a distorted 
depiction of this “space.”  Rather than presenting a new domain of warfare and realm 
                                                
306 U.S. Department of State, “Remark on Internet Freedom,” Remarks, Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, Secretary of State, Washington, DC, January 21, 2010. 
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where cyber attacks pose a significant threat, cyber “space,” while it facilitates warfare in 
other domains, is best thought of in terms of intelligence, where cyber espionage poses a 
far greater threat than cyber attacks, especially in inter-state relations. 
 Though fashionable, as of late, to liken the character of cyber “space” in U.S.-
China relations to the Cold War with a need for cyber deterrence, this parallel 
misrepresents important aspects of cyber “space” and relations between China and the 
United States.  First, this study demonstrated that deterrence would do little to impede 
attempts at cyber espionage.  Second, likening cyber “space” to the Cold War ignores the 
fact that both the U.S. and China attempt to ease tension within their cyber and other 
relations when possible in order to avoid an escalation of tension or harm other aspects of 
their relations with one another.  Even though Beijing and Washington are contributing to 
an increasingly adversarial and militarized cyber “space,” this is not the only aspect of 
this “space” or of U.S.-China relations.  The identities of cyber “space” and of both actors 
are much more complex.  Both sides proffer narratives attempting to exert authority over 
cyber “space” by pointing to their victimization at the hands of the other.  In response to 
the threats it faces, the U.S. in particular draws upon its power in strengthening its cyber 
capabilities and taking a leading role in establishing its own cyber “space” policies and 
attempting to, at present to a large extent unilaterally, define international cyber “space” 
policy.  However, both sides also, at least rhetorically, note the importance of and speak 
of the need for greater cyber cooperation.  As both countries remain highly economically 
dependent upon one another, it is likely that these desires represent more than mere 
rhetoric. 
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 The identities at play in U.S.-China relations in relation to cyber “space” in some 
ways depict the dual characters of both countries and their overall relationship: 
aggressors and victims, competition and cooperation, freedom and repression.  However, 
to define U.S.-China relations and cyber “space” in terms of some binary combination 
masks, to a degree, the fluctuation and nuance of the identities on which this study 
focuses.  Over recent years, U.S.-China relations in cyber space have become 
increasingly conflictual, motivating high level officials on both sides of the Pacific to 
engage in public criticism of the other.  Much of this tension in U.S.-China cyber 
relations seems the result of Chinese espionage, pursued towards the end of catching up 
to the U.S. militarily and economically.  But recently, growing tension with regard to and 
threats posed by cyber “space” have spurred both sides to consider increased cyber 
cooperation in order to reduce this tension and not adversarially affect other aspects of 
the relations between both countries. 
 For cooperation with regard to cyber “space” to be effective, both the U.S. and 
China need to work together with the international community to establish the norms, 
rules, and, eventually, laws governing cyber “space” and cyber behavior, particularly 
with regard to cyber espionage.  Unfortunately, the nature of the Internet and the 
attribution problem pose a significant challenge to cooperation, instead incentivizing 
cyber espionage (government, military, or economic) due to a reduction in risk and 
increase in potential rewards with cyber “space’s” compression of space, time, and mass 
and the anonymity afforded by the Internet.  Due to these reasons, cyber “space” 
exacerbates the problem of espionage many times over.  In addition to paying increased 
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attention to securing and defending their networks and computer systems, a logical place 
for the United States and China to begin seeking greater cooperation is with regard to 
economic espionage and the protection of intellectual property.  As China adamantly 
denies its involvement in state sponsored “hacking” in spite of strong evidence otherwise, 
working towards this sort of increased cooperation will either require a change in China’s 
public position or require efforts to reduce public criticism of China in order to work 
towards resolving issue more privately, allowing China to “save face” internationally 
and, perhaps more importantly, domestically. 
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VI 
 
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
 
 
Foreign affairs thus expands to encompass a range of sovereignty performances; 
it emerges in social activities where people continually divide friends from 
enemies, domestic from foreign, East from West, and patriots from traitors in 
everyday life, as well as in the halls of power. † 
 
–William A. Callahan 
 
 
Rather than dismissing it as some sort of abstraction, even distraction, as many security 
scholars do, this study has sought to demonstrate identity’s importance as an influential 
concept in understanding international politics.  The goal has not been to determine 
whether China’s rise is peaceful or even whether it threatens U.S. security interests.  The 
goal has not been to pass off a neutral, passive description of reality absent the realization 
and admission that those who conduct research studies are never truly disinterested 
observers.307  China and U.S. identities, as well as the cases examined within this study, 
did not simply lie in wait of attempts at greater understanding.  Social subjects, beyond 
the bilateral relationship of focus within these pages, elude simple attempts at 
understanding and hardly offer a straightforward explanations or findings in response to 
the queries observers pose and ponder. 
                                                
† William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010): 1. 
 
307 As are also of the concerns noted in Pan Chengxin, “The ‘China Threat’ in American 
Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 29, no. 3 (June/July 2004). 
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 Unlike traditional approaches to understanding, this study explored the interplay 
of identities in U.S.-China relations by examining each side’s relational conceptions of 
self and other to understand how these conceptions mutually influence identities and thus 
how these identities influence the nature of the U.S.-China relationship in international 
politics.  In doing so, focus was placed on the representations each country holds of both 
itself and the other, how these representations interact and influence one another, and on 
the related role of interests in this mix of politics and power.  Doing so required exploring 
the glimpses into the worldviews held by each side offered by the narratives they adopt, 
gleaning insights into their identities based on these views, based on their perceptions of 
important international issues, based on their reactions to such issues, and based on the 
interaction of these factors. 
 At the outset, noting the importance of China’s continued rise and the U.S. 
“pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, this study outlined its hopes of contributing to a basis for and 
demonstrate the value of examining identity as a fundamental concept in international 
politics by both exploring its theoretical principles and applying this approach towards 
developing a richer understanding of the nature of U.S.-China relations.  Doing so, a 
variety of cases have been analyzed, from U.S.-China relations bracketing the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States to the issues raised by the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute for U.S.-China relations to the somewhat recent 
emergence and impact of cyber issues on the relationship (as well as the impact of the 
U.S. “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region itself, most prominently signified by the joint 
U.S.-Australian agreements in November, 2011). 
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 While seeking to explore and understand the nature of U.S.-China relations and 
not simply the nature of China’s rise, this bias does obviously exist to some extent, and 
while this study seeks to inform policymakers in general, it likely does so more in terms 
of U.S. foreign policy and security interests.  At the most basic level, however, this study 
aims to at least illuminate important aspects and questions pertaining to U.S.-China 
relations and offer greater insight into and a fuller understanding of this relationship. 
As Gries explains, in relations between states observers often find attempts to 
either maintain or challenge the existing power hierarchy.308  In the recent decades of 
U.S.-China relations, claims of the “China threat” and attempts to contain China have 
gained widespread recognition.  Some strands of conventional international relations 
logic hold that as China’s rise continues, it becomes more of a strategic competitor and 
threat to U.S. power and security in the international system.  This may lead to increasing 
tension in bilateral relations between both countries and attempts by the United States to 
actually attempt to contain China’s rise.  Changes in great power dynamics might also 
cause shifts in the balancing behavior of other states in the Asia-Pacific region.  
However, understanding how and why this might be the case requires more than 
deferring to simple notions of selfish security interests and swings in material 
capabilities.  More so, the relationship and its future character depend on the multifaceted 
identities of the actors involved.  It seems plausible, then, to consider Gries’ prescription 
for states such as the U.S. and China to refrain from treating one another as enemies or in 
                                                
308 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 
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conflictual ways when possible, to avoid fueling confrontational nationalisms and 
undesirable self-fulfilling prophecies. 
 Ultimately, this study has identified the nature of the U.S.-China relationship as 
beset by chronic mistrust and fundamental differences, with varying levels of tension 
dependent upon dominant issues in international politics..  As Malik noted with regard to 
the effect of September 11 on U.S.-China relations, “Beneath the smiles and handshakes 
and talk of opening a new chapter in Sino-U.S. relations are the lurking fears of 
American encirclement and containment of China – a hot topic among Chinese strategists 
and foreign policy analysts.”309  In the U.S., concern over China’s rise does exist, 
especially with regard to any constraining influence China’s growth might have on U.S. 
interests in the Asia-Pacific or elsewhere, on U.S. economic security and growth, and in 
addition to concerns over issues such as Chinese human rights abuses.  Most importantly, 
however, are the ways in which both countries view each other and the behavior that 
these views stimulate.  Both sides hold the potential to construct a new reality and 
improve their relationship by paying heed not only to their representations of one another 
and their own assumptions about the other’s interests and identities, but also by 
consciously avoiding politicizing issues and identities in adversarial or conflictual ways 
in their dominant narratives. 
Prescriptions for Improved U.S.-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century 
Whether the importance of U.S.-China relations remain a matter of much concern moving 
into the future remains unforeseen.  Aside from and in addition to their relations with one 
                                                
309 Malik,  “Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses 
After 11 September,”  272. 
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another, both Beijing and Washington face a multitude of other pressing concerns and 
issues.  The United States, for instance, has yet to fully recover from the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GCF) or fully extract itself and recover from its interventions and 
commitments in the Middle East and Central Asia.  Terrorism, too, remains a perennial 
U.S. security concern.  These issues have the potential to divert U.S. attention away from 
its relationship with China or even adversely affect the United States’ status and 
operational capabilities as the world’s sole superpower as the twenty-first century 
advances.310 
 China faces issues as well, as its phenomenal economic growth has begun to 
experience a significant slowdown.  The country also faces problems ranging from its 
ageing population, lopsided gender ratio due to the “one child” policy (a policy China 
recently relaxed beginning in December, 2013), significant levels of environmental 
pollution, rising labor costs, a commercial and residential real estate bubble, separatist 
movements/sentiments within the mainland, and so on.  Any of these issues might 
significantly strain or derail China’s economic growth and continued rise in international 
politics.  Moreover, any threat to China’s economic growth also threatens the legitimacy 
of the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
 Facing these actual or potential concerns, working together, the U.S. and China 
have the potential to mitigate many of them through increased coopearation, especially in 
                                                
310 Some might argue that the United States is already suffering adverse and constricting 
effects on its freedom of action and operational capabilities due to the impact of the 
Global Financial Crisis and cost of its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, causing the 
U.S. reconsider its long ascribed to two major wars doctrine—the belief in the need for 
the U.S. to maintain the ability to fight two simultaneous large wars (a capability which 
may, in actually, never have truly existed in reality). 
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the realm of economics.  However, pursuing a mutually collaborative and cooperative 
rather than competitive or conflictual relationship requires important shifts in how each 
country views the other.  It requires new identities of the self an other and, of sorts, a new 
reality.  Overcoming the endemic mistrust in U.S.-China relations presents a difficult 
goal.  In order to effect lasting improvement in bilateral relations, Beijing and 
Washington must bridge the differences in their identities and views of one another and 
the perceptual gaps these identities and views often create.  Of course, much of this 
depends on whether each side can either resolve or overcome fundamental differences in 
salient aspects of their current identities, such as differences in their views and treatment 
of human rights concerns.  Improvement and change, however, need not be immediate.  
Small steps can lead to more profound future changes.  Many opportunities exist for both 
sides to attempt to improve relations with the other and construct not only a more 
cooperative bilateral relationship but, as two of the world’s greatest powers, a more 
cooperative world.
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